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This thesis consists of three inter-related chapters designed to study the e¤ects
of scal policy on unemployment, the distribution of income, and social welfare in
heterogeneous agent models incorporating unemployment. Each chapter employs
a di¤erent setup for unemployment in a general equilibrium framework. These
include models of equilibrium unemployment, right-to-manage union bargaining,
and search and matching.
Chapter 1 develops a model with equilibrium unemployment to study the
e¤ects of optimal taxation under commitment. Two models are explored: a
model with zero economic prots and a model with non-zero economic prots
due to the presence of productive public investment. We nd that the optimal
policy in these two models results in a di¤erent labour wedge which denes the
gap between the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption
and the marginal product of labour. In particular, the labour wedge can only be
completely eliminated when the prots are absent from the model. It is further
demonstrated that there exists a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity for the
government in the model with non-zero economic prots.
Chapter 2 examines the importance of imperfect competition in labour and
product markets in determining the welfare e¤ects of tax reforms assuming agent
heterogeneity in capital holdings. The analysis shows that each of these market
distortions, independently, results in welfare losses for at least one segment of the
population after a capital tax cut and a concurrent labour tax increase. However,
with both present in the model, the tax reform is Pareto improving in a realistic
calibration to the UK economy.
Chapter 3 extends a Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching framework
with household heterogeneity to investigate the importance of search frictions
in determining the welfare and distributional e¤ects of tax reforms which re-
allocate the tax burden from capital to labour income. The optimal tax policy
under commitment is also analysed. We nd that the tax reforms are Pareto
improving in the long run, despite welfare losses for at least one segment of the
population in the transition period. Finally, the long-run Ramsey policy implies
a negative capital tax which is associated with a rise in the labour tax and a fall
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This thesis is generally concerned with the relationship between scal policy and un-
employment in general equilibrium models populated by agents who di¤er in their
endowments. In each of the three chapters, a di¤erent setup for unemployment is used.
The purpose of this thesis is threefold. It rst aims to analyse optimal scal policy
under commitment by assuming that the government can choose di¤erent policy in-
struments under di¤erent assumptions about unemployment. Second, it examines the
importance of the combination of labour and product market failures in determining
the welfare e¤ects of tax reforms. Finally, it investigates the relevance of job search
frictions in determining the long- and short-run welfare e¤ects of tax reforms using a
search-and-matching framework. All the objectives contribute to the growing literature
on scal policy study in macroeconomics.
Chapter 1 studies the optimal design of steady-state taxation under commitment
in heterogeneous agent models with equilibrium unemployment. It particularly ex-
amines the e¤ects of optimal taxation on unemployment, the distribution of income,
and welfare of agents. It further examines the importance of the presence of economic
prots in determining the optimal taxation. In addition, this chapter evaluates the op-
timal labour wedge which captures the gap between the marginal rate of substitution
between labour and consumption, and the marginal product of labour. The labour
wedge is considered as an indicator of the labour market distortions.1
In Chapter 1 households are divided into capitalists and workers and the agent
heterogeneity lies in the working and saving propensities of households. Following
Judd (1985), Lansing (1999) and Ardagna (2007), we assume that only capitalists can
participate in the asset market and only workers can work. We then employ a simple
and tractable setup for unemployment. Following Pissarides (1998), Ardagna (2001)
and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), unemployment arises in the competitive labour
markets as the outcome of optimal choices made by workers. In particular, time o¤
work (leisure) is treated as unemployment. Unemployment can generate both leisure
and unemployment benets for the workers. The model is calibrated in a way that
unemployment benets are always below the net wage rate. This implies that leisure
is always costly to the workers. Unemployment benets in the economy can mimic the
role that they have in non-competitive labour markets, and in e¤ect they are equivalent
1See Chari et al. (2002 and 2007a) and Shimer (2009). But they use this concept to study the
business cycle accounting.
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to a labour income tax. However, by separating the unemployment benets from the
labour tax, it makes the model capable of evaluating their di¤erent e¤ects on workers
and governments budget. In the modied model, prots are present in the economy
when the productive government investment is introduced (see e.g. Lansing (1998) and
Malley et al. (2009)).
Chapter 1 contributes to the optimal policy literature by showing the importance
of economic structure in determining optimal taxation, and focusing on the e¤ects of
optimal taxation on unemployment and its distributional e¤ects on di¤erent agents.
In this chapter, we show that the standard Chamley-Judd result of long-run optimal
zero capital tax survives in the model with zero economic prots. The optimal policy
completely eliminates the labour wedge. These results hold even if the government
cares only about the workers. This implies that there is no conict of interests between
agents. The study o¤ers new results in the model with non-zero economic prots. The
optimal taxation implies a negative capital tax. The negative capital tax can help to
correct the under-investment of capitalists which is consistent with Guo and Lansing
(1999) and Judd (1997 and 2002). The labour wedge cannot be completely eliminated.
The optimal allocation of resources varies when the government changes the weight
placed on the welfare of agent in its objective function.
Chapter 2 investigates the e¤ects of tax reforms of cutting capital tax in models
with labour and product market distortions. We study the interactions between labour
and product market failures in determining the welfare and inequality e¤ects of factor
income taxation. The studies of tax reforms have recently received a great deal of
attention from both academics and policymakers. However, the potential distributional
e¤ects of tax reforms have not been examined under imperfect competition in both
labour and product markets.
In Chapter 2 capitalists and workers are distinguished by di¤erences in their capital
holdings which is motivated by imperfections in the asset market that require agents to
pay di¤erent participation premia (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (2009)). On the other
hand, households are identical in the labour market since labour unions guarantee that
they have equal employment and wages (see e.g. Pissarides (1998), Ma¤ezzoli (2001)
and Ardagna (2007)). In this chapter the labour market distortion is introduced in the
unionised labour market. Following Nickell and Andrews (1983), Farber (1986), Pis-
sarides (1998) and Kass and von Thadden (2004), a right-to-manage union bargaining
setup is employed where unions and rms bargain over the wage rate to maximise a
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weighted average of labour income and prots. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Guo and Lansing (1999), the product market failure
lies in the intermediate goods production as the intermediate goods producers have
monopoly power and can earn strictly positive prots in equilibrium.
The over-arching nding in Chapter 2 is that the presence of labour and product
market distortions is critical in determining not only the size but also the direction
of welfare e¤ects after the tax reforms, in particular, whether a capital tax cut can
be Pareto improving. We nd that each of these two market distortions can result
in welfare losses for at least one segment of the population after the tax reforms.
However, when they are combined in a realistic calibration to the UK economy, a
capital tax cut will be Pareto improving. Our analysis makes clear that although each
market distortion independently has similar welfare e¤ects, they two together can lead
to completely reversed welfare implications. Therefore, our results suggest that the
omission of relevant market and policy failures may lead to biased results that cannot
always be predicted ex ante.
Chapter 3 evaluates both the long- and short-run e¤ects of re-allocating the tax bur-
den from capital to labour income using a Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching
framework. We examine the importance of search frictions in determining the welfare
e¤ects of such tax reforms. To the best of our knowledge, this question has not yet
been answered in the search-and-matching literature. The steady-state optimal tax
policy is also studied. We compare our results with those in Domeij (2005) by making
several distinct model assumptions. Our analysis shows that incorporating the search
frictions into the model cannot only change the size but also the sign of optimal capital
tax.
In Chapter 3 the setup for agent heterogeneity employed is as in Chapter 1. Specif-
ically, the capitalists by assumption do not work and workers do not save. Following
Shi and Wen (1999), Pissarides (2001) and Domeij (2005), the wage paid in any given
job is determined through a Nash bargain between a pairing of matched worker and
rm. They bargain over the wage rate to maximise a weighted average of workers
and rms surpluses. Once they reach an agreement, the worker supplies one unit of
labour endowment to the rm in the following period. If the worker rejects the o¤er,
he is not entitled to the unemployment benets. In this sense, the employment is
pre-determined at any given time. As a model extension, a di¤erent specication of
unemployment benets is studied. Unemployment benets by assumption depend on
14
past wages due to some institutional features in the labour markets, following Blan-
chard and Katz (1999) and Chéron and Langot (2010). As a result, the unemployment
benet is proportional to past wages by a constant in the transition period. However,
at the steady-state, it is constant. Given the relevance of unemployment benets in
determining the wage rate in the bargaining, this new specication can o¤er new results
of the e¤ects of tax reforms and allow the study of the mechanisms driving the results.
Chapter 3 contributes to the search-and-matching literature on the study of the
tax reforms and optimal tax policy by examining the relevance of search frictions. The
results suggest that the tax reform will be Pareto improving in the long run although it
hurts the workers and worsens the aggregate welfare during the transition. Generally,
there are higher welfare gains for all agents by reducing workersbargaining power or
under the new specication of unemployment benets. Finally, the optimal tax policy
implies a negative capital tax in the long run, while the labour tax increases and
unemployment benets decrease.
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Chapter 1: Optimal taxation in heterogeneous agent
models with equilibrium unemployment
Abstract: This chapter examines the e¤ects of optimal taxation on unemployment,
the distribution of income and welfare of agents in dynamic general equilibrium models
with capitalists and workers. Equilibrium unemployment is generated in a competitive
labour market as the outcome of optimal choices made by workers. Two models are
studied: a model without economic prots and a model with economic prots due to
the presence of productive public investment. First, we nd that, in the absence of
economic prots, the optimal taxation implemented by the government relative to the
historical taxation indicates that: (i) the long-run optimal capital tax is zero; (ii) it
is optimal to tax the leisure which is equivalent to a subsidy to the labour supply of
workers; (iii) the labour wedge is completely eliminated and there are welfare gains for
all agents; and (iv) all the results hold when the government varies the weight attached
to the welfare of agent in its objective function, so that there is no conict of interests
between agents. Second, in the presence of economic prots, we show that: (i) the
government subsidizes the capital income in the long run; (ii) the labour wedge cannot
be eliminated, as a result, the welfare of workers worsens despite welfare gains for
the capitalists; and (iii) the optimal taxation has redistributional e¤ects on di¤erent
agents when the weight placed on the welfare of capitalists by the government exceeds
a critical value. This leads to a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity.
1.1 Introduction
This chapter uses a heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibriummodel with unem-
ployment to examine the e¤ects of optimal taxation on unemployment, the distribution
of income and welfare of agents in the economy.
Since the 1980s there has been an extensive literature studying optimal taxation in
macroeconomics. For example, Chamley (1986) studies the optimal taxation using a
representative agent model. He shows that the government should use a zero tax rate
on capital income in the long run. Chari et al. (1994) and Chari and Kehoe (1999)
also conclude that a permanent positive tax rate on capital income is not e¢ cient in
a Ramsey-type setup of the government. This family of models, however, is silent on
the research question of inequality which has resulted from the conict of interests
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between di¤erent agents. In this sense, the distributional e¤ect of optimal taxation has
been neglected in these papers. In this context, heterogeneous agent models obviously
become a good candidate to study the distributional e¤ect of optimal taxation.
Within the heterogeneous agent framework, the seminal research of Judd (1985)
makes a distinction between "capitalists" and "workers" in order to investigate the
redistributive potential of capital taxation in the economy. He suggests that the optimal
tax policy under commitment is to not tax capital income in the long run and to raise
all the required tax revenues by taxing labour income. This result even holds when
the government cares only about the workers. This implies that there is no conict of
interests between agents in the economy.
All these studies point out that the government should not tax capital income in the
long run. However, the robustness of this result has recently been challenged. Whether
capital income should be taxed or not in the long run still remains an open question in
the literature. Guo and Lansing (1999) introduce imperfect competition and prots in
the product market and they show that the optimal zero capital tax rate might not be
obtained in the long run assuming that the government has access to a commitment
technology. The introduction of prots via rmsmonopoly power creates distortions
in the capital market that break down the normative long-run result of optimal zero
tax rate on capital income. Koskela and von Thadden (2008) model the non-Walrasian
labour market with Nash bargaining between rms and labour unions. They suggest
that both capital and labour taxes should be used in the long run. Also the result
of non-zero optimal capital income tax can also be obtained in the models without
commitment technology for the government (see e.g. Krusell (2002) and Angelopoulos
et al. (2011a)), or assuming that households are endowed with di¤erent skills in the
labour markets (see e.g. Conesa et al. (2009)). All these studies have shown the
importance of economic structure in determining optimal taxation of the government.
This chapter contributes to the optimal taxation literature by examining the deter-
mination and e¤ects of optimal taxation under di¤erent market structures. We stay as
close as possible to Judd (1985), but two new concepts are introduced into the model:
equilibrium unemployment and prots in the product market. In addition, this study
sheds some light on the determination of optimal labour wedge which captures the gap
between the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption, and the
marginal product of labour. This concept has never been studied in the optimal policy
literature. In the past, it was only used to study the business cycle accounting (see e.g.
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Chari et al. (2002 and 2007a) and Shimer (2009)). In the competitive labour market,
unemployment is generated, following for example, Pissarides (1998), Ardagna (2001)
and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), as the outcome of optimal choices made by workers.
In this chapter their models are extended to allow for agent heterogeneity by assuming
di¤erent economic roles of agents in the economy. Following Judd (1985), Lansing
(1999) and Ardagna (2007), we assume that capitalists do not work and workers do
not save. In this setup, the government taxes labour income and interest income from
capital and prots to nance its public spending. The unemployment benets in this
model mimic the role that they have in a non-competitive labour market.2 An increase
in unemployment benets tends to decrease the labour supply of workers and then put
some pressure on the equilibrium wage rate. Alternatively, unemployment benets can
be considered as another tax rate on the labour income. By separating unemployment
benets from the explicit tax rate on labour income, it is possible to investigate the
di¤erent e¤ects of these two policy instruments on workers and governments budget.
Two di¤erent heterogeneous agent models are studied in this chapter. In the rst
model which is referred to as the benchmark model, rms earn zero economic prots
in the product market. The second model extends the benchmark model to allow
for productive public investment in the production. This model is referred to as the
modied model. Following Lansing (1998) and Malley et al. (2009), we assume that
the government can provide individual rms with public capital without asking for
rents. In the modied model, the production is constant-returns-to-scale (CRTS) in
three productive inputs: private capital, labour and public capital. The equilibrium
prots are equal to the di¤erence between the value of output and the production
costs of inputs employed in the private sectors. This setup allows us to examine the
relevance of prots in determining the optimal taxation of Benthamite (non-partisan)
government. The case of partisan government is also examined, in the sense that, the
government is biased towards one agent and places higher weight to the welfare of the
agent in its objective function.
The model with exogenous policy instruments is calibrated so that its steady state
can reect the main empirical characteristics of the current UK economy, with partic-
ular focus on its long-run unemployment rate. The UK is chosen for the quantitative
analysis since the high and rising unemployment rate has been a feature of the UK
2Unemployment can also be generated in the unionised labour market (see e.g. Ma¤ezzoli (2001)
and Ardagna (2007)), or in the model with search frictions (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
and Pissarides (2001)).
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economy compared to other European countries.
The main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, in the benchmark model
with zero prots, we nd that the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero in the
long run. The government chooses to tax the leisure of workers in the long run. This
is equivalent to a subsidy to the labour supply of workers. Meanwhile, the government
slightly increases the tax rate on labour income. We also nd that the distortions in the
labour market caused by the distortionary labour tax can be completely eliminated as
a consequence of the equal amount of government subsidies to the workers in the form
of taxation on the leisure. In other words, the positive e¤ect of negative replacement
rate and the negative e¤ect of increase in labour tax on workers net out in the long
run. Therefore, the gap between the marginal rate of substitution between labour and
consumption, and the marginal product of labour totally disappears in the long run.
As a result, the labour supply of workers increases which is benecial to the workers.
The income, consumption and welfare of workers improves. In addition, as in Judd
(1985), the results show that the optimal taxation and allocation under commitment
are independent of the weight to the welfare of agent in the Ramsey setup of the
government. This implies that there is no conict of interests between agents in the
long run.
Second, the result of long-run optimal zero capital tax cannot be obtained in the
model with non-zero economic prots due to the presence of productive public invest-
ment. The optimal tax rate on capital income is negative which means the government
chooses to subsidize the capital income in the long run. There are two opposing e¤ects
in determining the direction of optimal capital taxation: the under-investment e¤ect
and the prot e¤ect (see e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999)). In our model, on one hand, the
crowding-out e¤ect of public investment is equivalent to the under-investment e¤ect
which motivates a Benthamite government to use a subsidy to the capital income in
order to reduce the distortions in the capital market. On the other hand, the presence
of prots motivates the government to use a positive tax rate on capital income as
taxing prots is not distortionary. In our case, we show that the under-investment
e¤ect outweighs the prot e¤ect. As a result, the government subsidizes the capital
income in the long run. The optimal capital tax directly increases the investment of
capitalists and therefore the income, consumption and welfare of capitalists increase.
As in the benchmark model, the government subsidizes the labour supply of workers
while the tax rate on labour income slightly increases. These two policy instruments
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have opposing e¤ects on the labour supply of workers. We nd that the positive e¤ect
of labour subsidy dominates so that the labour supply of workers is higher than it
would be in the model with given policy. In the presence of prots, there is a gap
between the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption, and the
marginal product of labour, so that the tax distortion in the labour market cannot be
completely eliminated in the long run. The distortion causes welfare losses for workers.
In contrast to the benchmark model, the weight to the welfare of agent matters for the
optimal taxation in the modied model. The e¤ects are found to be monotonic. This
implies that the optimal taxation generates conict of interests between agents and it
has redistributional e¤ects in the long run. As the weight to the welfare of capitalists
increases, the capital taxation decreases and it turns into a subsidy after a critical
value. The tax rate on labour income increases in order to make up for the losses in
governments tax revenues. In this case, a trade-o¤between e¢ ciency and equity needs
to be taken into account by the government in the Ramsey setup of government.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 sets out the benchmark
model structure. Section 1.3 discusses the calibration of the model and gives the steady-
state and dynamic solution of the model. Section 1.4 analyses the impulse responses
of variables to models exogenous shocks. Section 1.5 studies optimal policy under
commitment. Section 1.6 presents one extension to the benchmark model and provides
an analysis of steady-state optimal policy. Section 1.7 constructs welfare analysis for
two models and Section 1.8 o¤ers a summary and conclusion.
1.2. Equilibrium unemployment in a model without prots
1.2.1 The model
The main features of the economy are summarized as follows. Innitely lived house-
holds, rms and a government populate the economy. There is a large but xed number
of households which can be divided into two types in terms of their di¤erent roles in the
economy: capitalists and workers. Following Judd (1985), Lansing (1999) and Ardagna
(2007), capitalists by assumption do not work and workers do not save. Capitalists
can participate in the capital market and they are owners of the rms. Their income
includes interest income from private capital and dividends of rms. Employed workers
supply labour to the rms and obtain wage incomes. If workers are unemployed, they
can receive unemployment benets from the government. Workers consume all their
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disposable income in each period. Following Pissarides (1998), Ardagna (2001) and
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), equilibrium unemployment is generated in the com-
petitive labour market as the outcome of optimal choices made by workers. Firms
are perfectly competitive and they produce a single product in the goods sector with
a constant-returns-to-scale technology. Finally, the government purchases goods and
services from the private sector which could enhance the utility of households. It also
provides unemployment benets to unemployed workers. The government nances all
its spending requirements by taxing labour income and interest income from capital
and prots.
1.2.2 Population composition
The whole population size of the households is given by N . The population sizes of
capitalists and workers are assumed to be: Nk and Nw.3 The population shares of
capitalists and workers are assumed to be: Nk=N  nk, and Nw=N  nw = 1   nk.
The population composition is taken as given and xed over time. The rms are
indexed by the superscript f . Each capitalist owns one single rm. This implies that
the number of rms is equal to the number of capitalists, i.e. N f = Nk.
1.2.3 Capitalists
The utility function of households is of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)









 + (1  )  1 H it 1 i  1 (1)
where Cit is household is private consumption; G
c





t=N , where G
c
t denotes aggregate government consumption;
H it is the labour supply. We x H
k
t = 0 for the capitalists in their utility function
as they are assumed to not work in the economy. The parameter  > 0 measures the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure; and 0 <  < 1 is the weight
given to consumption relative to leisure in the utility.
The utility function di¤ers from the conventional neoclassical utility function by in-
cluding the term of per capita government consumption, G
c
t . The private consumption
and government consumption are assumed to be substitutes in the utility function. The
3Variables for capitalists are indexed by the superscript k and variables for workers are indexed by
the superscript w in what follows.
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degree of substitutability is determined by the constant parameter 0 < !  1. In this
way, the government could a¤ect households via the utility e¤ect of G
c
t . Barro (1981
and 1989) suggests that government consumption expenditure on goods and services
can provide direct utility for the households. This argument is supported by some
empirical studies in the literature. Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) test the pa-
rameter which denes the relationship between private and government consumption
for the US economy, and Ahmed (1986) for the UK economy. They all support the
substitutability relationship. This specication of substitutability between private and
government consumption is widely used in the RBC literature.4
The objective function of the representative capitalist is to maximise his present



























t    kt (rt   p)Kkt + (1   kt )kt (4)
where Kkt is the private capital stock at the beginning of time t; I
k
t is the investment; rt
is the gross return to capital; kt denotes prots; 0 < 
p < 1 is the constant depreciation
rate of capital stock; and 0   kt < 1 is the tax rate on capital income and prots.5
The evolution equation of capital stock is:








to maximize (2) subject to the constraints (3),
(4) and (5) by taking market prices frtg1t=0, policy variables







4See Aschauer and Greenwood (1985), Ambler and Paquet (1996) and Finn (1998).
5Following Guo and Lansing (1999), we assume that the government cannot distinguish between
returns to capital stock and prots received from rms, so that they are taxed at the same rate.
In equilibrium, the rms earn zero economic prots, and hence the capitalists receive zero prots
from rms, i.e. kt = 0. Hereafter, the last term involving 
k
t will be dropped from capitalists
budget constraint in the benchmark model. In addition, the capital taxes are assumed to be net of
depreciation (see e.g. Lansing (1998)).
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condition for the capital stock, Kk0 , as given.




















t+1   (1  p)Kkt = rtKkt    kt (rt   p)Kkt :




















t    kt (rt   p)Kkt   Ckt  Kkt+1 + (1  p)Kkt
	
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the capitalists budget constraint.








 + (1  )
i 1
 1    Ckt + !Gct  1 = t: (6)
The FOC for Kkt+1 is:
t+1

1 + (1   kt+1) (rt+1   p)

= t: (7)
































 + (1  )
i 1
 1 
 1 + (1   kt+1) (rt+1   p)	 : (8)
This is the consumption Euler equation of the capitalist which describes the optimal
intertemporal choice made by the capitalist in equilibrium. It implies that the marginal
utility of foregone consumption at time t should be equal to the expected marginal
benet of discounted t+1 returns from investing one more unit at time t in equilibrium.
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1.2.4 Workers
The workers are assumed to be identical in the labour market. Hence, the labour sup-
ply of workers to rms is homogenous. They work and consume all their disposable
income in each period. Unemployment is generated in the competitive labour market
as the outcome of optimal choices made by the workers. Time o¤ work is then treated
as unemployment in the model. If unemployed, workers receive unemployment benets
from the government. The time constraint of workers is crucial in the workerssetup.
It is described as follows. At time t, the workers are endowed with the xed amount
of time. The time spent on physiological needs is treated as the exogenous leisure of
workers. Apart from this, the workers are expected to work for the rms and obtain
wage income from working. This portion of time is taken as potential labour supply of
workers which is normalised to unity. In the competitive labour market, both rms and
workers are assumed to be price takers. The wage rate is determined when the aggre-
gate labour supply is equal to the aggregate labour demand. The equilibrium labour
supply generated by the model is less than the potential labour supply of workers. The
di¤erence between these two is then treated as unemployment. In other words, time
o¤ work is considered as unemployment in this model. Unemployment by assumption
could generate both leisure and unemployment benets for the workers. The structural
parameters is calibrated so that per capita unemployment benets are always below
the net return to labour. In other words, leisure is costly to workers as working can
generate higher labour income. The workers do not save so that they do not have to
make intertemporal choices. The optimization problem for the workers is thus static.
At time t, the objective function of the representative worker is given by:
maxUwt (C
w
t ; 1 Hwt ; G
c
t) (9)















The time constraint of the worker is given by:
Lwt = 1 Hwt (11)
where Lwt denotes the leisure of the worker.
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The worker has the following within-period budget constraint:
Cwt = (1  wt )wtHwt +G
u
t (1 Hwt ) (12)
where wt is the wage rate; 0  wt < 1 is the tax rate on labour income; and G
u
t is
per capita unemployment benets which are assumed to be proportional to the wage
rate, i.e. G
u
t = rtwt, where rt is the replacement rate measuring the imputed value of
leisure. As discussed above, unemployment benets are less than the net wage rate,
i.e. rtwt < (1  wt )wt, so that unemployment is costly to the worker although it yields
leisure.
The value of the free parameter in the utility function, , is calibrated, such that
the models steady-state unemployment is in line with the data average between 1970
and 2009.6
At time t, the worker takes the market price, wt, per capita government consumption




t , and the tax rate on labour income, 
w
t , as
given, and chooses Cwt and H
w
t to maximize (9) subject to the constraints (10), (11)
and (12).


















s:t: Cwt = (1  wt )wtHwt +Gut (1 Hwt ) :

















(1  wt )wtHwt +G
u
t (1 Hwt )  Cwt

(13)
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the workers budget constraint.



















 = t: (14)
6In the UK economy, the date average of unemployment rate was 7% between 1970 and 2009.
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(  1) (1 Hwt ) 
1
 +
+t (1  wt )wt   tG
u
t = 0: (15)
These two FOCs are next combined into one equation as follows:
















which can be re-written as:



















The expression above is re-arranged to obtain the following condition:


















=MRSHwt ;Cwt is the marginal rate of substitution between labour
and consumption. Therefore, the r.h.s of the equation reects the gap between the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption, and the marginal product
of labour.7 Chari et al. (2002 and 2007a) and Shimer (2009) dene it as the labour
wedge. The labour wedge is interpreted as an indicator of the labour market distortions.
1.2.5 Firms
A representative rm produces its individual output using a technology that exhibits
constant-returns-to-scale in capital and labour. The production function of the repre-
sentative rm is given by:







7In equilibrium, the rms hire the workers until the wage rate is equal to the marginal product of
labour. This is shown in the prot-maximizing problem of the rm as follows.
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where Y ft represents the rms output; K
f
t is the capital stock employed by the rm
in the production; Hft is the labour input; and 0 < 1; 2 < 1 denote the capitals and
labours shares of output. The CRTS property implies: 1 + 2 = 1.
The aggregate output denoted by, Yt, measuring the gross product of the economy,
is the sum of individual rms output:
Yt = N
fY ft : (20)









ln(At+1) = (1  a) ln (A0) + a ln (At) + "at+1 (22)
where A0 > 0 is a parameter which gives the steady-state value of TFP; 0 < a <
1 is the rst-order auto-regressive parameter; and "at  iid (0; 2a) is the technology
innovation which follows a normal distribution with the standard deviation being a >
0.
The prots earned by the rm at time t are given by:8
ft = Y
f
t   rtKft   wtHft : (23)
At time t, the rm chooses the quantities of capital and labour in order to maximise
prots taking the market prices of them as given.






Y ft   rtKft   wtHft
o













2   rtKft   wtHft : (24)
8The price of goods is xed to be 1, so that all the variables in the model are written in real terms.
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2   rt = 0 (25)
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2 1   wt = 0













These two optimality conditions of the rm imply that factor rentals are equal to
their marginal products in equilibrium.
The rms prots in equilibrium are:
ft = Y
f
t   rtKft   wtHft












This implies that the rm earns zero prots in equilibrium.
1.2.6 Government
In the absence of government debt, the government has a balanced budget in each
period. The aggregate budget constraint of the government is:
Gct +N
wrtwt (1 Hwt ) = Nk kt (rt   p)Kkt +Nwwt wtHwt : (29)
Government expenditures include unemployment benets and government con-
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sumption which is utility-enhancing. They are nanced by the tax revenues from
capitalists and workers.
Both sides of the constraint (29) are divided by the total population, N , and we
make use of the population relationships, Nk=N = nk, Nw=N = 1  nk and N f = Nk,





1  nk rtwt (1 Hwt )
= nk kt (rt   p)Kkt +
 
1  nk wt wtHwt : (30)
The policy instruments of government include  kt , 
w
t ; rt and G
c
t . In the exogenous
policy case,  kt , 
w




1  k ln   k0+ k ln   kt + "kt+1 (A1)
ln(wt+1) = (1  w) ln (w0 ) + w ln (wt ) + "wt+1 (A2)
and
ln(rt+1) = (1  r) ln (r0) + r ln (rt) + "rt+1 (A3)
where  k0, 
w
0 and r0 are constant which give the steady-state values of these policy
variables; 0 < k; w; r < 1 are rst-order autoregressive parameters; and "kt , "
w
t and





. In Section 1.4, the dynamic responses of key variables
to each of these random shocks plus TFP shock are examined.
The per capita government consumption, G
c
t , is allowed to be residually determined
ensuring that the government budget constraint is balanced at any given period of time.
The change in any other exogenous policy variable will be met by the change in G
c
t .
1.2.7 Market clearing conditions and resource constraint
In the capital market, the aggregate demand of capital is equal to the aggregate supply
of capital. This implies:
NkKkt = N
fKft : (31)




9In what follows, the superscript p is used to denote the private capital stock in the model, i.e.
Kkt = K
f
t  Kpt in order to distinguish from the public capital stock to be introduced in Section 1.6.
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which can be re-written in per capita terms:
nkY ft = n
kCkt +
 
1  nkCwt + nkIpt +Gct : (34)
1.2.8 Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given policy)
We now summarise the decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) conditions in
the benchmark model. Given the paths of policy instruments







frt; wtg1t=0, the TFP fAtg1t=0 and the initial condition for Kp0 , a decentralized com-





















, such that (i) capitalists, workers
and rms undertake their respective optimization problems; (ii) all budget constraints
satised; and (iii) all markets clear.
Thus, the DCE consists of the capitalists and workers optimality conditions, i..e.
OCk andOCw; the rms rst-order conditions forKft and L
f
t ; the budget constraints of
capitalist, worker and government, i.e. BCk, BCw and BCg; the production function,
i.e. PF ; and the per capita market clearing conditions in capital and labour markets,
i.e. MCK and MC.10
1.3 Calibration and model solution
1.3.1 Calibration and steady-state solution
The structural parameters of the model are calibrated using the annual data of the UK
economy over the period 1970-2009. All the data is obtained from International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), United Nation Statistics Division (UNSD), the O¢ ce for National
Statistics (ONS), OECD International Sectorial Data Base (ISDB) and OECD Eco-
10The full DCE conditions are provided in the Appendix 1.A.1. Relying on the Walrass law, if the
budget constraints of capitalists and workers and the government budget constraint are satised, then
the resource constraint is redundant and it can be dropped from the equilibrium.
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nomic Outlook. The IMF data is from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.
The UNSD databases include: (i) World Bank (WB) database; (ii) National Accounts
Statistics (NAS) database; and (iii) International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.
The ONS data is from Labour Force Survey (LFS) database. The OECD data is from
OECD tax database.
The structural parameters of the model are assigned values so that the models
steady-state solution can reect the main empirical characteristics of the current UK
economy with particular focus on its unemployment rate. The calibrated values for the
structural parameters are reported in Table 1.1 as follows.
Table 1.1: Calibration in the benchmark model
Parameter Denition Value
0 <  < 1 rate of time preference 0.970
0 < 1 < 1 capitals share of output 0.400
0 < 2 < 1 labours share of output 0.600
0 < !  1 degree of substitutability 0.400
0 <  < 1 weight of consumption 0.841
0 < p < 1 depreciation rate on capital 0.100
0 < nk < 1 population share of capitalists 0.115
 > 0 elasticity of substitution 2.000
A0 > 0 TFP process 1.000
0   k0 < 1 tax rate on capital income 0.344
0  w0 < 1 tax rate on labour income 0.188
0 < r0 < 1 replacement rate 0.204
0 < a < 1 persistent parameter of At 0.914
0 < k < 1 persistent parameter of  kt 0.971
0 < w < 1 persistent parameter of wt 0.971
0 < r < 1 persistent parameter of rt 0.972
a > 0 s.d. of innovation "at 0.025
k > 0 s.d. of innovation "kt 0.015
w > 0 s.d. of innovation "wt 0.029
r > 0 s.d. of innovation "rt 0.013
The labours share of output, 2 = 0:6, is obtained directly from the ISDB dataset.
The capitals share of output is therefore: 1 = 1 2 = 0:4. The annual depreciation
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rate of capital stock is 10%, which is consistent with 2:5% quarterly depreciation rate of
capital stock. The degree of substitutability across private and public consumption, !,
is set to 0:4. This is in line with Ahmed (1986, see Tables 1 and 2) who estimated this
parameter for the UK economy. The elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure, , is set to 2 which is common in the DGE literature. The steady-state
TFP is normalised to 1. The normal distribution parameters are estimated by the TFP







to their respective data averages and the parameters in AR(1) equations, (A1)  (A3),
are estimated from the data series. All the tax data is obtained from OECD tax
database.11
There are two common methods in the literature to calibrate the annual rate of
time preference, . It can be calibrated so that, 1= 1, corresponds to the annual ex-
post real interest rate. Alternatively, the consumption Euler equation of the capitalist
can be used to calibrate the value for . In this model, the second method for the




be in line with its data average.12 The steady-state version of the consumption Euler
equation is now re-arranged for .13 It yields:
 =
1
[1 + (1   k) (1Y f=Kp   p)] : (35)
Using the values for p and 1 and the data average of K
p
Y f
, the calibrated value for
 is 0:97. This is very close to 0:972 which is calibrated applying the rst method.
The capitalists do not work in the model economy, but they can save in the form
of private capital stock, own rms and receive dividends of rms. Following Ardagna
(2007), the self-employed are treated as capitalists in the economy in order to calibrate
the population share of capitalists, nk. The data of self-employment only became
available from 1992 for the UK economy in the LFS database. The data average is
0.115, so that nk = 0:115. Finally, the value for  is calibrated in order to get the
steady-state unemployment rate of 7% which coincides with the data average between
1970 and 2009.
In the long run, the economy converges to a steady state when all the variables
11The average marginal tax rates on capital and labour income in the data are used for k and w.
The replacement rate, r0, is a net rate after the deduction of taxes. The value for r0 is similar to
Ardagna (2007).
12Data of aggregate capital stock is generated using perpetual inventory method.
13In what follows variables without time subscripts denote their steady-state values.
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remain constant. The steady-state solution of the benchmark model for the above
parameterization is shown in Table 1.2 below.14
Table 1.2: Steady-state solution of the benchmark model
Variable Description Value
Ck consumption of capitalist 1.172
Kp private capital stock 37.895
Ip private investment 3.790
Cw consumption of worker 0.899
Hw labour supply of worker 0.930
Y f output of rm 13.940
r return to private capital 0.147
w real wage rate 1.169
G
c
per capita government consumption 0.237
Uk utility of capitalist 1.222
Uw utility of worker 0.776
U average utility 0.827
Table 1.3 below shows the steady-state ratios of aggregate capital stock, investment
and consumption to output, and the steady-state employment generated by the model.
The same table also gives their data averages.
Table 1.3: Data averages and benchmark models steady-state values






As can be seen from Table 1.3, the models long-run solution matches most of the
data averages well.
14In Table 1.2, U is dened in a Benthamite fashion as the aggregate welfare of capitalist and worker





To solve the model, the method of generalised Schur decomposition is applied.15 The
non-linear DCE conditions and expectations of the exogenous AR(1) processes can be
expressed in the form of:16
Etf (yt+1;yt;xt+1;xt) = 0 (36)
where Et stands for the expectation operator which is conditional on the information
available at time t; xt is a vector of the predetermined (state) variables of size nx  1;
and yt is a vector of the non-predetermined (control) variables of size ny  1. In the
vector of xt, the endogenous state variables are written rstly. In our model, we have
xt = [K
p















All the non-linear equilibrium conditions in (36) are log-linearised round their
steady state values of the variables.17 The log-linearised system can be expressed






where the hatted variable denotes the natural log di¤erence of the variable, e.g. bKpt =
lnKpt  lnKp. It approximates the percentage deviation of variable from its steady-state
value. A and B are two 12 12 coe¢ cient matrices which specify the log-linearised
equations.
The above system can be solved using generalised Schur or QZ decomposition al-
gorithm. In the solution, it is found that all the eigenvalues are real. There is one
eigenvalue with absolute value less than one. Therefore, this model exhibits saddle
path stability as there is one endogenous state variable in it, i.e. Kpt . This implies a
unique convergent solution to the model. The models solution can be represented in
the form of rst-order linear di¤erence equations:
Etbxt+1 = Ebxt (38)
15For more details, see Klein (2000).
16The variablesKft and L
f
t have been substituted out using the per capita market clearing conditions
for private capital and labour, i.e. MCK and MCL.
17See Appendix 1.A.2 for the mathematical details of log-linearization.
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and byt = Fbxt (39)
where E and F are 5 5 and 7 5 coe¢ cient matrices specifying the laws of motion
for the variables in vectors xt and yt.18
1.4 Impacts of TFP and scal policy shocks
Using the dynamic solution of the benchmark model given in (38) and (39), we now
study the dynamic behavior of the model economy in response to a temporary unitary
innovation to TFP and the exogenous policy instruments: capital income tax, labour
income tax and replacement rate.19 The exogenous and temporary policy changes can
a¤ect both the supply- and demand-side of the economy during the transition to the
initial steady-state, but not in the long run. The household heterogeneity has been
assumed by isolating the di¤erent economic roles in the economy. In e¤ect, policy
changes would impact on their behaviors di¤erently so that these scal policy shocks
will have di¤erent e¤ects on the welfare of capitalists and workers.
The e¤ects of one-period, unanticipated 1% increase in each of the exogenous vari-
ables are studied in the following sub-sections. We keep all the other exogenous vari-
ables xed at their steady-states. In each experiment, the post-shock economy is
simulated for 100 years and the data are presented as percent deviations from vari-
ablesrespective steady-states. The impulse responses of key variables are illustrated
in Figures 1.1-1.4, respectively. In Tables 1.4-1.7, the present discounted values of per-
cent deviations from the steady-states of variables are reported in years after the shock









where j denotes the number of years after the shock; X is the steady-state value of
variable; Xt is the value of variable for year t; and DXj is the percent deviation after j
years. All the t > 1 values are discounted by the parameter, 0 <  < 1.
18In order to save space, we have not presented the policy rules in (38) and (39). But they are
available upon request.
19See Appendix 1.A.3 for the mathematical details of the simulation.
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1.4.1 Shock to TFP
Figure 1.1 illustrates the e¤ects of the one-period, unanticipated 1% increase in TFP
on the key variables and Table 1.4 reports the numeric results of percent deviations of
variables after j years in the post-shock economy.
[Figure 1.1 about here]
Table 1.4: Percent deviation from steady-state after At shock
Years after At shock
1 3 5 10 20 50 80 100
Ckt -3.341 -2.288 -1.512 -0.363 0.370 0.433 0.377 0.361
Cwt 1.027 1.019 0.997 0.916 0.746 0.495 0.426 0.408
Hwt 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.059 0.049 0.033 0.028 0.027
Lwt -0.853 -0.857 -0.846 -0.787 -0.648 -0.432 -0.372 -0.356
Y ft 1.044 1.036 1.015 0.932 0.759 0.504 0.433 0.415
Kpt 0.000 0.185 0.311 0.468 0.498 0.364 0.314 0.301
G
c
t 1.769 1.638 1.520 1.281 0.969 0.623 0.535 0.513
Ukt -2.537 -1.710 -1.102 -0.207 0.354 0.383 0.333 0.319
Uwt 1.004 0.985 0.956 0.867 0.699 0.463 0.398 0.381
Ut 0.402 0.527 0.607 0.685 0.641 0.449 0.387 0.370
The innovation to TFP impacts on the model economy via two e¤ects: wealth e¤ect
and substitution e¤ect. They are accompanied by the changes in input prices. This
positive TFP shock generates one immediate positive e¤ect on rmsoutput which can
be seen from the production function. The output, Y ft ; goes up immediately following
the shock (i.e. 1.044%). This is a positive wealth e¤ect generated by the innovation in
TFP. As a result, more goods are available for consumption and to be invested at the
aggregate level. It leads to an immediate increase in the government consumption by
holding all the other policy instruments unchanged in its budget constraint. Govern-
ment consumption increases by 1.769% relative to its initial steady-state. Meanwhile,
the return to capital and to labour increases immediately in response to the shock as
can be seen in Figure 1.1. This is because the innovation in TFP increases the mar-
ginal product of capital and labour. The capitalists spend the disposable income on
consumption or investment. The higher return to capital increases the attractiveness
of investment. The capitalists increase investment and this could bring them higher
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income to nance the future spending. In turn, the accumulation of capital stock in-
creases in response to the TFP shock. The transition path of capital stock is converted
U-shaped. Figure 1.1 shows that the consumption of capitalists decreases in the rst
few years before it rises above its initial steady-state. There are two e¤ects resulting
in the initial decrease in the consumption of capitalists. On one hand, there exists
substitutability between private consumption and government consumption. On the
other hand, the increase in private investment crowds out the private consumption.
The workers are assumed to not save in the economy. If the workers are employed,
they obtain wage incomes from the rms. The return to work increases immediately in
the post-shock economy. This tends to increase the attractiveness of working. There
exist two opposing e¤ects in determining the labour supply of workers as a result of
the higher return to labour, in other words, the higher wage rate. On one hand, the
higher wage rate implies an increase in the opportunity cost of leisure. This increases
the benets of working and it induces workers to substitute labour for leisure. This
is called a positive substitution e¤ect (SE) resulting from a higher wage rate. On the
other hand, the higher wage rate increases the wage income of workers. As a result,
they value leisure more relative to working. This is called a negative income e¤ect (IE).
The dynamic path of the labour supply illustrates that the substitution e¤ect outweighs
the income e¤ect in our model. This result is consistent with the calibrated value for
the elasticity of substitution in the CES utility function. The parameter  > 1 implies
that the substitution e¤ect is bigger than the income e¤ect. As a result, the labour
supply increases immediately after the shock (i.e. 0.064%) which is benecial for the
workers. The higher labour supply increases the income of workers as working can
generate higher income for workers. As a result, the consumption of workers increases
immediately in response to the innovation in TFP (i.e. 1.027%).
In the long run, the return to capital and labour recovers to their respective initial
steady-state. Subsequently, all the other variables gradually return to their steady-
states as the positive TFP shock dies out. In the process of adjustment, all the variables
display some inherent persistence. On the whole, as can be seen in Figure 1.1, the TFP
shock has a positive impact on the aggregate economy.
1.4.2 Shock to capital income tax
In the following three sub-sections, the e¤ects of shocks to scal policy instruments on
the economy are analysed. Figure 1.2 provides the dynamic paths of variables to the
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one-period, unanticipated 1% increase in the tax rate on capital income,  kt , and Table
1.5 shows the present values of percent deviations in di¤erent j years after this positive
shock.
[Figure 1.2 about here]
Table 1.5: Percent deviation from steady-state after  kt shock
Years after  kt shock
1 3 5 10 20 50 80 100
Ckt 0.782 0.598 0.456 0.224 0.025 -0.075 -0.077 -0.076
Cwt -0.001 -0.016 -0.027 -0.045 -0.056 -0.054 -0.049 -0.047
Hwt -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003
Lwt 0.026 0.040 0.050 0.066 0.075 0.068 0.062 0.060
Y ft -0.001 -0.017 -0.028 -0.046 -0.058 -0.055 -0.050 -0.048
Kpt 0.000 -0.037 -0.065 -0.108 -0.136 -0.130 -0.119 -0.115
G
c
t 0.295 0.284 0.274 0.253 0.223 0.175 0.157 0.151
Ukt 0.638 0.492 0.379 0.194 0.034 -0.048 -0.051 -0.050
Uwt 0.027 0.014 0.004 -0.012 -0.029 -0.027 -0.025 -0.024
Ut 0.131 0.095 0.068 0.023 -0.015 -0.031 -0.030 -0.029
The isolating positive shock to capital income tax immediately generates a positive
wealth e¤ect on the government consumption since more tax revenues can be provided
to nance government spending. The increase in  kt results in a concurrent increase
in G
c
t by holding all the other policy instruments constant in the budget constraint
of government (i.e. 0.295%). The dynamic responses of capitalists are then analysed.
This positive shock causes a negative wealth e¤ect on the investment of capitalists.
A higher tax rate on capital income implies lower net return to capital. In this case,
the investment of capitalists decreases dramatically immediately in response to the
capital tax increase. This negative wealth e¤ect is transformed into a decrease in the
capital stock. On one hand, the decrease in Kpt results in a fall in the output, Y
f
t (i.e.
-0.001%). On the other hand, the lower level of capital stock implies a higher return
to capital which stimulates the investment of capitalists. The private investment, Ipt ,
gradually rises and in the end recovers to its initial steady-state. The consumption of
capitalists increases in the rst few years although it falls short of the initial steady-
state afterwards. The increase in the consumption of capitalists in the rst few years
is resulted from the dramatic decrease in investment.
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In the labour market, the marginal product of labour decreases when the output
falls. This implies a decrease in the return to labour. As a result, the labour supply
of workers decreases. The decrease in labour supply reinforces the fall in the output.
Table 1.5 shows that the output, Y ft , continuously falls in the rst twenty years (i.e.
from -0.001% to -0.058%). The labour supply gradually recovers to the steady-state,
the rms increase the production and output nally returns to its initial steady-state.
1.4.3 Shock to labour income tax
The time paths of variables generated by the one-period, positive shock to the labour
income tax are shown in Figure 1.3. Table 1.6 shows the results calculated using the
formula (40) for di¤erent variables. In general, the temporary, unanticipated increase
in labour income tax has a negative impact on the aggregate economy.
[Figure 1.3 about here]
Table 1.6: Percent deviation from steady-state after wt shock
Years after wt shock
1 3 5 10 20 50 80 100
Ckt 0.084 0.063 0.048 0.022 0.001 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010
Cwt -0.238 -0.233 -0.228 -0.216 -0.194 -0.155 -0.139 -0.134
Hwt -0.033 -0.032 -0.031 -0.030 -0.027 -0.021 -0.019 -0.018
Lwt 0.444 0.433 0.422 0.398 0357 0.284 0.254 0.245
Y ft -0.020 -0.021 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 -0.019 -0.017 -0.016
Kpt 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012
G
c
t 0.704 0.684 0.665 0.622 0.554 0.440 0.393 0.379
Ukt 0.111 0.094 0.080 0.057 0.036 0.020 0.017 0.016
Uwt -0.120 -0.118 -0.116 -0.111 -0.100 -0.080 -0.072 -0.069
Ut -0.081 -0.082 -0.083 -0.082 -0.077 -0.063 -0.057 -0.055
The increase in tax rate on labour income brings about more tax revenues which
could directly increase government consumption for the rst year (i.e. 0.704%). Mean-
while, higher labour income tax has a negative revenue e¤ect on workers. It reduces
the disposable income of workers. The consumption of workers reduces by 0:238%
for the rst year relative to its initial steady-state. The increase in wt decreases the
net return to work. This has a negative e¤ect on the labour supply of workers. The
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wage rate is determined in the competitive labour market. The gross return to work
becomes higher as the supply of labour decreases. As a result, the workers increase
labour supply gradually. In the long run they will o¤er the initial level of labour supply.
The output, Y ft , goes down for the rst year (i.e. -0.020%). As a consequence, fewer
goods are available for consumption and investment in the post-shock economy such
that the investment of capitalists reduces. This negative e¤ect is transformed into lower
capital stock, which reinforces the fall in rmsoutput. The consumption of capitalists
increases for the rst few years. This is because the fall in private investment outweighs
the decrease in output. In turn, more income is used for consumption. However as
the capitalists increase investment over time, the consumption falls short of its initial
steady-state. The higher capital stock due to increase in investment leads to an increase
in rmsoutput.
1.4.4 Shock to replacement rate
Finally, the responses of variables to the one-period, unanticipated 1% increase in
replacement rate, rt are investigated. This is a positive shock to government spend-
ing. The impact of this shock is illustrated by Figure 1.4 and Table 1.7 reports the
percentage deviations of key variables in the post-shock economy.
[Figure 1.4 about here]
Table 1.7: Percent deviation from steady-state after rt shock
Years after rt shock
1 3 5 10 20 50 80 100
Ckt 0.133 0.102 0.078 0.039 0.005 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012
Cwt 0.003 2E-04 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006
Hwt -0.047 -0.046 -0.045 -0.042 -0.038 -0.030 -0.027 -0.026
Lwt 0.624 0.609 0.595 0.562 0.506 0.405 0.363 0.350
Y ft -0.028 -0.030 -0.031 -0.033 -0.032 -0.027 -0.025 -0.024
Kpt 0.000 -0.006 -0.011 -0.018 -0.023 -0.022 -0.020 -0.019
G
c
t -0.150 -0.146 -0.143 -0.135 -0.121 -0.097 -0.087 -0.084
Ukt 0.096 0.071 0.053 0.022 -0.003 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014
Uwt 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003
Ut 0.032 0.025 0.020 0.012 0.005 0.001 4E-04 3E-04
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In this model, there are two types of government expenditures: government con-
sumption on goods and services and unemployment benets. The positive shock to
replacement rate implies that the government increases unemployment benets to un-
employed workers. It causes a negative crowding-out e¤ect on the government con-
sumption so that it decreases in the post-shock economy (i.e. -0.150%). The unem-
ployment benets are equivalent to a subsidy to labour. There are two opposite e¤ects
in determining the consumption of workers. On one hand, the positive shock to re-
placement rate generates a positive wealth e¤ect on the consumption of workers as
higher replacement rate increases the income of workers. On the other hand, higher
replacement rate increases the attractiveness of leisure. This discourages the labour
supply of workers. As a result, the labour supply of workers decreases dramatically for
the rst year (i.e. -0.047%). The consumption of workers decreases as the leisure is
costly to workers. As can be seen in Figure 1.4, the negative e¤ect dominates and the
consumption of workers decreases in the post-shock economy.
The rms output, Y ft , goes down for the rst year (i.e. -0.028%). This has a
positive e¤ect on the wage rate. The wage rate rises and higher return to work increases
the labour supply of workers. The marginal product of capital decreases in the post-
shock economy. In the capital market, the return to capital falls and it leads to a
decrease in the private investment of capitalists. This is transformed into lower capital
stock. In turn, the consumption of capitalists increases. In addition, the decrease in
government consumption generates a further increase in the consumption of capitalists
via the substitution e¤ect.
All the variables will return to their respective steady-states in the long run. In
response to this positive shock to replacement rate, most variables display large per-
sistence, with the exception of two input prices, i.e. rt and wt.
1.5 Optimal policy with commitment
1.5.1 Ramsey problem
In the commitment framework, the government takes into account that the households
and rms will behave in their own best interest by taking all the scal policy variables
as given. Each applicable scal policy implies a feasible equilibrium allocation that
fully reects the optimal behavioral responses of resources. Given a welfare criterion,
the optimization problem for the government is to pick the best scal policy which can
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produce an equilibrium allocation giving the highest aggregate welfare. To avoid the
general time inconsistency problem in policy making, the government is assumed to
commit itself once-and-for-all to one scal policy which is announced at initial period
and never re-optimizes.20 This problem is usually referred to as the Ramsey problem
of government under commitment.
The government now optimally chooses some of its policy instruments. Meanwhile,
it also chooses the allocation of private agents. This is called the dual approach to the
Ramsey problem.21 The objective of government is to maximize the present discounted





Ukt + (1  )Uwt

(41)
where the government is assumed to have the same discount rate as households; and
0 < ; (1  ) < 1 are the weights attached to the welfare of capitalists and workers
by the government.
The optimal policy approach emphasizes the constraints under which the govern-
ment must operate. These constraints include the requirement to raise enough tax
revenues and the behavioral responses of households and rms. These are summarized
in the DCE conditions. In order to simplify the optimization problem of the govern-
ment - it is necessary to reduce the number of choice variables for the government,






t , by making use of some DCE conditions.
The per capita government consumption, G
c





for all periods.22 To summarize, in the dual approach of the










and three policy variables
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. The initial condition
for Kp0 is taken as given. The optimization problem can thus be summarized as follows:
max










+ (1  )U (Cwt )

(42)
20The time inconsistency refers to that when the government revises its policy annouced initially if
it has a chance to do so.
21In contrast to the dual approach, the government only chooses the allocation of private agents
and all the policy variables are substituted out using DCE conditions in the primal approach.
22Its value is set to the steady-state value as in Table 1.2.
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subject to the DCE conditions of
 
Ckt + !G




c  1 h  Ckt+1 + !Gc 1 + (1  )i 1 1 
 1 + (1   kt+1) (rt+1   p)	 (D1)












t+1   (1  p)Kpt = rtKpt    kt (rt   p)Kpt (D3)
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wt wtHwt : (D5)























c  1 h  Ckt+1 + !Gc 1 + (1  )i 1 1 
 1 + (1   kt+1) (rt+1   p) 
   Ckt + !Gc  1 h  Ckt + !Gc 1 + (1  )i 1 1+
+2t
h














t    kt (rt   p)Kpt   Ckt  Kpt+1 + (1  p)Kpt

+
+4t [(1  wt )wtHwt + rtwt (1 Hwt )  Cwt ] +
+5t

nk kt (rt   p)Kpt +
 
1  nk wt wtHwt  
 Gc    1  nk rtwt (1 Hwt )	 (43)
where it, i = 1; 2;    ; 5, represents the multiplier associated with each constraint in
(D1)  (D5). The constraints in the Lagrangian function have been rearranged so that
all the multipliers are non-negative at the steady-state.
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Some FOCs of the government at time 0 are di¤erent from the same rules governing





these variables appear in the forward-looking inter-temporal optimality condition (D1).
To avoid this problem, it is necessary to consider the Ramsey problem in the economy
starting from time 1 and assume that time 0 optimality conditions of the government
do not alter the results in equilibrium.
In addition, the FOCs of the government should also include the constraints to the
Ramsey problem, i.e. (D1)  (D5).23
1.5.2 Benthamite (non-partisan) optimal taxation
The rst case to be studied is that of a Benthamite government. This implies that the
weights attached to the welfare of capitalists and workers in the objective function of
government are equal to their respective population shares, i.e.  = nk and 1    =
1   nk. Using the parameters in Table 1.1, we can get the steady-state solution of
optimal policy which is shown in Column (1) of Table 1.8. It is compared to the
steady-state solution with exogenous policy as reported in Column (2) of Table 1.8.
Table 1.8 incorporates the following ndings. First, in the absence of prots, the
celebrated result of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) is veried: the optimal capital
tax is zero in the long run. This implies that capitalists are exempted from paying
taxes in the long run. All the government expenditures should be nanced by the
taxes on workers.24 This result is silent about the transition to the steady-state. If
 k is positive, it reduces the return from todays savings and therefore makes the con-
sumption of next period more expensive relative to current period. In the model with
innitely-lived households, the long-run positive tax rate on capital income implies
that the implicit tax rate on consumption of future periods increases without bound.
However, the relevant elasticity of demand for consumption in all periods is constant.
Therefore taxing consumption at di¤erent rates violates the general public nance prin-
ciple stating that tax rates should be inversely proportional to the demand elasticities
of consumption. The assumption of constant demand elasticity of consumption implies
that the capital income tax rate should be zero in the long run. As a result, zero capital
income tax stimulates the investment of capitalists (i.e. from 3.79 to 4.833), and this
23We did not show the FOCs of government in the Ramsey problem to preserve space. But they
are available upon request.
24In the model with non-zero economic prots, this result does not hold any more. The two opposing
e¤ects on the sign of optimal tax rate on capital income will be demonstrated later.
.
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is transformed into higher capital stock (i.e. from 37.895 to 48.332).





















Second, the optimal replacement rate turns out to be negative in the long run. It
predicts that the government taxes unemployed workers rather than o¤er unemploy-
ment benets. In this model, the di¤erence between the level of potential labour supply
and the level of labour supply chosen by the workers is treated as unemployment. A
negative replacement rate implies that the government taxes those workers who do not
provide the potential level of labour. In this sense, leisure generates income losses for
workers. Alternatively, we can understand the negative replacement rate as a subsidy
to the labour supply of workers.25 Therefore, the negative, r, leads to an increase in the
25The budget constraint of workers (12) at the steady state can be rewritten as: Cw =
(1  w   r)wHw + Gu. A negative replacement rate therefore implies that the government sub-
sidizes the labour supply of workers. The last term, G
u
= rw < 0, can be considered as a lump-sum
tax paid by the workers at the steady-state which does not generate any distortion in the economy.
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labour supply of workers. The optimal tax rate on labour income, w, slightly increases
relative to the exogenous policy case (i.e. from 0.188 to 0.212). This, in contrast, has a
negative e¤ect on the labour supply. Overall, the labour supply increases resulting from
the dominant positive e¤ect of negative replacement rate (i.e. from 0.930 to 0.976).
Third, the labour wedge dened by 1  w   r is equal to one at the steady state.
This implies that the marginal product of labour is equal to the marginal rate of
substitution between labour and consumption. In the words, in absence of prots,
the labour wedge can be completely eliminated by the government in the long run.
This happens because, in Ramsey, the government optimally chooses two tax rates on
workers, i.e. wt and rt. At the steady state, the wedge between the marginal product of
labour and the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption created
by w is exactly canceled out by the negative r. As a result, there is no distortion in
the labour market. This result also explains the large increase in labour supply which
is consistent with the nding in Prescott (2002 and 2004).
Finally, the output, Y f , increases substantially at the steady-state (i.e. from 13.940
to 15.820) as two production inputs, capital and labour, both increase in the produc-
tion. This generates positive welfare e¤ects on private consumption and investment
as can be seen in aggregate resource constraint. The consumption of capitalists and
workers increases more than it would be in the exogenous policy case. The welfare of
all agents improves and the Ramsey solution is Pareto improving in the long run.
1.5.3 Non-Benthamite (partisan) optimal taxation
The next case to be investigated is that of a partisan government. In other words, the
weights attached to the welfare of each agent in Ramsey problem are not equal to the
population share of each agent so that the government is biased towards one party.
Table 1.9 reports the steady-state solutions of the optimal policy under di¤erent values
of .26 The case of Benthamite government is in bold.
As in Judd (1985), we nd that the optimal taxation and allocation under commit-
ment are independent of weights attached to the welfare of agents. This implies that,
for all agents, the zero capital tax and elimination of labour wedge are the best option
to adopt in the Ramsey set-up of government. This holds even if the government cares
only about the workers, so that there is no conict of interests between agents. In
the next section, the relevance of economic prots in determining this result will be
26The range of  corresponds to that in the modied model (see Table 1.11).
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investigated, in other words, we examine whether the commonality of interests still
holds in a model with strictly positive prots.
Table 1.9: Steady-state of Partisan optimal taxation in the model without prots
 = 0  = 0:105  = 0:110  = 0:115  = 0:120  = 0:125
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ck 1.495 1.495 1.495 1.495 1.495 1.495
Cw 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966
Hw 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976
 k 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
w 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212
r -0.212 -0.212 -0.212 -0.212 -0.212 -0.212
Uk 1.487 1.487 1.487 1.487 1.487 1.487
Uw 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794
U 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873
1.6 Equilibrium unemployment in a model with prots
In this section, one extension to the benchmark model is made by introducing equi-
librium prots into the model. Specically the prots appear in the economy when
the public investment appears in the production. Next to be studied is the optimal
taxation and its e¤ects on unemployment, the distribution of income and welfare of
agents. We intend to investigate the implications of this modication for the results
discussed in the benchmark model above.
1.6.1 Model extension
It is now assumed that the government can invest in the production of goods. The
government provides individual rms with public capital without asking for rents. Fol-
lowing Lansing (1998) and Malley et al. (2009), the rm produces homogeneous goods
with a CRTS technology in labour, private capital and public capital.27 The production
function of the representative rm is given by:










27See Aschauer (1989), Munell (1990) and Ai and Cassou (1995). These empirical studies support




t denotes the per capita public capital which is exogenously provided by the
government; and 0 < 3 < 1 measures the public capitals share of output. The CRTS
technology implies 1 + 2 + 3 = 1.
The specication of CRTS in all three inputs implies that the prots of individual
rm are non-zero in equilibrium. Prot-maximization of the rm yields:
ft = Y
f
t   rtKpt   wtHft











= (1  1   2)Y ft (45)











. In equilibrium, the rm earns strictly positive economic
prots which are equal to the di¤erence between the value of output and the production
costs of inputs employed from the capitalists and workers. The prots are equally




t  pt : (46)
This extension does not alter the optimality conditions of the worker which are
described by (17) and (12). The consumption Euler equation of the capitalist still
holds but the term involving, pt , should be recovered in his budget constraint. The
budget constraint of the capitalist is rewritten as:
Ckt +K
p
t+1   (1  p)Kpt = rtKpt    kt (rt   p)Kpt + (1   kt )pt : (47)





1  nk rtwt (1 Hwt ) + nkIgt
= nk











is the per capita public investment where Igt is the aggregate public
investment
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The aggregate public capital stock, Kgt , evolves according to:
28
Kgt+1 = (1  g)Kgt + Igt (49)
where g is the constant depreciation rate of public capital stock. The public capital
and private capital are assumed to depreciate at the same rate, so that g = 0:1.29
1.6.2 Benthamite (non-partisan) optimal taxation
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.10 report the stead-states of the modied model with
optimal and exogenous scal policy, respectively.30 The case of a Benthamite gov-
ernment is rst studied. We intend to examine the relevance of non-zero prots in
determining the long-run optimal taxation and therefore the steady-state allocation of
resources.
First, the result of long-run optimal zero capital tax rate cannot be obtained in
the modied model. This result is consistent with what has been found by Lansing
(1998). He argues that the existence of prots, together with the assumption that the
government cannot distinguish between prots and other asset incomes can result in
the non-zero optimal capital income tax in the long run. The steady-state optimal tax
rate on capital income is negative.31 This implies that it is optimal for the government
to subsidize the interest income from capital and prots in the long run and it is
accomplished by increasing the labour income tax. Guo and Lansing (1999) show that
in an imperfectly competitive economy, the sign of the steady-state optimal capital
income tax is ambiguous and nd that this ambiguity mainly results from two opposite
e¤ects: under-investment e¤ect and prot e¤ect. The under-investment e¤ect arises
when the private agent under-invests relative to the socially optimal level as the interest
rate that determines the equilibrium investment is smaller than the social marginal
28The aggregate public capital stock is the sum of public capital stock that each rm receives from




29Because in what follows, the focus will only be on the steady-state analysis of the model, the
ratio of aggregate public investment to aggregate output, gi, is set to the data average. In the Ramsey
setup, the government optimally chooses Kgt+1, and I
g
t is substituted out using the public capital
evolution equation, (49).
30The results reported in Column (2) are obtained using the parameters in Table 1.1, except that,
, is re-calibrated so that the steady-state value of Hw = 0:930 can be achieved at the steady-state
of the modied model.
31Judd (1997) shows that the tax rate on capital income is ambiguous if the government does
not distinguish between taxing returns on new investment and taxing economic prots. His paper,
however, mainly studies on the sub-optimality of a capital income tax. Judd (1999) argues that a tax
on capital cannot be optimal as its distortions accumulate over time, a pattern that is inconsistent
with the commodity tax principle. Later, Judd (2002) proposes an optimal capital income subsidy
referring to the repealed Investment Tax Credit scheme in the US economy.
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product of capital. Therefore, a negative tax rate on capital income helps to correct
the existence of under-investment in the capital market. The prot e¤ect, in contrast,
motivates the use of a positive tax rate on capital income, because taxing prots does
not a¤ect private agents decisions at the margin such that it does not distort incentives
of investment. In this case, the government has an incentive to fully conscate the
prots. This motivates a positive tax rate on capital income. In the model with the
presence of public investment, the crowding-out of the public investment is equivalent
to the under-investment e¤ect and it dominates the prot e¤ect. As a result, the
steady-state optimal tax rate on capital income turns out to be negative. The negative
capital tax increases the private investment of capitalists (i.e. from 3.089 to 4.047).
This is transformed into higher private capital (i.e. from 30.892 to 40.472). In turn,
the output, Y f , goes up at the steady-state (i.e. from 12.122 to 13.760).
Second, the government increases the tax rate on labour income. As in the bench-
mark model, the long-run optimal replacement rate is negative. In other words, the
government provides a subsidy to the labour supply of workers. The optimal labour
income tax and replacement rate generate two opposite e¤ects on the labour supply of
workers in the long run. On one hand, higher labour tax implies lower return to work.
This tends to reduce the labour supply of workers. On the other hand, the negative
replacement rate working as a subsidy to work tends to increase the labour supply of
workers. On the whole, the replacement rate e¤ect dominates and labour supply goes
up relative to the exogenous policy case (i.e. from 0.930 to 0.976).
Finally, the labour wedge, 1 w r, is no longer equal to one at the steady-state in
the modied model. This implies that there exists a discrepancy between the marginal
rate of substitution between labour and consumption and the marginal product of
labour. The labour market distortion exists in the modied model. The Benthamite
optimal taxation, with the presence of prots, generates conict of interests between
agents. It leads to distributional e¤ects in the long run. This is because the under-
investment distortion is so large in the capital market that it increases the incentive
for the government to impose a subsidy to capital income. In turn, this reduces the
incentive for the government to eliminate the distortion in the labour market. Because
of labour market distortion, the welfare of workers decreases in the Ramsey setup (i.e.
from 0.680 to 0.676). The welfare of capitalists increases (i.e. from 1.191 to 1.592)
as the subsidy to capital income together with the prots increases the income and
consumption of capitalists. The optimal policy increases the aggregate welfare (from
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0.739 to 0.782) despite welfare losses for the workers in the long run.























1.6.3 Non-Benthamite (partisan) optimal taxation
The steady-state of Ramsey problem is next studied when the government becomes
partisan. We solve the model and evaluate the models steady-state for di¤erent weight
attached to the welfare of capitalists in governments objective function.32 Figure 1.5
32The steady-state is calculated when  lies in [0, 0.125]. Beyond 0.125, the incentive for the
government to subsidise capital income in order to eliminate capital distortion is so high that an interior
solution cannot be obtained. However, our evaluation captures all three cases of the government:
Benthamite, "capitalist bias", and "worker bias". Moreover, the changes of variables at steady-state
are monotonic with the magnitude of .
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below plots the steady-state values for the policy instruments, equilibrium allocations
and welfare of di¤erent agents against the weight attached to the welfare of capitalists,
.
[Figure 1.5 about here]
We also produce Table 1.11 to compare with the steady-state values in the model
with zero prots as in Table 1.9.
Table 1.11: Steady-state of Partisan optimal taxation in the model with prots
 = 0  = 0:105  = 0:110  = 0:115  = 0:120  = 0:125
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ck 1.200 1.537 1.581 1.639 1.723 1.929
Cw 0.827 0.819 0.817 0.813 0.807 0.789
Hw 0.974 0.976 0.976 0.977 0.977 0.978
 k 0.342 2E-04 -0.053 -0.125 -0.236 -0.539
w 0.152 0.218 0.227 0.237 0.252 0.286
r -0.189 -0.218 -0.222 -0.226 -0.231 -0.248
Uk 1.229 1.508 1.544 1.592 1.660 1.828
Uw 0.689 0.681 0.679 0.676 0.671 0.658
U 0.751 0.776 0.778 0.782 0.785 0.792
In Table 1.11, the case of Benthamite government is in bold. Apparently, in contrast
to the benchmark model, the value of  matters for the steady-state solution in the
modied model. In addition, all the changes of variables are monotonic with the
magnitude of . The magnitude of change in capital income tax is very large. The case
when the government cares only about the workers is rst examined. As can be seen
in Column (1), the capital income rate is positive and well below the date average of
34.4%. The incentive for the government to tax labour income is reduced. The labour
income tax is below the data average of 18.8%. In this case, the replacement rate is
negative which implies the government subsidizes the labour supply in the long run.
When  = 0, the welfare of workers improves at the steady-state of Ramsey relative
to the exogenous policy case. (i.e. from 0.68 to 0.689). As weight for the welfare of
capitalists increases, the capital income tax falls very quickly, as can be seen in Figure
1.5. The steady-state optimal capital tax turns into a subsidy when  reaches 0.110,
i.e.  k =  0:053. In turn, the labour income tax increases to make up for the tax
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revenue losses from capital. This optimal policy hurts the workers and the welfare of
workers decreases relative to the exogenous policy case (i.e. from 0.680 to 0.679). This
implies that the government redistributes the welfare towards capitalists if  exceeds
0.110. The replacement rate decreases as  increases. This implies the government
increases the subsidy to labour as  increases. This policy increases the incentive for
the workers to provide labour to rms. As a result, employment goes up (i.e. from
0.974 to 0.978).
As can be seen in Figure 1.5, as the weight to the capitalists increases, the steady-
state welfare of capitalists increases. It is because the capitalists directly benet from
the substantial reductions in capital tax. In contrast, the increase in  worsens the
welfare of workers. However, the workers are slightly hurt by the labour tax increases
since the subsidy to labour increases in the meanwhile. The output, Y f , goes up as a
result of increases in three inputs, Kp, Hw and K
g
. Moreover, the aggregate welfare
improves as  increases. This implies that the e¢ ciency of the whole economy has
improved as the government becomes biased towards the capitalists.
The above discussion suggests that, in the model with strictly positive prots, when
the government cares more about the capitalists, it helps to reduce the ine¢ ciently
high capital tax and eventually it turns into a subsidy after a critical level of the
weight attached to the capitalists placed by the government. The welfare of capitalists
substantially improves as the capital distortion reduces. Meanwhile, the optimal policy
hurts the workers as the government has to raise the revenue to the required level by
increasing labour income tax. As a result, the welfare of workers worsens. This implies
a conict of interests between the agents and hence a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and
equity. This result is consistent with Angelopoulos et al. (2011a).
1.7 Welfare analysis
This section examines the welfare e¤ects of optimal taxation at the steady-state. In
particular, the steady-state welfare costs or benets for all agents are computed when
the government chooses the optimal policy relative to the exogenous policy. This has
become one popular way to evaluate scal policies in recent literature (see e.g. Baier
and Glomm (2001) and Ardagna (2007)). Following Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen
(1992) and Ohanian (1997), the additional level of consumption,  i to give to the agent
is calculated so that he is equally well o¤ in two cases of exogenous policy and optimal
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policy. Mathematically,  i satises the following equation:














 + (1  )  1 H iE 1 i  1 : (50)
The welfare losses and gains for the capitalists and the workers are denoted by k
and w, respectively, together with the welfare losses and gains at the aggregate level,
.33 The subscript E denotes the exogenous policy while the subscript R denotes the
Ramsey policy U
i
E is the contingent utility of agent i in the model with exogenous
policy in which he would increase  i fraction of the consumption such that he can
enjoy the same utility as in the model with optimal policy.
A positive  i implies that the agent is better o¤ in the optimal policy case while a
negative  i implies that the agent is better o¤ in the exogenous policy case. The agent
will be indi¤erent about two policies if  i is zero.
1.7.1 Model without prots
The values for i for agents in the benchmark model are rst computed by varying the
values for . Table 1.12 in what follows reports the di¤erent values of i under di¤erent
values of . We can refer to di¤erent columns in this table for welfare losses or gains
for di¤erent agents.





Worker (w) Aggregate ()
 (1) (2) (3)
0.000 0.276 0.028 0.052
0.105 0.276 0.028 0.052
0.110 0.276 0.028 0.052
0.115 0.276 0.028 0.052
0.120 0.276 0.028 0.052
0.125 0.276 0.028 0.052
As can be seen in Table 1.12, the optimal taxation in Ramsey can improve the
welfare of all agents in all cases of di¤erent . There does not exist a conict of interests
between agents. In the benchmark model, the long-run optimal zero capital taxation
holds no matter the weight attached to the welfare capitalists, i.e. k = 0:276 > 0.
33The derivation of the formula for i is provided in the Appendix 1.A.4.
54
This is because the long-run optimal zero capital tax increases the private investment
and therefore capital stock. The income and consumption of capitalists increases in
the long run. Recalling the utility function of capitalists, the welfare of capitalists
depends on the private consumption and per capita government consumption because
the capitalists do not work in the economy. The increase in private consumption
increases the welfare of capitalists.
The welfare of workers improves as well. It has been demonstrated, in the steady-
state analysis above, that the long-run optimal negative replacement rate is equivalent
to a subsidy to work. This leads to a rise in the labour supply of workers. On one
hand, the income, consumption welfare of workers increases as a result of higher labour
supply as working can generate higher income for the workers. On the other hand, the
welfare of workers decreases because the utility of workers negatively depends on the
labour supply. As can be seen in Table 1.12, the positive e¤ect dominates and the
workers are better o¤ in the setup of Ramsey, i.e. w = 0:028 > 0.
Both capitalists and workers are better o¤ at the steady-state of Ramsey setup
no matter whether the government is Benthamite or partisan. The optimal policy is
Pareto improving in the long run, but the welfare gains for the capitalists relative to
the workers are bigger. This implies that the optimal taxation increases the welfare
inequality.
1.7.2 Model with prots
The welfare gains or losses for agents in the model with prots are next analysed. Table
1.13 shows di¤erent values for  i for di¤erent values of . The results are compared
with those in Table 1.12 in order to investigate the distributional e¤ects of optimal
taxation.
Apparently, the commonality of interests no longer holds in the modied model with
strictly positive prots. The presence of prots creates the conict of interests between
agents. As can be seen in Table 1.11 above, when the government cares more about
the capitalists, it substantially decreases the capital income tax in order to reduce the
distortion in the capital market. The capital income tax turns into a subsidy when
 exceeds 0.110. The capital tax cut is associated with a higher labour income tax.
Thus, the welfare of workers goes down as  increases. When the weight attached to
the welfare of capitalists increases above the critical value of 0.110, the steady-state
welfare of workers decreases in the optimal policy case compared to the exogenous
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policy case, i.e. w =  0:003 < 0.





Worker (w) Aggregate ()
 (1) (2) (3)
0.000 0.040 0.014 0.017
0.105 0.332 0.001 0.036
0.110 0.370 -0.003 0.039
0.115 0.420 -0.008 0.043
0.120 0.492 -0.016 0.050
0.125 0.671 -0.038 0.061
The above ndings show that, with the presence of prots, the government redis-
tributes welfare towards capitalists, when  reaches a critical level. In the modied
model with non-zero prots, the government values distortion in the capital market
more than labour market distortion. This incentive leads to a decrease in the optimal
capital income tax and therefore the long-run welfare gains for capitalists increase while
the welfare gains for workers decrease as  increases. Therefore, there is a conict of
interests between agents.
1.8 Summary and concluding remarks
This chapter used two di¤erent heterogeneous agent models with equilibrium unem-
ployment to study the e¤ects of optimal taxation on unemployment, the distribution
of income and welfare of agents. The agent heterogeneity lay in the working and saving
propensities of households. The capitalists by assumption did not work and the workers
did not save. In the rst model the rms earned zero economic prots in equilibrium
while in the second model the equilibrium prots were non-zero due to the presence
of productive public investment. In both models, equilibrium unemployment was gen-
erated in the competitive labour market as the outcome of optimal choices made by
workers. The main ndings can be summarized as follows.
First, in the model with zero economic prots, we show that the optimal tax rate on
capital income should be zero in the long run which is consistent with Judd (1985) and
Chamley (1986). It is optimal for the government to tax the leisure of workers in the
long run. This is equivalent to a subsidy to the labour supply of workers. Meanwhile,
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the government slightly increases the tax rate on labour income. The distortions in the
labour market caused by the distortionary labour tax can be completely eliminated as
a consequence of the equal amount of government subsidies to the workers in the form
of taxation on the leisure. As a result, the labour supply of workers increases which is
benecial to the workers. The income, consumption and welfare of workers improves
in the long run. In addition, as in Judd (1985), The weight to the welfare of agent in
the Ramsey setup of the government does not matter for the long-run optimal policy.
This implies that there is no conict of interests between agents in the long run in the
benchmark model.
Second, the result of long-run optimal zero capital tax cannot be obtained in the
modied model. The optimal tax rate on capital income is found to be negative in the
long run which means the government chooses to subsidize the capital income in the
long run. There are two opposing e¤ects in determining the direction of optimal capital
taxation: the under-investment e¤ect and the prot e¤ect (see e.g. Guo and Lansing
(1999)). In our model, on one hand, the crowding-out e¤ect of public investment is
equivalent to the under-investment e¤ect which motivates a Benthamite government to
use a subsidy to the capital income to help reduce the distortions in the capital market.
On the other hand, the presence of prots motivates the government to use a positive
tax rate on capital income as taxing prots is not distortionary. In our case, we show
that the under-investment e¤ect outweighs the prot e¤ect. As a result, the government
subsidizes the capital income in the long run. The negative capital income tax directly
increases the investment of capitalists and therefore the income, consumption and
welfare of capitalists increase. As in the benchmark model, the government subsidizes
the labour supply of workers while the tax rate on labour income slightly increases.
These two policy instruments have opposing e¤ects on the labour supply of workers.
We nd that the positive e¤ect of labour subsidy dominates so that the labour supply
of workers is higher than it would be in the model with given policy. In the presence of
prots, the tax distortion in the labour market cannot be completely eliminated in the
long run. The distortion causes welfare losses for workers. Finally, in contrast to the
benchmark model, the weight to the welfare of agent matters for the optimal taxation
under commitment in the modied model. The e¤ects are found to be monotonic. This
implies that the optimal taxation generates conict of interests between agents and it
has redistributional e¤ects in the long run. As the weight to the welfare of capitalists
increases, the capital taxation decreases and it turns into a subsidy after a critical
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value. The tax rate on labour income increases in order to make up for the losses in
governments tax revenues. In this case, a trade-o¤between e¢ ciency and equity needs
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We rst take natural logs of equations. We then di¤erentiate the resulting logged
equations at the steady-state with respect to time. The log-linearization of the non-































 + (1  )
i 1
 1 



















 + (1  )
i











































































































































c 1 + (1  )i dt +
+
1
[1 + (1   k) (r   p)] dt

















































































































[1 + (1   k) (r   p)]
"
(1   k)rd (rt+1)
rdt





















c 1 + (1  )i
=  














c 1 + (1  )i +
+
h
(1   k)rEtbrt+1   (r   p)  kEtb kt+1i
[1 + (1   k) (r   p)] (51)


























































































(1  w) dt  
1





























































































c  1+ Cw bCwt + !GcbGct
= bwt   w
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bwt = bY ft   bHwt (54)
Ckt +K
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Ck bCkt +KpEt bKpt+1   (1  p)Kp bKpt i
=
h
Kprbrt +Kpr bKpt   (r   p)Kp kb kt i  h kKprbrt +  k (r   p)Kp bKpt i (55)
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Cwt = (1  wt )wtHwt + rtwt (1 Hwt )
ln (Cwt ) = ln [(1  wt )wtHwt + rtwt (1 Hwt )]
d ln (Cwt )
dt
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bY ft = bAt + 1 bKpt + 2 bHwt (58)
ln(At+1) = (1  a) ln (A0) + a ln (At) + "at+1
Et ln(At+1) = (1  a) ln (A0) + a ln (At)
Etd ln(At+1)
dt










Et bAt+1 = a bAt (59)
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Etb kt+1 = kb kt (60)
ln(wt+1) = (1  w) ln (w0 ) + w ln (wt ) + "wt+1
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Etbwt+1 = wbwt (61)
ln(rt+1) = (1  r) ln (r0) + r ln (rt) + "rt+1














Etbrt+1 = rbrt (62)
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1.A.3 Simulation of the model











which are all nor-
mally distributed with the sample size of T = 100. The evolution equations of the
predetermined and non-predetermined variables are given by the following equations,
respectively:
Etbxt+1 = Ebxt (63)
and byt = Fbxt (64)
where bxt = [ bKpt ; bAt;b kt ;bwt ;brt]0; yt = [ bCkt ; bCwt ; bHwt ; bY ft ; brt; bwt; bGct ]0; and E and F are
5 5 and 7 5 coe¢ cient matrices specifying the laws of motion for the variables in
vectors xt and yt.
Then, the simulation for these variables in conducted using the following rst-order
linear di¤erence equations: bxt+1 = Ebxt +G"t+1 (65)
and byt = Fbxt +H"t (66)










and H is a 7 4
zero matrix. The coe¢ cient matrix G is given by:
G =
26666666664
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
37777777775
: (67)
Based on the above system, the function dimpulse in the Matlab can be used to
simulate the impulse responses of the variables to the random shock.
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1.A.4 Derivation of i
i satises the follow equation implying that the agent i is as well o¤ in the exogenous
policy model as in the Ramsey model.
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Chapter 2: The welfare e¤ects of tax reforms under
market distortions
Abstract: This chapter examines the importance of imperfect competition in product
and labour markets in determining the welfare e¤ects of tax reforms assuming agent
heterogeneity in capital holdings. The analysis shows that each of these market failures,
independently, results in welfare losses for at least one segment of the population, after
a capital tax cut and a concurrent labour tax increase. However, when these two market
failures are combined in a realistic calibration to the UK economy, they imply that a
capital tax cut will be Pareto improving. Consistent with the theory of second-best,
these two distortions in this context work to correct the negative distributional e¤ects
of a capital tax cut that each one, on its own, creates.
2.1 Introduction
The seminal research of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) established that the optimal
tax policy under commitment is to set a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, while,
concurrently, increasing labour taxes to the level required to nance public spending.34
A striking implication of this result is that despite the higher tax burden for those
agents not holding capital, optimal tax policy is Pareto improving in the long run.
The intuition is that the gains from increased labour productivity, induced by higher
capital accumulation, compensate for the costs of higher labour taxes and hence labour
income is increased.35
Another strand in the literature has focused on the distributional e¤ects of tax
reforms in models where the optimal long-run zero capital tax may or may not obtain
(see e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) for a review of this literature). For instance, Domeij
and Heathcote (2004) show that there can be distributional e¤ects from cutting capital
taxes in the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Garcia-Milà et
al. (2010) nd that there will be lifetime welfare losses for labour from a tax reform
34A signicant body of literature has examined the conditions under which an optimal non-zero
capital tax might be obtained in the long run. For example Guo and Lansing (1999) and Domeij
(2005) introduce product and labour market power respectively into representative agent models
assuming governments have access to a commitment technology. Also see Klein et al. (2008) who,
in contrast, use a representative agent framework without market frictions assuming time-consistent
Markov policies.
35Note that a non-zero optimal capital tax can be obtained in models with heterogeneous agents,
under skill di¤erences (see e.g. Conesa et al. (2009)) or lack of commitment mechanisms on the part
of the government (see e.g. Krusell (2002) and Angelopoulos et al. (2011a)).
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that implements the zero capital tax. This is because the benets to labour, through
the high capital and productivity channel, occur in the long run, whereas the costs, in
the form of higher labour taxes, have an immediate e¤ect. Also Angelopoulos et al.
(2011b) show that if capital complements skilled labour more than unskilled, capital
tax cuts can be skill-biased and thus hurt unskilled labour.
With a view to contributing to the tax policy literature focussed on distributional
issues, the importance of unionised labour markets and monopolistically competitive
product markets in determining the welfare e¤ects of tax reforms that re-allocate the
tax burden from capital to labour is investigated. In this setup the government taxes
capital income, including interest on savings and prots, and labour income by using
two di¤erent tax rates. In the unionised labour market, the wage rate is determined,
following Nickell and Andrews (1983), Farber (1986), Pissarides (1998) and Kass and
von Thadden (2004), as the outcome of a Nash-bargain between unions and rms.
Also, given the importance of the unemployment benet as the outside option in the
Nash-bargaining process, we include it as a component of government spending along
with non-employment related public transfers. In the monopolistically competitive
product market, following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and
Guo and Lansing (1999), intermediate goods producers earn non-zero economic prots.
To highlight the importance of union bargaining and rm power in the product market
relative to the competitive model of Judd (1985) we assume a standard neoclassical
production technology without skill heterogeneity. Therefore, agents are distinguished
in this setup by di¤erences in their capital holdings, which can be motivated by imper-
fections in the asset markets that require agents to pay di¤erent participation premia,
see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (2009). On the other hand, households are identical in the
labour market since unions guarantee that their members have equal employment and
wages (see e.g. Pissarides (1998), Ma¤ezzoli (2001) and Ardagna (2007)). Following,
for example, Judd (1985), Lansing (1999), Krusell (2002) and Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003), we allow for two types of households that are termed as capitalists and workers
and assume that workers do not participate in the asset market. The capitalists, on
the other hand, own the rms and invest in capital in the economy.
The setup regarding heterogeneity in rm ownership is similar to Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003), who also consider a model with an entrepreneur and a worker assuming
unionised labour markets and monopolistic product markets to examine the e¤ects of
de-regulation in the product and labour markets. We build on this framework to focus
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instead on the interactions between product and labour market failures in determining
the welfare and inequality e¤ects of factor income taxation. This requires that we
extend Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) by introducing tax policy and productive capital,
which the entrepreneurs-capitalists own.
To understand the quantitative implications of distortions in the labour and product
markets when assessing the welfare e¤ects of tax reforms, the model is calibrated so
that its steady-state reproduces the main features of the current UK economy and,
in particular, its tax structure and long-run unemployment rate. The UK is used
to illustrate the quantitative analysis since unions play an important role in wage-
bargaining at the rm-level compared to other EU economies36 and because its tax
structure stands in stark contrast with other European countries, by having a very
high capital to labour income tax ratio.37
Since the e¤ects of tax reforms that reduce the capital tax are monotonic in the
setup, implementing a reform that is consistent with the "zero capital tax" prescrip-
tion from the optimal taxation literature is focused on.38 Tax reforms have recently
received a great deal of attention by both academics and policymakers (see e.g. the
discussion in Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) for OECD countries and the Mirrlees Review,
Mirrlees et al. (2010, 2011) for the UK). However, to the best of our knowledge, the
potential distributional e¤ects of such reforms have not been examined under imperfect
competition in both product and labour markets. Given the relevance of these market
failures, which the scal authorities must largely take as given institutional features
when designing tax reforms, our analysis aims to inform current policy discussions in
the UK and other advanced economies.
The last section of this chapter solves for the laws of motion of variables and studies
the dynamic behavior of the economy in response to a temporary and unanticipated 1%
cut in the tax rate on capital income. The results of post-policy change are compared
with the initial steady-state. The results emphasize the importance of labour and
36For example, see the OECD Employment Outlook 2004 which distinguishes levels of bargaining
in terms of where labour contracts are negotiated for the period 1970-2000. The data show that wage
bargaining in the UK mainly occurs at the rm-level since 1980. The evidence also suggests that there
is little or no coordination by upper-level associations. In contrast, in many other European countries,
e.g. Belgium, Germany and Spain, bargaining takes place at the industry-level.
37According to the ECFIN tax rates (see Martinez-Mongay (2000)) the UK implicit tax rate on
labour is 26.5% compared to 37.5% in the EU-11. In contrast, the implicit tax rate on capital of 47%
in the UK is well above the rate of 30% in the EU-11, and indeed is one of the highest in the EU.
More details on tax and other data used for the calibration are provided later in Section 2.3.
38See, however, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for a discussion of Ramsey taxation in models with
distortions and Hagedorn (2010) on how labour market distortions can result in non-convexities in
the Ramsey problem.
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product market distortions in determining the dynamic e¤ects of tax policy changes
on unemployment, the distribution of income and welfare. Moreover, our analysis
highlights the similarities and di¤erences in the transmission mechanisms of tax policy
changes across four alternative models.
The over-arching nding is that the presence of labour and product market distor-
tions is critical in determining not only the size but also the direction of welfare e¤ects
after the capital tax cut and, in particular, whether a capital tax cut can be Pareto
improving. Previous research suggests that, on their own, each of these failures should
result in welfare losses for at least a segment of the population, after a capital tax cut
and a concurrent labour tax increase. For instance, Ardagna (2007) employs a model
with monopoly union power and documents negative welfare e¤ects for workers after
increases in labour taxes, while Guo and Lansing (1999) show that the optimal capital
tax in a model with monopolistic competition in the product market can be non-zero.
While these implications are conrmed in the model, it has been found that when both
failures characterise the economy, one distortion e¤ectively corrects the other in a way
that a capital tax cut can be Pareto improving.
The specic results can be summarised as follows. First, in the model with only the
labour market distortion, a tax reform that implements a zero capital tax will imply
welfare losses for the workers in the long run, whereas capitalists and aggregate welfare
increase. As in the model with perfectly competitive labour and product markets, when
the capital tax is set to zero, the labour tax will have to increase to make up for the
loss in tax revenue. However, given the non-competitive labour market, this increase
in labour taxes will lead to a rise in unemployment, because it lowers the returns
to work and thus makes the outside option, in the form of unemployment benets,
more attractive to the union. The unemployment channel is the critical link that
modies the results from the benchmark model with competitive labour markets.39 In
particular, although labour productivity and the wage rate increase in the long run,
thanks to the higher capital accumulation, the workers cannot capture the full benet
of this as unemployment has also increased and the return to unemployment, i.e. the
unemployment benet, is less than the wage rate.
Second, under competitive labour markets but non-competitive product markets,
39The quantitative importance of the unemployment channel is conrmed by contrasting the above
results to those obtained by performing the same experiment in the model with perfectly competitive
labour markets, also calibrated to the same tax structure for the UK economy. In this case there are
welfare gains for all agents.
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there are welfare gains for the capitalists, losses for the workers, and also losses at the
aggregate level, by a reform that implements a zero tax on capital income. This happens
because, in this case, the government foregoes revenue from a non-distortionary tax
base comprised of "pure prots" so that the required increase in the labour tax is larger
and thus the after-tax wage decreases after the tax reform.
Third, monopolistic competition in the product market under unionised labour
markets, introduces a market failure that works to correct the negative implications
of imperfect labour markets. In particular, monopolistic competition tends to reduce
the positive revenue e¤ects of the increase in output after a capital tax cut and thus
reduces the benets to the rm for a successful outcome of wage bargaining. In turn,
this implies that the relative attractiveness of the rms outside option in bargaining
and its power relative to the union increases. This tends to increase employment and
the benets to all agents after a tax cut.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model
structure and Section 2.3 discusses the calibration of the model to the current UK
economy. The results of tax reforms are analysed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 solves the
model and studies the dynamic behavior of the economy in response to a temporary
and unanticipated capital tax cut and nally Section 2.6 gives a summary of the model
and concludes.
2.2 The model
A model economy that allows for imperfect competition in both labour and product
markets is described in this section. The economy consists of innitely lived house-
holds, rms, trade unions, and a government. Households are comprised of capitalists
and workers. Capitalists can work and save in the form of capital, own rms and
receive prots. Workers, in contrast, do not save and thus consume all their dispos-
able income in each period. Both capitalists and workers can spend part of their time
endowment either employed or unemployed and receive unemployment benets from
the government when not working. All households are represented by rm-level trade
unions which determine work hours and bargain with rms over the wage rate with
the aim of maximising the average labour income of their members. Firms include
nal and intermediate goods producers. Final goods producers are competitive, but
intermediate goods producers have monopoly power in the product market and seek
to maximise prots employing workers from the unionised labour market and capital
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from the perfectly competitive asset market. Finally, exogenous public policy consists
of the government taxing interest income from capital, prots and labour income to
nance unemployment benets and other non-employment related public transfers.
The timing of events in this setup is as follows. Given scal policy, unions and inter-
mediate goods producers bargain over the wage rate, subject to the demand functions
for labour and intermediate goods, by taking capital accumulation as given. Next, each
intermediate goods producer, taking factor prices, nal output and government policy
as given, chooses factor quantities to maximise prots, subject to the demand function
by the nal goods producer for its output. Finally, nal goods producers generate out-
put and households make their savings decisions, taking all prices and policy variables
as given.
2.2.1 Population composition
Total population, N , is exogenous and constant over time with capitalists and workers
respectively being denoted asNk andNw. The population share of capitalists is dened
as: Nk=N  nk, and the workers share as Nw=N  nw = 1 nk. Finally each capitalist
is assumed to own one intermediate goods-producing rm, hence the number of rms,
N f = Nk.
2.2.2 Households
As pointed out above, the households which populate the model have unequal access to
the nancial markets. This is motivated by imperfections in the asset markets that re-
quire agents to pay transactions costs to participate. These participation premia di¤er
between the agents due to, for instance, past experience, socioeconomic background,
networks, or rm ownership that gives an insider advantage in nancial transactions
(see e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (2009) for
further discussion and micro-foundations for capital market imperfections and income
inequality). On the other hand, households are identical in the labour market since
unions guarantee that their members have equal employment and wages (see e.g. Pis-
sarides (1998)).40
Following, for example, Judd (1985), Lansing (1999), Krusell (2002) and Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) there are two types of households, termed as capitalists and work-
40For a model with price taking rms and uninsured idiosyncratic employment risk due to incomplete
nancial markets and search frictions, see Krusell et al. (2010).
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ers, that face, respectively, the minimum (zero) and maximum (innity) participation








where Cit is household is private consumption; 0 <  < 1 is the constant discount
rate; and  > 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
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 kt (rt   )Kkt + (1  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where Ikt is the investment; K
k
t is the capital stock held at the beginning of time t; rt is
the gross return to capital; kt is prots; et = 1  ut is the per capita employment rate
with ut denoting the per capita unemployment rate; wt is the gross wage rate; G
u
t is
per capita unemployment benets; G
t
t is per capita government transfers; 0  wt < 1
is the tax rate on labour income; 0   kt < 1 is the tax rate on capital income; and
0 <  < 1 is the constant depreciation rate of capital stock.41
The capital stock evolves according to:
Kkt+1 = (1  )Kkt + Ikt : (71)
Each workers within period budget constraint is given by:
Cwt = (1  wt )wtet +G
u
t (1  et) +G
t
t: (72)
Each household is randomly allocated to a union which bargains with a rm to
determine employment, et, and the wage rate, wt. Given that we will work with a
symmetric equilibrium, employment and the wage rate will be the same for all house-
holds, so that the allocation of households to unions does not matter. In other words,
the hetererogeneity in the labour market is not examined in the model. Instead, all
heterogeneity in our model is driven by di¤erences in asset ownership.42
41Note that capital taxes are assumed to be net of depreciation as in e.g. Lansing (1998). Also,
as in Guo and Lansing (1999), the scal authority cannot impose a separate tax rate on prots and
on interest income from savings, since it is di¢ cult, in practice, to distinguish these two sources of
capital income. If a separate prot tax was available, welfare could be improved by using this tax
instrument, relative to the others, given that taxing prots does not distort incentives.
42To simplify notation, household subscripts are not used for et and wt, since these quantities will
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subject to (70) and (71) taking market prices frt; wtg1t=0, the employment rate fetg1t=0,
policy variables
n









, and Kk0 as given. The work hours for capitalists
and the wage rate are determined by the bargain between the union and rm.
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where kt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with capitalists budget constraint.













The FOC for Kkt+1 is:
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
: (74)
These two optimality conditions from capitalists utility maximization problem de-
scribe the optimal intertemporal choice made by the capitalist in equilibrium.
Since the worker does not save and given that his work hours also depend on the
outcome of the Nash bargain, optimal consumption simply follows residually from his





average, or per capita outcomes.
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budget constraint in (72).
2.2.3 Firms
There are two production sectors: intermediate goods sector and nal goods sector.
Following for example, Guo and Lansing (1999), the model allows for monopolistic
power in the intermediate goods market. A unique nal good, Yt, is produced according











f = 1 are weights attached to intermediate goods producers; and 0 <   1
implies the degree of monopoly power of intermediate goods producers. Final goods
producers behave competitively and choose intermediate inputs, Y ft , to maximize
prots, t, taking the price of these inputs, P
f
t , as given:
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which is the demand function for intermediate input in the nal goods production and
can be rewritten as follows:






Final goods production is completely competitive and this implies zero prots of
the rm:


































which could be thought of as zero-prot condition in the nal goods sector.
In intermediate goods sector, each rm produces its individual output, Y ft , with a
constant-returns-to-scale technology in two productive inputs: capital, Kft , and labour,
Lft :







where A is neutral technical progress and 0 <  < 1 denotes capitals share of output.





t   rtKft   wft Lft . (85)
Taking factor prices, rt and w
f
t , and nal output, Yt, as given, the intermediate rm
chooses Kft and L
f
t to maximize prots (85) subject to its production function (84),
and the demand function for its output (80).
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which is the demand function for physical capital services in the intermediate goods
sector.




= wft : (87)
In equilibrium, the resulting prots in the intermediate goods sector are:
ft = (1  )P ft Y ft : (88)
If we restrict our attention to a symmetric equilibrium, all the intermediate pro-
ducers are identical so that the products they produce are identical. In this case, the
same wage rate is paid to the households by all rms, i.e. wft = wt for all f . These two
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implications of P ft = 1 and Y
f
t = Yt can be obtained in equilibrium conditions (83)











ft = (1  )Y ft : (91)
When  = 1, intermediate goods are perfect substitutes in the production of the
nal good implying that intermediate goods producers have no power in the product
market. In this case, prices are given for these producers and thus there is perfect
competition. However, when  < 1, the demand function is downward sloping and
they can exploit their monopoly power to maximise non-zero prots.
2.2.4 Unions
Following the literature cited in the introduction, the right-to-manage setup is employed
where unions and rms (intermediate goods producer) bargain over the wage rate. For
simplicity, each union is assumed to bargain with one rm to determine the wage rate
(see e.g. Pissarides (1998)). Given that we will work with a symmetric equilibrium,
this assumption is not important. Moreover, for tractability, and following for example,
Domeij (2005) and Koskela and von Thadden (2008), two simplifying assumptions are
made regarding this bargaining process.43 First, unions are small enough so that they
do not internalise the e¤ects of the wage rate on capital accumulation and thus on
future prices. Second, rms are also small enough so that they do not internalise the
e¤ects of the outcome of wage bargaining on capital accumulation.
The above assumptions imply that unions and rms take capital as given when
bargaining over the wage rate. This form of myopia allows for a technical simplication
in that it e¤ectively reduces the wage-bargaining problem to a series of static problems,
as in for example, Pissarides (1998), Ma¤ezzoli (2001) and Ardagna (2007). The union
and the intermediate goods producer bargain over the wage rate to maximise a weighted
43See Domeij (2005), Koskela and von Thadden (2008) and the references therein for the empirical
relevance of these assumptions.
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average of labour income and prots:
UNt =
h



























ing the capital stock,Kft , nal output, Yt, and the scal policy variables,
n














is the unemployment rate and 0    1 describes the relative bargaining power of
the union with  = 1 representing the monopoly union case. Note that the union






, while the rm tar-
gets average prots, ft . The outside option for the union is the unemployment benet,
G
u
t , while for the rm it is the sunk cost of capital,  rtKft , which is a consequence of
the assumption that the representative rm takes the average capital accumulation as
given. It is important to note that while the agents involved in Nash-bargaining over
the wage rate do not internalise the e¤ects of the wage rate on capital accumulation
which is consistent with Domeij (2005) and Koskela and von Thadden (2008).
To get the optimality conditions of the union, the labour demand function is used
as a constraint in the Lagrangian function of the union and we derive the rst-order
conditions with respect to wt and et. The variable 
u
t is the Lagrangian multiplier on
the labour demand function. Alternatively, the variable, et, can be substituted out in
the bargaining function (92) by using the labour demand function. The choice variable
of union is therefore only wt. In practice, these two methods are analytically equivalent.
We have examined that both methods yield the same equilibrium conditions.44
2.2.5 Government and market clearing conditions






t (1  et) = nk kt (rt   )Kkt + nk kt kt + wt wtet: (93)
To ensure that the government budget is balanced at each time t, the wage income
44The analytical solution to the bargaining problem is obtained using Matlab programs. In order
to save space, we did not present the intermediate mathematical steps. But they are available upon
request.
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tax, wt , is residually determined. In what follows, the government spending instru-




, respectively, so that any
changes in the capital tax rate,  kt , will be met by changes in 
w
t , ensuring that the
budget constraint of the government is satised.
2.2.6 Market-clearing conditions and recourse constraint












Finally, in the goods market, the economys per capita resource constraint is:





Kkt+1   (1  )Kkt

: (97)
2.2.7 Decentralized equilibrium (given policy)
The decentralized equilibrium conditions are now summarised in real terms and as
a symmetric equilibrium implying that Y ft = Yt, w
f
t = wt and P
f
t = 1 for all f .
Given the paths of prices fwt; rtg1t=0 the policy instruments
n
















and one residually determined policy instrument, wt , such that (i)
households, rms and unions undertake their respective optimization problems outlined
above; (ii) all budget constraints are satised; and (iii) all markets clear.
To summarize, the DE45 consists of the capitalists optimality conditions for Ckt




t ; the budget constraints of
workers and government, i.e. BCw and BCg; the aggregate resource constraint, RC;
the market clearing conditions in the capital, dividend and labour markets, i.e. MCK ,
45The full DE conditions are provided in the Appendix 2.A.1. Note that relying on Walrass law,
the budget constraint of the capitalist can be dropped from the DE.
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MC and MCL; the unions optimality condition for the wage rate, wt, and constraint
for the employment rate, et.
2.3 Calibration to the UK economy
2.3.1 Calibration
The structural parameters of the model with product and labour market distortions
are next calibrated so that its steady-state solution reects the main empirical char-
acteristics of the UK economy, with particular emphasis on the tax rates and the un-
employment rate. The structural parameters for the full model, including both labour
and product market distortions, are reported in Table 2.1 with the implied steady-state
solution in Column (1) of Table 2.2.
Table 2.1: Calibration (labour and product market distortions)
Parameter Denition Value
0 <  < 1 rate of time preference 0.970
0 <  < 1 capitals share 0.350
0 <  < 1 depreciation rate on capital 0.100
0 < nk < 1 population share of capitalists 0.300
 > 1 relative risk aversion coe¢ cient 2.000
A > 0 TFP level 1.000
0    1 union power 0.500
0 <   1 product market power 0.900
G
t
> 0 per capita public transfers 0.309
G
u
> 0 per capita unemployment benet 0.475
0   k < 1 tax rate on capital income 0.442
According to the Family Resources Survey in 2008-2009, about 30% of households
have savings and investments above £ 10,000.46 Assuming, for the households with
savings below this threshold, that capital income does not constitute a signicant
portion of their budget, the share of capitalists, nk, is set to 0:3. The productivity
parameter, A; is normalised to 1. The common values from the literature are used for
the: (i) intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1= = 0:5 or  = 2; (ii) depreciation
46The survey is sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions (see their Table 4.9 in Chapter
4: Savings and Investments of the 2008-2009 Annual Report for the information reported here).
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rate,  = 0:1; and (iii) annual rate of time preference,  = 0:97, (see, e.g. Angelopoulos
et al. (2011b) and references therein). Together with a standard value for the capital
productivity parameter,  = 0:35,47 these parameters imply that in the steady-state
the capital-to-output ratio is about 2.
The value for union power,  = 0:5, is chosen to be the middle of the range (i.e. 0:4
to 0:6) of values typically used in the literature (see e.g. Domeij (2005) for a discussion
of the relevant studies and empirical evidence). It is shown later that the results which
follow in the remainder of the study remain qualitatively robust to lower and higher
values of  encompassing this range.
The base calibration also allows for market power in the product market by setting
 = 0:9, implying that prots, in equilibrium, amount to 10% of GDP. This value
approximates the magnitude typically employed in New Keynesian models to capture
the price mark-up over marginal costs (see, e.g. Leith and Malley (2005)). As with
union power, it is shown below that the results which follow, generally, do not change
qualitatively when di¤erent values of  are considered.
E¤ective average tax rates for capital and labour income from 1970-2005 are con-
structed by following the approach in Conesa et al. (2007) using data from the National
Accounts and the Public Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation databases (available
from OECD.Stat database). The average capital tax rate over the time period is
 k = 0:442. This dataset also implies that the average tax rate on labour income is




, are thus calibrated so that the implied
model solution for w is 0:27 and the unemployment rate is 7%. The unemployment
rate corresponds to the average from 1970 to 2010 from the UK O¢ ce for National
Statistics.
The steady-state solution of four di¤erent models given the above parameterisation,




= 0:227 and G
u
Y
= 0:024, which further implies that government spending in
transfers is about 25% of GDP, consistent with UK data from the OECD.Stat database.
In addition, it suggests a replacement ratio, G
u
w
, of about 50% in the long run. This
rate is comparable with data for industrialised countries (see e.g. Nickell and Nunziata
47Note that the value for  is di¤erent from the one employed in Chapter 1. This is because the
calibration in Chapter 1 is completely based on the data. However, in this chapter, this value is chosen
to yield the steady-state capital-to-output ratio of 2.
48Following the approach in Conesa et al. (2007) gives similar qualitative tax rates for the UK to
those in Martinez-Mongay (2000), and has the advantage that the data for a longer period can be
employed.
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(2001)) and values used in previous studies, ranging from 45% (Shi and Wen (1999))
to 60% (Pissarides (1998)).
2.3.2 Steady-state solution
Table 2.2 also reports the net returns to labour and capital, ew = w(1   w) ander = (r   )  1   k, respectively, which will be useful for the analysis which follows.
Finally aggregate or social welfare, U , is dened in the Benthamite fashion as the
average welfare of all agents in the economy.
Table 2.2: Pre-reform steady-states
Full Comp. Union Prots
Model Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C
Y
0.797 0.775 0.775 0.797
Ik
Y
0.203 0.225 0.225 0.203
Kk
Y
2.027 2.252 2.252 2.027
Gt
Y
0.227 0.231 0.203 0.252
Gu
Y
0.024 0.000 0.028 0.000

Y




0.499 0.000 0.575 0.000
w 0.270 0.270 0.270 0.270
(1  e) 0.070 0.000 0.070 0.000
w 0.951 1.006 1.006 0.856ew 0.694 0.735 0.735 0.625
r 0.173 0.155 0.155 0.155er 0.041 0.031 0.031 0.031
Ck 1.461 1.451 1.350 1.571
Cw 0.924 1.092 1.015 0.993
Uk -22.82 -22.97 -24.70 -21.22
Uw -36.09 -30.53 -32.83 -33.57
U -32.11 -28.26 -30.39 -29.86
To obtain benchmarks that will help contextualise the importance of the two dis-
tortions in the labour and product markets, in addition to the full model shown in
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Column (1) of Table 2.2, the relevant special cases are presented. For example, Column
(2) reports the steady-state results for the competitive model.49 This model e¤ectively
belongs to the set of models discussed in Judd (1985) and assumes an inelastic labour
supply implying that ek = ew = e = 1, or that unemployment is zero.50 Column
(3) covers the case when both nal and intermediate product markets are completely
competitive but labour markets are unionised.51 Following the setup in Guo and Lans-
ing (1999), albeit with inelastic labour supply, Column (4) shows the results for the
model when intermediate product markets are monopolistic but labour markets are
competitive.52
To understand the e¤ects of introducing union power to the competitive model and
to the prots model, compare respectively the results in Column (2) with (3) and (4)
with (1). It is clear that the labour market distortion worsens relative outcomes for
both agents through higher unemployment, lower labour income and lower consump-
tion. Hence welfare for both agents and thus aggregate welfare is lower in the models
incorporating unions.
Similarly the e¤ects of allowing for market power in the competitive model and in
the union model can be seen by comparing, respectively, the results in Column (2) with
(4) and (3) with (1). In both cases it can be seen that the welfare of capitalist has
increased though workers and aggregate welfare has decreased. This nding is driven
by higher relative consumption for the capitalist arising from non-zero economic prots
resulting from the intermediate goods production.
2.4 Steady-state e¤ects of tax reforms
We are now in a position to examine the distributional e¤ects of tax reforms that reduce
the tax burden on capital under market distortions in labour and product markets. In
all cases, the e¤ects of capital tax reductions are found to be monotonic and increase
49The results reported in Column (2) have been obtained using the parameters in Table 2.1 except
that  and G
u
are not relevant since unemployment is zero,  is equal to unity and G
t
is re-calibrated
so that the steady-state value of w = 0:27 can be achieved.
50The case of inelastic labour supply was also considered by Judd (1985) and is employed here
so that exogenous leisure is treated consistently across the models we employ. However, note that
the results reported below do not change qualitatively when we allow for endogenous leisure in the
perfectly competitive model.
51To obtain the results reported in Column (3), the parameters from Table 2.1 are employed,




are re-calibrated, so that the implied
model solutions for w and (1  e) are 0:27 and 0:07 respectively.
52The results reported in Column (4) have been obtained using the parameters in Table 2.1, except
that,  and are not relevant since unemployment is zero and Gt is re-calibrated so that the steady-state
value of w = 0:27 can be achieved.
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with the magnitude of the capital tax cut. Hence, we focus on a policy reform that
imposes a zero capital tax given, as pointed out in the introduction, its prominence in
the tax reform literature.
The e¤ects of the tax reform are evaluated by comparing the post- with the pre-
reform steady states since the distributional e¤ects of capital tax cuts in the long run
will be examined.53 In the Tables 2.3-2.6 which follow, for ease of comparison, the rel-
evant pre-reform results alongside the post-reform ones are repeated. To contextualise
the importance of market imperfections, the results for the benchmark case of compet-
itive markets are rst discussed. We next analyse the role of unionised labour markets
and imperfect product markets in isolation and then add product market power to
the labour market distortion. Finally, as a robustness exercise, in Tables 2.7 and 2.8
respectively, the quantitative importance of rm and union power is examined.
2.4.1 The competitive model
The steady-state allocations together with welfare in the competitive model are shown
in Table 2.3. The steady-state welfare gains and losses for capitalists and workers,
k and k, respectively, together with the welfare gains at the aggregate level,  are
also reported. These have been calculated as the consumption supplement required to
make the agent as well o¤ in both regimes.54 As can be seen, in the competitive model,
implementation of the tax reform will be Pareto improving in the long run, even if it
increases inequality. In other words, there are welfare gains for both type of agents,
although the gains for the capitalists compared to the workers are much higher (i.e.
8:3% versus 1:1%) and thus their relative welfare position improves. This is consistent
with Judds (1985) results that it is optimal for both types of agents to choose a zero
capital tax.
The trade-o¤ for the worker after implementing the zero capital tax can be seen by
noting that, although the labour tax, w, increases (i.e. from 0:27 to 0:324) to make up
for the loss in the tax revenue, due to the elimination of the capital tax, the wage rate,
w, rises as well (i.e. from 1:006 to 1:104). This implies that the net return to labour, ew,
also increases (i.e. 0:735 to 0:747) and thus income, consumption and welfare rise. The
53Note that it is already known that including the transition period will a¤ect the Pareto superiority
of capital tax cuts, even in models where a reduction in the capital tax is Pareto improving in the
long run (see e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) and Angelopoulos et al. (2011b)).





1    1, where WA and WB is
welfare post- and pre-reform, respectively.
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reason the wage rate increases by more than the tax rate is that the elimination of the
capital tax boosts investment and capital, which in turn increases labour productivity
and this is translated into higher wages. Therefore, everyone benets in the long run
by a reform that implements the zero capital tax.


























(1  e) 0.000 0.000
w 1.104 1.006ew 0.747 0.735









2.4.2 Unionised labour markets
The results for the model with distortions in the labour market are shown in Table
2.4. Under unionised labour markets, the welfare gains for all agents are generally
lower, compared to those obtained in the competitive model (see Table 2.3), and, more
94
importantly, there are now welfare losses for the workers in the long run. This occurs
since imperfect competition in the labour market negatively a¤ects the trade-o¤ for
the workers that arises with the implementation of the zero capital tax.


























(1  e) 0.082 0.070
w 1.104 1.006ew 0.735 0.735









For example, Table 2.4 shows that the rise in the wage rate (i.e. from 1.006 to
1.104), due to higher productivity, just makes up for the rise in the labour income tax
(i.e. from 0:27 to 0:334), so that the net wage for workers is the same before and after
the zero capital tax reform (i.e. ew = 0:735).
Given the existence of unemployment, the labour income tax has to increase by
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more under imperfect competition to raise the necessary tax revenue after the loss in
capital tax revenue. However, this rise in the labour tax has an additional side e¤ect
which ultimately hurts workers labour income. In particular, a higher labour tax
increases the unemployment rate, (1  e), (i.e. from 7% to 8:2%), given that, ceteris
paribus at the union-rm bargaining level, it decreases the returns to work and thus
makes the outside option more attractive to the union. At the same time, again at the
union-rm bargaining level, the rise in rmscapital stock increases output and this
tends to increase the desire of the rms for a successful outcome of the wage bargain
and thus further enhances the power of the unions.55
Since both e¤ects tend to increase unionspower, unemployment increases. This in
turn implies that the labour income of the worker falls since the wage rate is higher than
the unemployment benet. Therefore, the distortion in the labour market implies that
workers cannot fully benet from the positive e¤ects created from capital accumulation
and overall they are worse o¤ by a tax reform that eliminates capital and increases
labour taxes.
Our results for aggregate welfare are consistent with the long-run welfare gains to
the representative agent in a unionised labour market generated by a tax reform that
cuts capital taxes and increases labour taxes, see e.g. Daveri and Ma¤ezzoli (2001).
The quantitative magnitudes we nd suggest that such a reform would generate enough
gains to compensate the losers. Our ndings regarding the distributional e¤ects of
the tax reform are also consistent with those in Ardagna (2007) who uses a model
with monopoly union power following Ma¤ezzoli (2001). Under perfectly competitive
product markets, Ardagna (2007) includes a rich scal policy menu and government
sector employment to examine exogenous changes in scal instruments accommodated
by changes in government debt and nds that workersutility decreases after increases
in labour taxes.
2.4.3 Monopolistic product markets
The results for the model with distortions in the product markets are shown in Table
2.5. These suggest that there are welfare losses for the workers and at the aggregate
level, but big welfare gains for the capitalists. This occurs since imperfect competition
in the product market negatively a¤ects the trade-o¤ for the worker that arises with
55Note, given that there is perfect competition in the product market, prices are given for the rm
and thus the increase in output implies a similar increase in revenue. The importance of this will
become clearer when the case of monopolistic competition in product markets is considered below.
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the implementation of the zero capital tax.


























(1  e) 0.000 0.000
w 0.939 0.856ew 0.570 0.625









More specically, although the wage rate increases after the elimination of the
capital tax (i.e. from 0:856 to 0:939), due to the usual channel of increased capital
stock and labour productivity, the net wage decreases (i.e. from 0:625 to 0:57), as the
rise in the labour tax (i.e. from 0:27 to 0:393) is higher than the increase in the wage
rate. This implies that labour income is reduced and the workers are worse-o¤after the
tax reform. This results is driven by the fact that the loss in tax revenue from capital
is bigger under monopolistic prots, since prots represent an inelastic tax base. In
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turn, consistent with the ndings in Guo and Lansing (1999), this implies that the tax
rate on labour has to increase by more to make up for the loss in revenue, so that the
net wage is reduced.
2.4.4 Labour and product market distortions
The post-reform ndings in the model with distortions in both product and labour
market are shown in Table 2.6. These reveal that the zero capital tax is Pareto superior
to the current tax regime. This transpires since distortions in the product market work
to o¤set the e¤ects of imperfect competition in the labour market, resulting in a trade-
o¤ for the workers implying welfare gains in the long run after the capital tax cut.
Although again, after the tax reform, the net return to labour has remained the
same as in the pre-reform economy, unemployment falls from 7% to 0:6% and, given
that the wage rate is higher than the unemployment benet, income, consumption
and welfare for the workers increase as well. The two distortions create two opposing
e¤ects on unemployment after the tax reform. On one hand, the unionization of the
labour market implies that, as previously, the rise in the labour tax (i.e. from 0:27 to
0:334) decreases the return to work and thus makes the outside option more attractive
to the unions. However, the fall in the capital tax increases capital accumulation,
which increases each individual rms output, i.e. Y f goes up. Given that nal, per
capita output, Y , is taken as given, this increase in individual rms supply in the
monopolistic market implies a fall in its individual price, P f and tends to decrease the
expected revenue of the representative rm. Monopolistic competition, therefore, tends
to reduce the positive revenue e¤ects of the increase in output and overall reduces the
desire of the rms for a successful outcome of the wage bargain. In turn, this implies
that the relative attractiveness of the rmsoutside option in bargaining has increased,
or else that the rmspower relative to the unions has increased. The result of these
opposing e¤ects is a rise in employment which is benecial to the workers. Finally,
note that the welfare gains to the capitalists are bigger relative to the worker, so
that, although the elimination of the tax cut is Pareto superior, welfare inequality has
increased.
In general, our ndings for this case are consistent with results from policy analysis
in second-best environments, which suggest that adding more frictions may lead to
improved outcomes, given that one distortion might, e¤ectively, correct another. Inde-
pendently, each market failure implies that capital tax cuts will result in welfare losses
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for at least one segment of the population. Together, however, decreases in the capital
tax under monopolistic competition in the product markets and unionization in labour
markets are welfare improving for all agents.


























(1  e) 0.006 0.070
w 1.043 0.951ew 0.694 0.694









2.4.5 Changes in rm power
Using the full model, the importance of rm power in the product market on the
welfare gains/losses of a tax reform that eliminates the capital tax is examined, given
a unionised labour market (i.e.  = 0:5). The results for  between 0:9 and 1 are
summarised. For each case considered, we report the changes for consumption and the
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unemployment rate from a tax reform that eliminates the capital tax relative to the
current tax policy as well as the compensating consumption supplement for each agent
and the aggregate economy.56
Under unionised labour markets, the positive welfare e¤ects for both types of agents
are increased when the extent of monopolistic competition in the product market in-
creases. In particular, when rmspower in the product market is su¢ ciently high (for
our calibration, this occurs for  < 0:98), there are welfare gains to the workers to be
observed after the capital tax cut. As can be seen, the e¤ect of the tax reform on the
labour market is positive in these cases, in the sense that employment is increased.
This is because the monopolistic e¤ect on rmsrevenue is strong enough to outweigh,
in the wage bargaining problem, the negative e¤ects of increased labour taxes in the
trade-o¤ between the two market distortions discussed above.
Table 2.7: Firm power () in the product market
(changes relative to current policy)
0.900 0.950 0.980 0.990 1.000
Ck 0.400 0.240 0.150 0.122 0.093
Cw 0.009 0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(1  e) -0.064 -0.024 -0.002 0.005 0.012
k 0.273 0.170 0.109 0.090 0.069
w 0.010 0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
 0.057 0.038 0.024 0.020 0.015
2.4.6 Changes in union power
The importance of union power in the labour markets on the welfare gains of a tax
reform the eliminates the capital tax, for given rmspower in the product market
(i.e.  = 0:9) is next examined The parameter that measures the relative power of
unions vis-a-vis the rms in Nash-bargaining for the wage rate is . As discussed
earlier, our base calibration above is based on a value for  that is e¤ectively in the
middle of the range of the empirically relevant values. In what follows, the changes
in  that encompass the entire range used in the literature, (see e.g. Domeij (2005))
56Not that for all cases considered, the spending shares are re-calibrated so that the base in all
cases is an economy with 7% unemployment and 27% labour tax rate. Otherwise, the parameters
used are as in Table 2.1. Also note that the results in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 for consumption are in
percent di¤erences, whereas the unemployment rate is in percentage point di¤erences.
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are examined. As in Table 2.7, for each case considered, the results are reported as
changes from a tax reform that eliminates the capital tax relative to the current tax
policy.
The results in Table 2.8 suggest that the welfare gains for all agents from a tax
reform are increasing in . As  increases, the unemployment benet needs to fall in
the pre-reform economy so that the new calibration implies the same labour tax and
unemployment rate as in the base case.57 This suggests that the relative power of the
union in the labour market derives more from the institutional features associated with
 and less from the outside option or else, that G
u
has a smaller e¤ect on determining
unemployment. As discussed above, after the capital tax cut and the concurrent in-
crease in labour tax, the negative e¤ect on unemployment takes place via the increase
in the labour tax relative to the unemployment benet, as they determine the relative
weight of the outside option for unions. Therefore, given that the importance of this
outside option has been reduced for a combination of higher  and lower G
u
, the e¤ect
of the increase in the labour tax relative to G
u
after the tax reform exerts a smaller
negative e¤ect on unemployment.
Table 2.8: Union power () in the labour market
(changes relative to current policy)
0.250 0.375 0.500 0.625 0.750
Ck 0.392 0.396 0.400 0.403 0.406
Cw 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.013
(1  e) -0.060 -0.062 -0.064 -0.066 -0.068
k 0.268 0.271 0.273 0.276 0.278
w 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.014
 0.052 0.055 0.057 0.059 0.060
2.5 Model dynamics
In line with most DGE literature (see e.g. Judd (1989), McGrattan (1994), and Chari
et al. (2007b)), the time path of capital income tax is assumed to be an AR(1) process











57As before, the spending shares are re-calibrated so that the base in all cases is an economy with





1  k ln   k0+ k ln   kt + "kt+1 (99)
where  k0 is constant which gives the steady-state value of 
k
t ; 0 < 
k < 1 is the rst-
order autoregressive parameter which measures the persistence of the AR(1) process;
and "kt represents a random shock to the capital income tax which is characterised by
a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation of k. The estimation
results show that the persistence parameter k is 0:956 and the variance 2k is 0:24%
for the UK economy.
To solve the model, all the non-linear DE conditions are rst log-linearised around
the steady-state values of variables. The log-linearised system is then solved by ap-
plying Kleins (2000) generalised Schur or QZ decomposition algorithm. We nd that,
in all cases, the model exhibits saddle path stability. This implies a unique conver-
gent solution to the model. The solution for each model can be represented in the
form of rst-order linear di¤erence equations. The variable in the solution is expressed
as log-di¤erence from its corresponding steady-state which approximates the percent
deviation from its respective steady-state value.58
Next, we study the dynamic behavior of the economy in response to a temporary,
unanticipated 1% decrease in the tax rate on capital income while keeping all the
other policy variables xed to their respective steady-states. We discuss the principal
channels via which an exogenous change to the capital income tax can inuence the
economy under four di¤erent model structures. The dynamic results are compared
with those obtained in the steady-state analysis of capital tax reforms. In this section,
we keep the same sequence of models as in the steady-state analysis. We rst discuss
the results under the competitive model without markets distortions and then analyse
the e¤ects in the model with labour market distortion or product market distortion,
respectively. The model with distortions in both labour and product markets are nally
studied. The results emphasize the relevance of labour and product market distortions
in determining the dynamics of the model. Our analysis also highlights the similarities
and di¤erences in the transmission mechanisms across four models. In addition, the
cumulative e¤ects of the tax changes on unemployment, the distribution of income
and welfare of agents are evaluated during the transition by comparing the post-shock
deviations relative to the steady-state. In particular, the present discounted values of
58See Chapter 1 for the mathematical details. The linear solution for models in the chapter are not
presented in this chapter to save space. But they are available upon request.
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variables in years after the shock are compared with their respective present discounted
values if variables are assumed to stay at the steady state and never deviate from it.
The post-shock economy is simulated 100 years following the temporary, unantici-
pated capital tax cut. The impulse responses are calculated as percent deviations from
the steady-state values. The percent deviations in the present discounted values are









where j denotes years after the shock; X is the steady-state value of variable; Xt is
the value of variable for year t; and DXj is the percent deviation after j years. All the
t > 1 values are discounted by the discount factor, 0 <  < 1.
Figure 2.1 below provides a full picture of the complete paths of percent deviations
in the post-shock economy in all four models. The results of di¤erent models are pooled
in di¤erent rows in Figure 2.1. This gure clearly shows the cumulative e¤ects of the
temporary negative shock on the whole economy.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
Figures 2.2-2.5 in the following sub-sections, for each model, plot the impulse
responses of endogenous variables, which show the time paths of variables in re-
sponse to the temporary and unanticipated tax change. In addition, in Tables 2.9-
2.12 which follow, for each case of comparison, the numeric results of the percent
deviations calculated in (100) for eight di¤erent values of j are reported, i.e. j =
1; 3; 5; 10; 20; 50; 80; 100:
2.5.1 The competitive model
The impulse responses of variables in the competitive model without market distortions
are plotted in Figure 2.2. The numeric results of percent deviations of variables after
j years calculated using the formula (100) are reported in Table 2.9 and we can also
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refer to Figure 2.1a above for the complete paths of percent deviations.59
[Figure 2.2 about here]
Table 2.9: Percent deviation from steady-state in the competitive model
Years after negative  kt shock
1 3 5 10 20 50 80 100
Ckt -0.031 -0.020 -0.012 0.005 0.024 0.036 0.034 0.033
Cwt -0.078 -0.070 -0.062 -0.047 -0.029 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007
Y kt 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.023 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.032
(1  e) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Y ft 0.000 0.007 0.013 0.024 0.036 0.040 0.037 0.036
Kkt 0.000 0.020 0.037 0.069 0.102 0.115 0.106 0.103
wt 0.315 0.300 0.286 0.256 0.212 0.152 0.132 0.127
 kt -0.995 -0.953 -0.914 -0.829 -0.702 -0.514 -0.450 -0.432
Ukt -0.031 -0.020 -0.012 0.005 0.024 0.036 0.034 0.033
Uwt -0.078 -0.070 -0.062 -0.048 -0.029 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007
Ut -0.067 -0.058 -0.050 -0.035 -0.016 0.001 0.002 0.003
The temporary capital income tax cut results in an increase in the labour income
tax. This is because additional labour tax revenue is required to nance the government
spending when the capital income tax decreases. The decrease in capital income tax
increases the investment of capitalists. Ikt rises dramatically following the shock and
this is transformed into higher capital accumulation. As the shock dies away, the
increase in investment weakens although it is still above the steady-state level over
time. The increase in investment generates a negative income e¤ect crowding out
the consumption of capitalists. Hence, Ckt falls short of its steady-state in the rst 5
years (i.e. -0.012%). After then, Ckt exceeds its initial steady-state and the present
discounted value of utility, Ukt , is also above its steady-state as can be seen in Table 2.9.
The capital stock increases and it results in increase in output and labour productivity.
This is transformed into the higher wage rate, wt. The net return to work, ewt, falls
short of its steady-state in the rst 20 years. This is because the labour income tax
increases by more than the wage rate. In turn, income, consumption and welfare of
workers decrease. After 20 years, the net return to work exceeds its initial steady-






state and thus income, consumption and welfare of workers go above their steady-state
levels. However, as can be seen in Table 2.9, the present discounted value of workers
utility is smaller that it would be at steady state. This implies that workers are worse
o¤ in terms of welfare in the transition to steady-state although the welfare losses
are diminishing over time. Yet in light of the capitalist, after 10 years, the present
discounted value of welfare is bigger than it would be at steady state. The negative
shock generates welfare losses at the aggregate level in the rst 20 years (i.e. -0.016%),
but after 50 years, the aggregate welfare improves (i.e. 0.001%). This implies that the
temporary capital tax cut, in the long run, improves the aggregate welfare. The income
inequality increases in the post-shock economy. The above ndings are consistent with
the steady-state results of capital tax reforms shown in Table 2.3.
2.5.2 The union model
The impulse responses in the model with only labour market distortion are illustrated
by Figure 2.3 and Table 2.10 shows the percent deviations of di¤erent variables. In
addition, the paths of percent deviations of variables are shown in Figure 2.1a.
[Figure 2.3 about here]
Table 2.10: Percent deviation from steady-state in the union model
Years after negative  kt shock
1 3 5 10 20 50 80 100
Ckt -0.017 -0.004 0.006 0.023 0.038 0.040 0.036 0.035
Cwt 0.019 0.016 0.013 0.009 0.004 0.001 9E-04 8E-04
Y kt 0.026 0.032 0.036 0.043 0.046 0.041 0.036 0.035
(1  e) -1.720 -1.459 -1.124 -0.838 -0.410 -0.109 -0.077 -0.072
Y ft 0.085 0.084 0.082 0.078 0.070 0.053 0.047 0.045
Kkt 0.000 0.033 0.060 0.105 0.141 0.137 0.123 0.119
wt -0.124 -0.073 -0.032 0.039 0.104 0.122 0.111 0.107
 kt -0.995 -0.953 -0.914 -0.829 -0.702 -0.514 -0.450 -0.432
Ukt -0.017 -0.004 0.006 0.023 0.038 0.040 0.036 0.035
Uwt 0.019 0.016 0.013 0.009 0.004 0.001 9E-04 8E-04
Ut 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.009
In the model with unionised labour market, the negative  kt shock generates re-
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ductions in the labour income tax in the rst 5 years (i.e. -0.032%). There are two
opposite e¤ects in determining the direction of this change. On one hand, more labour
tax revenue is needed to make up the revenue losses from capital tax cuts given that
all the other policy variables are unchanged in the government budget constraint. On
the other hand, unemployment rate, (1  e), falls dramatically initially and this change
reduces the required government spending and in turn the labour income tax decreases.
The latter e¤ect dominates and the labour income tax falls initially, but quickly goes
above its steady-state afterwards. As in the competitive model, the capital tax cut can
increase the investment of capitalists resulting from the higher net return to capital.
Therefore, investment and capital stock increase in response to capital tax cut. In
turn, individual rms output, Y ft , goes up. This intends to increase the desire of rms
to have a successful outcome of wage bargaining and the rmspower relative to the
unions decreases. This e¤ect leads to an increase in unemployment. Meanwhile, the
initial decrease in labour income tax increases the net return to work. This implies that
the relative attractiveness of the unionsoutside option has decreased. This tends to
increase the desire of unions to have a successful outcome of wage bargaining and the
unions power relative to the rms decreases. so that unemployment falls. These two
opposite e¤ects, on the whole, generate an initial decrease in unemployment which is
benecial to the workers. The negative shock does not inuence the net turn to work,ewt, over time. The income, consumption and welfare of workers increase as a result
of the increase in employment. After 5 years, the labour income tax goes above its
initial steady-state. Unemployment exceeds its steady-state after 10 years and in turn
income, consumption and welfare of workers are lower in the post-shock economy.
The income of capitalists increases as lower capital tax results in higher interest
income. The consumption of capitalists falls short of its steady-state in the rst 3 years
(i.e. -0.004%) and then goes above it. The initial decrease in consumption is due to the
crowding-out e¤ect of investment. The present discounted value of capitalistsutility
increases monotonically over time and the welfare of capitalists improves compared to
the steady state after 5 years (i.e. 0.006%). The present discounted value of workers
utility is bigger relative to its steady-state in all periods of post-shock economy. But
the benets get smaller over time. The temporary cut in capital income tax generates
welfare gains at the aggregate level than at the steady state.
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2.5.3 The prots model
The importance of distortion in the product markets in determining the model dynam-
ics is now examined. Figure 2.4 gives the impulse responses of variables to the negative
 kt shock. Table 2.11 and Figure 2.1b above show the percent deviations of variables
from their steady-state values quantitatively and qualitatively.
[Figure 2.4 about here]
Table 2.11: Percent deviation from steady-state in the prots model
Years after negative  kt shock
1 3 5 10 20 50 80 100
Ckt 0.032 0.042 0.050 0.065 0.080 0.081 0.074 0.071
Cwt -0.138 -0.125 -0.114 -0.092 -0.062 -0.032 -0.026 -0.025
Y kt 0.041 0.047 0.052 0.061 0.069 0.065 0.060 0.057
(1  e) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Y ft 0.000 0.009 0.017 0.031 0.046 0.052 0.048 0.046
Kkt 0.000 0.026 0.048 0.089 0.133 0.148 0.137 0.132
wt 0.596 0.566 0.538 0.479 0.395 0.279 0.243 0.233
 kt -0.995 -0.953 -0.914 -0.829 -0.702 -0.514 -0.450 -0.432
Ukt 0.032 0.041 0.050 0.065 0.080 0.081 0.074 0.071
Uwt -0.138 -0.126 -0.114 -0.092 -0.063 -0.032 -0.026 -0.025
Ut -0.102 -0.090 -0.079 -0.058 -0.032 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004
Table 2.11 shows that, in the model with only product market distortion, the in-
crease in labour income tax is bigger than in the competitive model (see Table 2.9).
This is because the labour tax has to increase by more to make up for revenue losses
of taxing prots. The cut in capital income tax raises the net return to capital. The
higher net return to capital boosts the investment of capitalists. As a result, the accu-
mulation of capital stock increases and in turn, rmsoutput and labour productivity
increase resulting in higher wage rate. However, the net return to work decreases after
the shock. This occurs because the increase in labour income tax outweighs the in-
crease in the wage rate. The income, consumption and welfare of workers decrease by
more in the prots model relative to the competitive model. This is due to the resulting
higher labour income tax in the prots model. In the model with only product market
distortion, the consumption of capitalists increases. This happens because the positive
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income e¤ects of prots on consumption outweighs the negative crowding-out e¤ect of
investment.
As can be seen in Table 2.11, the welfare of capitalists improves in the post-shock
economy despite welfare losses for the workers. The welfare losses for the workers get
smaller as the shock dies out. There are welfare losses at the aggregate level since the
welfare gains for the capitalists cannot make up for the welfare losses for the workers.
By comparing the paths of percent deviations of variables in Figure 2.1a with Figure
2.1b , we can see that variables behave similarly over time in the competitive model
and prots model. However, the e¤ects of capital tax cut are bigger in the prots
model. The dynamic results are in accordance with those have been found in the
steady-state analysis (see Table 2.5).
2.5.4 The full model
The transitional dynamics of the model with distortions in both labour and product
markets in response to the temporary and unanticipated decrease in tax rate on capital
income are nally studied. The results of impulse responses and percent deviations are
shown in Figure 2.5 and Table 2.12 as follows.
As in the union model above, the cuts in capital tax rate, at rst, result in reductions
in the labour income tax (i.e. -0.077%). But after 5 years, the labour income tax
is higher than it would be at the steady state. The direction of change in wt is
determined by two e¤ects shown above in the union model. However, the changes
after j year are larger, compared to those in the union model (see Table 2.10) due
to the existence of prots. The net return to work remains the same in the post-
shock economy. In the unionised labour market, the higher labour income tax reduces
the return to work. This implies that the relative attractiveness of the unionsoutside
option has increased and therefore the desire of the unions to have a successful outcome
of wage bargaining has decreased. In this case, the unionspower relative to the rm
increases and unemployment rate rises. Meanwhile, the distortion in the intermediate
goods market generates an opposite e¤ect on unemployment rate. The decrease in
capital tax rate has a positive income e¤ect on the investment of capitalists. Investment
increases dramatically after the negative shock and this positive e¤ect is transformed
into an increase in the capital stock. In turn, output, Y ft , goes up. In the production of
intermediate goods, the rms take the nal output, Yt, as given and hence the increase
in output results in a fall in price, P ft . As a result, the expected revenue of the rms will
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decrease. Therefore, the monopolistic competition reduces the positive revenue e¤ects
of the increase in rmsoutput. This tends to decrease the desire of rm to have a
successful outcome of wage bargaining and therefore the relative attractiveness of the
outside option for the rm increases. This implies that the rmspower relative to the
unions increases and unemployment falls. Figure 2.5 shows that these two opposite
e¤ects, on the whole, result in a fall in unemployment rate which is benecial to the
worker. The wage rate quickly rises above its steady-state in response to the negative
shock although it falls short of the steady-state in the rst few years. The net wage
rate remains the same over time in the post-shock economy, so that the income and
consumption of workers are totally determined by employment. As a result, they rise
in the post-shock economy. Both consumption and investment of capitalists increase
due to the positive income e¤ect of lower capital income tax. The magnitude is greater
in the full model relative to the union model due to the positive prots.
[Figure 2.5 about here]
Table 2.12: Percent deviation from steady-state in the full model
Years after negative  kt shock
1 3 5 10 20 50 80 100
Ckt 0.070 0.085 0.095 0.112 0.120 0.103 0.091 0.088
Cwt 0.036 0.031 0.026 0.019 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.003
Y kt 0.087 0.094 0.098 0.104 0.103 0.085 0.075 0.072
(1  e) -3.094 -2.658 -2.295 -1.627 -0.919 -0.396 -0.320 -0.305
Y ft 0.154 0.150 0.147 0.137 0.120 0.091 0.080 0.077
Kkt 0.000 0.052 0.094 0.162 0.214 0.203 0.182 0.175
wt -0.223 -0.142 -0.077 0.036 0.137 0.164 0.149 0.144
 kt -0.995 -0.953 -0.914 -0.829 -0.702 -0.514 -0.450 -0.432
Ukt 0.070 0.085 0.095 0.112 0.120 0.103 0.091 0.088
Uwt 0.036 0.031 0.026 0.019 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.003
Ut 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.039 0.034 0.026 0.022 0.021
Table 2.12 shows that all the agents are better o¤ in terms of welfare in the post-
shock economy. In other words, the present discounted values of utilities are bigger
than they would be at the steady state. This implies that adding more frictions can
lead to improved outcomes, given that one distortion, e¤ectively, corrects the other one,
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although the welfare inequality increases. These ndings are consistent with results
from the steady-state analysis (see Table 2.6).
2.6 Summary and concluding remarks
This chapter examined the long-run welfare e¤ects of tax reforms under heterogeneity
in capital holdings assuming imperfect competition in product and labour markets.
Given the relevance of these market failures, our analysis could help to inform current
policy discussions regarding the potential impacts of capital tax reforms. Finally,
the transitional paths of model variables in response to a temporary capital tax cut
were studied to investigate the importance of market distortions in determining model
dynamics. Using a calibrated model whose steady-state reproduced the main features
of the UK economy, our main ndings are as follows.
First, in the presence of the labour market distortion only, a tax reform that im-
plements a zero capital tax implies welfare losses for the workers, whereas capitalists
and aggregate welfare increases. We nd that the unemployment channel is the criti-
cal link that modies the results from the benchmark model with competitive labour
markets. In particular, although labour productivity and the after-tax wage increase,
the workers cannot capture the full benet of this as unemployment also increases.
Second, under competitive labour markets but non-competitive product markets,
a zero capital tax leads to welfare gains for the capitalists and losses for the workers
as well as the aggregate economy. This occurs since, the government has to forego
revenue from a non-distortionary tax base comprised of "pure prots" so that the
required increase in the labour tax is larger and thus the net wage falls after the tax
reform.
Finally, monopolistic competition in the product market, under unionised labour
markets, introduces a market failure that works to correct the negative implications
of imperfect labour markets. In particular, monopolistic competition tends to reduce
the positive revenue e¤ects of the increase in output after a capital tax cut and thus
reduce the benets to the rm for a successful outcome of wage bargaining. In turn,
this implies that the relative attractiveness of the rms outside option in bargaining
and its power relative to the union increases. This tends to increase employment and
the benets to all agents after a tax cut.
Given that most modern economies are characterised by imperfect competition
in both product and labour markets, we would consider the nal set of results to
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be potentially the most useful. However, the above analysis also makes clear that
combining market failures that, independently, have similar welfare e¤ects, does not
necessarily lead to total e¤ects which work in the same direction. Instead, the welfare
implications can be completely reversed. Thus, our results also imply that omission of
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Chapter 3: Tax policy in search-and-matching model
with heterogeneous agents
Abstract: Using a Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching framework, this chapter
investigates the importance of search frictions in determining the welfare and distrib-
utional e¤ects of tax reforms which re-allocate the tax burden from capital to labour
income assuming agent heterogeneity in their economic roles. With a realistic calibra-
tion to the current UK economy, we nd that the tax reforms will be Pareto improving
but increase inequality in the long run, despite welfare losses for at least one segment
of the population in the transition period. The results are robust to the variations in
the relative bargaining power of workers and di¤erent specications of unemployment
benets. But the welfare gains are higher for all agents by reducing workers rela-
tive bargaining power or assuming unemployment benets depending on past wages.
We nally show that the long-run optimal policy implies a negative capital tax which
helps to correct the market frictions caused by the forward-looking behavior of rms.
Meanwhile, the labour tax is increased and unemployment benets are reduced to
nance public spending. The optimal policy increases the number of vacancies and
employment. As a result, there are welfare gains for all agents.
3.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching framework
has become a powerful tool for the analysis of unemployment, job vacancies and labour
market behavior.60 The theory focuses on the interaction between unemployment and
job creation. It builds on the idea that matching in the labour markets takes time and
is costly. Frictions originate from lack of coordination between unemployed workers and
vacant jobs that disrupts the ability to form employment relationships. A signicant
body of literature has applied the search-and-matching models to explain the cyclical
uctuations in unemployment (see e.g. Yashiv (2007) for a review of this literature).
For example, Rogerson et al. (2005) discuss the usefulness of a range of search-theoretic
models for analyzing the unemployment dynamics, job turnover and wages. There is
also a debate on whether or not a calibrated matching model can quantitatively account
for observed aggregate uctuations in the labour markets (see e.g. Shimer (2005), Hall
60See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2001).
119
and Milgrom (2008) and Pissarides (2009)).
Another strand of the literature has studied the e¤ects of factor income taxation on
welfare and improving labour market e¢ ciency. For instance, Shi and Wen (1999) show
that labour income taxation is more costly than capital income taxation with realistic
parameter values by computing the marginal deadweight losses associated with capital
and labour income tax. Boone and Bovenberg (2002) explore the optimal role of the tax
system in alleviating labour market imperfections and raising revenue. They suggest
that the optimal tax system should not distort the labour market tightness and only
the ad valorem component of the wage tax should be employed to raise revenue. Domeij
(2005) examines the condition under which a long-run optimal zero capital tax can be
obtained by assuming that the government has access to a commitment technology and
optimally chooses capital and labour income taxation. He nds that when the Hosios
parameter restriction61 is satised or the government can use subsidies to vacancies
or unemployment, the optimal capital tax in the long run is always zero.62 If these
conditions do not hold, a non-zero capital tax can then works to correct the distortions
arising from search externalities.
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on tax policy study in search-
and-matching models. It aims to shed some light on the welfare and distributional
issues of re-allocating the tax burden from capital to labour income. We study the
importance of search frictions in determining the e¤ects of such tax reforms in both
the long- and short-run. To the best of our knowledge, this question is not answered
yet in the search-and-matching literature. In our setup, the government taxes capital
income, including interest on savings and prots, and labour income by using two
di¤erent tax rates to nance its spending requirements. We stay as close as possible
to the standard search-and-matching model with capital accumulation (see e.g. Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996)), but incorporate household heterogeneity. Following
Judd (1985), Lansing (1999) and Ardagna (2007), the households are divided into
capitalists and workers in terms of economic roles. Only capitalists have access to the
asset markets and only workers can work. The setup of household heterogeneity allows
us to examine the distributional e¤ects of income taxation and inequality issues.
Pissarides (1998) suggests that unemployment benets specication is one of the key
61This refers to the condition that the elasticity of search in job matches coincides with the relative
bargaining power of workers in the wage bargaining. We will discuss this condition in more detail in
sub-section 3.2.8.
62In contast, Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) show that the optimal capital tax rate tends to be high
when the government cannot commit to future tax rates.
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inuences on the e¤ects of tax reforms on unemployment and wages. In this chapter, we
further examine an alternative specication of unemployment benets by assuming that
they are proportional to past wages but are constant in the long run. As Chéron and
Langot (2010) point out, this setup for unemployment benets introduces a feedback
e¤ect of distribution of wages on the distribution of unemployment benets and is
important for the predictions of models with search frictions. Therefore, we intend to
analyse the importance of the specication of unemployment benets in determining
the e¤ects of tax reforms and explore the di¤erent mechanisms of tax reforms driving
the results.
Finally, we study optimal taxation under commitment. In our case, a Benthamite
government optimally chooses all the tax rates with the aim of maximising social
welfare. We particularly focus on the optimal capital tax rate in the long run. Our
results are compared against those in Domeij (2005). Our model setup di¤ers from his
in several ways.63 We intend to examine whether the Chamley-Judd result survives in
our model.
We calibrate the model so that its steady-state solution can reect the main fea-
tures of the current UK economy, in particular, its tax structure and labour market
characteristics. The UK is chosen to illustrate the quantitative analysis since its tax
structure stands in stark contrast with other European countries, by having a very high
e¤ective capital to labour income tax ratio. Since the e¤ects of tax reforms that re-
allocate the tax burden from capital to labour income are monotonic in our model, we
focus on the reform of eliminating the capital income tax which is widely investigated
in optimal taxation literature.
Our main ndings are summarized as follows. First, in a model with search and
matching frictions, the tax reform considered is Pareto improving in the long run al-
though it increases inequality between agents. In other words, all the agents are better
o¤, despite higher welfare gains for the capitalists compared to the workers. This hap-
pens because, in the new, post-reform economy, the increase in labour income tax and
labour productivity due to higher capital accumulation leads to an increase in the bar-
gained wage rate. Unemployment benet increases as it is assumed to be proportional
to the wage rate. As a result, the search-unemployment of workers increases. The
higher wage rate reduces the expected prots of rms even if the higher labour pro-
ductivity has a positive prots e¤ect. Thus, the rms open less job vacancies. The net
63More details are provided in Section 3.6.
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wage rate rises in the new, post-reform economy. This is because the productivity gains
outweigh the increase in labour income tax which is benecial to the workers. Overall,
the income, consumption and welfare of workers increase in the long run. Capitalists
can directly benet from the zero capital tax and the interest income from capital in-
creases. The capital income e¤ect is bigger than the labour income e¤ect. Capitalists
benet more from this tax reform and therefore inequality increases. However, the
capital tax cut met with the labour tax increase hurts the workers and also worsens
the aggregate welfare over the transition. This is because the positive e¤ects resulting
from higher capital accumulation take time to be realized. As a result, the combination
of an initially lower net wage rate and higher search-unemployment creates short-run
losses for the workers and aggregate economy, which are reversed in the long run. We
also show that our results are robust to variations in the relative bargaining power of
workers in the Nash bargain. Increasing the workersbargaining power makes the tax
reform less e¢ cient in terms of welfare improving.
Second, when we assume that unemployment benets depend on past wages, the
model can generate similar welfare results in both the long- and short-run although
the mechanism driving results is di¤erent. The tax reform is still Pareto improving
run but generates higher welfare gains for all agents in the long run. This happens
because, there are larger positive e¤ects resulting from higher capital accumulation. On
one hand, unemployment benets remain the same at the steady-state of post-reform
economy so that search-unemployment goes down when the net wage rate rises. On the
other hand, the rms open more job vacancies as higher capital accumulation increases
rmsexpected prots from a successful match. In turn, the tightness of labour market
is reduced which can lead to the increase in employment. Thus, the long-run welfare
gains for the workers are higher in the post-reform economy since working can generate
higher labour income for them. Similar to the long-run welfare implications, the tax
reform has higher welfare e¤ects for all agents in the transition period. In other words,
the lifetime welfare gains for capitalists are higher and welfare losses for workers are
lower. The lifetime aggregate welfare improves. The wage rate increases by more in
the short run since the capital tax cuts have larger initial e¤ects on boosting capital
accumulation. In turn, the net wage increases over time. The unemployment benets
depend on past wages and their path follows the path of wage rate which causes the
inertia in the increases in unemployment benets during the transition. This tends
to weaken the increase in search-unemployment which is benecial to the workers.
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The welfare of workers is raised more quickly in the new, post-reform economy. To
summarise, these imply that the long- and short-run welfare gains of tax reforms are
higher for all agents by assuming unemployment benets depending on past wages.
Finally, we nd that the optimal tax policy under commitment implies a nega-
tive optimal capital income tax in the long run which is accomplished by the labour
tax increase and unemployment benets reduction. The negative capital income tax
helps to correct the market frictions due to the forward-looking behavior of rms. As
a result, the investment is boosted and this is transformed into higher capital accu-
mulation. The income, consumption and welfare of capitalists increase. The labour
income tax is increased and the unemployment benets are reduced to make up for the
tax revenue losses from capital income. The lower unemployment benets reduce the
search-unemployment of workers. The rms open more job vacancies resulting from
higher labour productivity. As a result, the probability at which job seekers can be
matched with job vacancies is increased. In turn, employment increases which is ben-
ecial to the workers. There are welfare gains for the workers and aggregate welfare
improves in the long run.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 describes the model
structure. Section 3.3 discusses the calibration of the model to the current UK economy
and gives the old, pre-reform steady-state. The results of tax reforms are analysed in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 studies an alternative specication of unemployment benets
and investigates the e¤ects of tax reforms. The optimal tax policy under commitment
is examined in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7 summarizes this chapter and concludes.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Economic environment
The features of the economy are summarized as follows. Innitely lived households,
homogenous rms, and a government populate the economy. Households are divided
into capitalists and workers in terms of whether they can save or work. Only capitalists
can save and own rms. Their income is comprised of interest income from physical
capital and dividends of rms. Workers cannot save and consume all their disposable
income in each period. The workers can engage in one of three activities: working
to obtain wage income, searching for a job or enjoying leisure. If employed, they sell
one unit labour endowment to only one rm at a time. The labour supply is thus
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indivisible. At any given period of time, the workers searching for jobs are randomly
matched with job vacancies open by rms through a matching function. The search
frictions can generate unemployment. Unemployment arises as the job seekers are
not successful in their search for new employment. The unemployed workers receive
unemployment benets from the government. When there is a successful match, the
matched worker and rm bargain over the wage rate to maximise a weighted average of
workers and rms surpluses. Furthermore, we assume that two workers who are hired
at di¤erent times must be paid the same wage at any given time. If the bargaining
is successful, the worker will be employed by the rm in the following period. In this
sense, employment at a given period of time is predetermined. It changes as unemployed
workers get new jobs and employed workers separate from old jobs at an exogenous
rate of separation. Following Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995) and Pissarides (1998),
we assume that workers are identical in the labour market. Individual unemployment
risk is completely smoothed by using employment lotteries64 and all workers have equal
employment and income.65 Hence, one worker can be thought of as being endowed with
one unit of time in each period, which can be split into: working, search and leisure.
The rms produce nal goods by employing capital and labour. As discussed above,
since employment is predetermined, the rms open job vacancies at a constant resource
cost to target their next-period employment. The government taxes interest income
from physical capital, prots and labour income to nance its spending requirements.
3.2.2 Population composition
Total population is given by N which is exogenous and constant over time with the
population of capitalists and workers respectively being denoted by Nk and Nw. The
population shares of capitalists and workers are assumed to be: Nk=N  nk, and
Nw=N  nw = 1   nk, respectively. We further assume that each capitalist owns one
single rm, so that N f = Nk.
64The technique is introduced in models with indivisible labour, e.g. Hansen (1985) and Rogerson
(1988).
65For a model with price taking rms and uninsured idiosyncratic employment risk due to incomplete
nancial markets and search frictions (see e.g. Krusell et al. (2010)).
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3.2.3 Matching technology
As in the standard search-and-matching literature,66 the matching technology is rep-






whereMt is the new matches at t; St = Nwst denotes the aggregate number of workers
who are looking for a job ; Vt = N fvt denotes the aggregate number of job vacancies
created by rms in the labour market; m > 0 represents the constant e¢ ciency of
matching; 0 <  < 1 denotes the elasticity of matches to searching. In addition, we
dene the ratio: zt = Vt=St, as the tightness of the labour market. The smaller the
ratio of zt, the tighter the labour market and therefore the harder for an unemployed
worker to match with a job vacancy.










and its inverse, 1=pt, measures the duration of a search.










and its inverse, 1=qt, measures the duration of a job vacancy.
3.2.4 Utility function
The objective of household i  k; w, is to maximise his discounted lifetime utility. A






66See Pissarides (1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
67Mortensen and Wright (2002) discuss results for increasing-returns-to-scale matching function and
nd that equilibria are unlikely to be e¢ cient.
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where 0 <  < 1 stands for the constant rate of time preference. The instantaneous






where Ckt is the capitalists private consumption; and  > 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion.














where Cwt is the workers private consumption; et is the employment; st is the search
activities of worker which e¤ectively belongs to unemployment; et + st is therefore the
labour force participation rate and st= (et + st) gives the unemployment rate;  > 0 is a
disutility parameter attached to the non-leisure activities; 1
 1 > 0 measures the wage
elasticity of labour force participation. Di¤erent from the capitalist, exerting work or
search e¤ort in the labour market generates disutility for the worker.
3.2.5 Capitalists












where Ikt is the capitalists private investment; K
k
t is the physical capital held by the
capitalist at the beginning of t; rt is the gross return to physical capital; kt is prots
received from rms which are taxed at the same rate as interest income from savings;
G
t
t is per capita transfer from the government; 0   kt < 1 is the tax rate on capital
income; and 0 <  < 1 is the constant depreciation rate of physical capital.
The capital stock evolves according to:
Kkt+1 = (1  )Kkt + Ikt : (109)
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Here, we have dened a new variable, Rt = 1    + rt    kt (rt   ), as 1+the net
return to physical capital after taxation and depreciation.





















and the initial condition for Kk0 as given.
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3.2.6 Workers
Each workers within-period budget constraint is given by:





where wt is the gross wage rate; 0  wt < 1 is the tax rate on labour income; and
G
u
t denotes per capita unemployment benets o¤ered by the government. Following
Pissarides (1998), Shi and Wen (1999) and Ardagna (2007), we assume that unemploy-
ment benets are proportional to the wage rate, i.e. G
u
t = rtwt, where rt is dened
as the replacement ratio. Unemployment benets are less than the net wage rate, i.e.
rtwt < (1  wt )wt, searching is costly to the worker.
Employment evolves according to:
et+1 = ptst + (1  ) et (112)
where 0 <  < 1 is the constant exogenous rate of job separation. The worker chooses
fCwt ; st; et+1g1t=0 to maximise (106) subject to the constraints (111) and (112), tak-
ing the gross wage rate fwtg1t=0, the matching probability fptg1t=0, policy variablesn





and the initial condition for e0 as given.69
3.2.7 Firms
A representative rm produces the nal goods with a constant-returns-to-scale tech-
nology in two productive inputs: capital, Kft , and labour, L
f
t . The production function
68The utility-maximization of the capitalist is given in the Appendix 3.A.1.
69The utility-maximization of the worker is given in the Appendix 3.A.2.
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is given by:







where 0 < ; 1    < 1 denote the constant output elasticities of capital and labour,
respectively.
Two remarks follow. First, employment is pre-determined at any given period of
time prior to the production taking place. The rm takes the number of workers
currently employed as given. It opens new vacancies in order to employ the desired
number of workers next period. There is an exogenous resource cost from creating a
new vacancy. The rm also needs to decide on the size of the capital stock that it needs
for production. Second, the rm can earn positive prots. This is because the rm
can inuence its future employment by controlling the currently created job vacancies.
This forward-looking decision making results in a marginal product of labour which is
higher than the marginal cost of labour, in other words, the gross wage, so that the
search frictions result in positive prots in the product markets.
The job transition function which links the future number of lled jobs to the net
hiring plus the current stock of lled jobs is given by:
Lft+1 = qtvt + (1  )Lft (114)
where the old jobs dissolve at a constant rate of 0 <  < 1.
The prots function of the rm is given by:
ft = Y
f
t   rtKft   wtLft   vt (115)
where  > 0 stands for the constant resource cost of opening a new vacancy.
It is worth noting that the prot-maximisation problem of the rm is intertemporal,
in the sense that the rm can inuence its future employment by choosing the number
of vacancies created in contemporaneous period. The rm takes the factor prices
frt; wtg1t=0, the matching probability fqtg1t=0 and an initial condition for Lf0 as given,
and chooses
n














subject to the constraints (113), (114), and (115).70






which states that the rate of return on capital is equal to the marginal product of
capital.













which states that the average vacancy creation costs of a successful match at time t
are equal to the discounted expected value of prots brought about at time t+ 1.
3.2.8 Wage determination
The wage rate is determined by a Nash bargaining between a pair of matched worker
and rm with the aim of maximising the weighted product of their surpluses resulting
from a successful match. The workers utility can be increased by (1  wt )wtuw1;t uw2;t
if he is employed.71 We rewrite the workers surplus as wt   u
w
2;t
(1 wt )uw1;t by separating
out the wage rate, wt. The quantity,
uw2;t
(1 wt )uw1;t , is then interpreted as the workers
reservation wage. By employing one additional unit of labour, the rm can increase its
prots by, Y f2;t wt, which is the rms marginal protability from hiring. To summarise,
the worker and the rm bargain over the wage rate to maximise the following weighted





Y f2;t   wt
i1 
(119)
where 0    1 represents the constant relative bargaining power of the worker.
The wage rate after a successful bargaining is given by:72
wt = (1  )
uw2;t
(1  wt )uw1;t
+ Y f2;t: (120)
It shows that the wage rate is a weighted average of the reservation wage (the outside
70The prot-maximization of the rm and the derivation of its expected prots are provided in the
Appendix 3.A.3 and 3.A.4, respectively.
71We assume that an unemployed worker is not entitled to the unemployment benets if he does
not accept a potential job. If this is the case, the worker leaves the labour force and he is then counted
as part of (1  et   st).
72The derivation of the wage rate in Nash bargain is given in the Appendix 3.A.5.
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factor) and labour productivity (the inside factor). Since we do not study heterogeneity
of labour, all the workers who are hired will receive the same wage from the rms at
any given time. It further implies that we work with a symmetric equilibrium.
As in Domeij (2005) and Arseneau and Chugh (2008), we assume that the house-
holds cannot a¤ect the reservation wage via the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. This assumption is standard in the literature. As such, only
the labour tax changes a¤ect the reservation wage and therefore the equilibrium wage
rate.
There exist externalities in the matching models which arise from the fact that
one additional job seeker can increase the probability that a rm is matched with a
worker, i.e. a positive externality, but decrease the probability of a job seeker already
existing in the markets to be matched with a rm, i.e. a negative externality. As
pointed out by Mortensen (1982) and Hosios (1990), the workers and rms ignore the
externalities created by their choices and therefore search ine¢ ciency arises. But in a
model with no distortionary taxes, Hosios (1990) shows that two opposite externalities
will be balanced and the search ine¢ ciency vanishes when the elasticity of searches in
the matching is equal to the relative bargaining power of the workers, i.e.  = .
3.2.9 Government and market clearing conditions







t st = n
k kt (rt   )Kkt + nk kt kt + nwwt wtet: (121)
To ensure that the government budget is balanced in each period, we allow the
labour income tax, wt , to be residually determined.





All the prots of rms are equally distributed to the capitalists which gives the









Finally, in the goods markets, the economys per capita resource constraint is sat-
ised:





Kkt+1   (1  )Kkt

+ nkvt: (125)
3.2.10 Decentralised equilibrium (given policy)
We summarize the decentralised equilibrium conditions in real terms in the following.
Given the paths of prices fwt; rtg1t=0, the paths of policy instruments
n












t ; st; et+1; vt
	1
t=0
and one residually determined policy in-
strument, wt , such that (i) capitalists, workers, and rms undertake their respective
optimization problems outlined above; (ii) wage rate is determined by a Nash bargain-
ing between a pair of matched worker and rm; (iii) all budget constraints are satised;
and (iv) all markets clear.
Thus, the DE consists of the capitalists optimality conditions for Ckt and K
k
t+1;
the workers optimality conditions for Cwt , st and et+1; the rms rst-order conditions
for Kft , vt and L
f
t+1; the optimality condition for the wage rate in the Nash-bargain,
wt; the evolution of employment, et; the budget constraints of worker and government,
i.e. BCw and BCg; the aggregate resource constraint, RC; and the market clearing
conditions in the capital, dividends and labour markets, i.e. MCK , MC and MCL.73
3.3 Calibration and steady-state solution
The structural parameters of the model are next calibrated so that the models steady-
state solution reects the main empirical characteristics of the UK economy, particu-
larly the features of its labour market. Table 3.1 below reports the structural parame-
73Note that relying on Walrass law, we drop the budget constraint of the capitalist from the DE.
The full DE conditions are provided in the Appendix 3.A.6.
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ters in the model.




0 <  < 1 rate of time preference 0:970
 > 1 relative risk aversion 2:000
 > 1 elasticity parameter in utility 5:000
0 <  < 1 depreciation rate on capital 0:100
 > 0 utility parameter 12:000
0 <  < 1 job separation rate 0:200
0 <  < 1 capitals share 0:350
 > 0 job posting cost 0:316
0    1 workers bargaining power 0:500
m > 0 e¢ ciency of matching 2:800
0 <  < 1 elasticity of unemployment 0:500
0 < nk < 1 population share of capitalists 0:115
A > 0 TFP level 1:000
0   k < 1 tax rate on capital income 0:442
0 < r < 1 replacement ratio 0:500
G
t
> 0 per capita government transfer 0:164
Preferences: Time is measured in years. The annual rate of time preference is set to
0.97, i.e.  = 0:97 (see e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2011b) and references therein). In the
utility function, we use a value for  that is common in DGE literature, i.e.  = 2. The
value of  is set at 5 to obtain the labour participation elasticity of 1
 1 = 0:25. This
elasticity value falls in the range in Killingsworth (1983). The value of  is calibrated
to get the labour participation rate of 63:1%.74
Production: We use a standard value for the capital productivity parameter, i.e.
 = 0:35. The annual depreciation rate of physical capital is 10%, which is consistent
with the quarterly depreciation rate of 2.5%. These two parameters imply a realistic
steady-state capital-to-output ratio of 2:25 on an annual basis. The unit cost of opening
a vacancy of  is calibrated to get the steady-state unemployment rate of 7%. The
unemployment rate corresponds to the data average from 1970 to 2010 from the UK
O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS). The productivity parameter, A, is normalised to
74See Schweitzer and Tinsley (2004) for the empirical evidence.
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1.
Labour market : We assume that the capitalists do not work in the model. But they
can save in the form of capital, own rms and receive prots. Following Ardagna (2007),
we treat the self-employed as capitalists to calibrate the population share of capitalists.
The data of self-employment becomes available from 1992 for the UK economy in the
Labour Force Statistics (LFS) database. The population shares of capitalists is set
to the data averages of 0:115.75 With regards to the bargaining process, we set the
workers bargaining power to 0.5 which features a symmetric Nash bargaining solution.
In later tax policy analysis, we allow this parameter to take a range of di¤erent values as
a robustness test, i.e.  2 [0:25; 0:375; 0:5; 0:625; 0:75]. The elasticity of unemployment
in the matching function is set to 0:5. The exogenous job separation rate  is set to
0:2 as in Pissarides (1998). This is also consistent with a quarterly job separation rate
of 0:05 as in, e.g. Shi and Wen (1997 and 1999) and Domeij (2005). The inverse of 
gives the average duration of a job. Our calibration implies that the average duration
of a job is ve years which is consistent with the data average from 1992 to 2010 from
OECD.Stat database. The matching technology is represented by a homogenous of
degree one function and characterized by the e¢ ciency parameter, m. We calibrate,
m, to obtain the duration of unemployment of 4:5 months at the steady-state when
the tightness of labour market is 0:9. The unit cost of creating a vacancy yields the
duration of a job vacancy of 4 months, similar to Pissarides (2006).
Policy instruments: E¤ective average tax rates for capital and labour income from
1970 to 2005 are constructed by following the approach in Conesa et al. (2007), i.e.
 k = 0:442, and w = 0:27. We then calibrate the per capita government transfers,
G
t
t, to obtain the steady-state 
w of 0:27. The replacement ratio is set to 0:5 which is
comparable with the data for industrialised countries (see e.g. Nickell and Nunziata
(2001)) and between the values used in previous studies, ranging from 0:45 (Shi and
Wen (1999)) to 0:6 (Pissarides (1998)).
The parameters imply the steady-state solution which is reported in Column (1)
of Table 3.2 below. The net returns to labour and capital, ew = (1  w)w ander =  1   k (r   ) are useful for the policy analysis which follows. The steady-state
disposable income of capitalists and workers is given by Y k and Y w, respectively. The
lifetime welfare of agent is obtained using the formula U iss =
(1 T )
1  u
i, for i = k; w,
75This value di¤ers from the one calibrated in Chapter 2. It is due to the di¤erent model setup for
agent heterogeneity in these two cases. In the other case, capitalists are assumed to work and save in
the economy.
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where ui is the welfare of i calculated at the steady-state using (105) and (107) and
T = 1000. The aggregate or social welfare, Uss, is dened in the Benthamite fashion
as the average welfare of all agents in the economy.76
The steady-state solution for the above parameterisation implies the following
shares of public spending in GDP: G
t
Y
= 0:203 and G
u
Y
= 0:024, which further im-
plies that the government spending in transfers is about 23% of GDP consistent with
UK data from the OECD.Stat database.
3.4 Distributional e¤ects of tax reforms
3.4.1 The long-run e¤ects
We rst examine the long-run e¤ects of reducing the tax burden on capital income in
the model. In all cases, we nd that the e¤ects of capital tax reductions are monotonic
and increase with the magnitude of the capital tax cut. Hence, we particularly analyse
the e¤ects of abolishing capital taxation which is associated with a concurrent increase
in labour income tax rate, w, to generate the required tax revenues to nance public
spending. The zero capital tax has been intensively examined in the optimal taxation
literature. We evaluate the e¤ects of the tax reform by comparing the post- with the
pre-reform steady-states with main focuses on the labour market and the distribution
of welfare. The steady-state allocations together with welfare of agents after the tax
reform are shown in Column (2) of Table 3.2.
As can been seen in Table 3.2, the implementation of a zero capital income tax
will be Pareto improving in the long run (see Us), even if it increases inequality (see
Y k
Y w
). In other words, all the agents are better o¤ after the tax reform, although the
gains for the capitalists compared to the workers are higher. This is consistent with
Judds (1985) results that it is optimal for both capitalists and workers to choose a
zero capital tax in the long run.
The trade-o¤ for the workers after implementing the zero capital tax can be seen
by noting that, the labour tax, w, increases (i.e. from 0.27 to 0.334) to make up
for the tax revenue losses, due to the elimination of the capital tax. In turn, the
workers reservation wage,
uw2;t
(1 wt )uw1;t , increases. Meanwhile, the labour productivity,
Y f2;t, increases which induced by higher capital accumulation. Both changes intend to
increase the wage rate which can be seen in the optimality condition in the bargaining
76The aggregate welfare is given by: Uss = nkUkss + n
wUwss.
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(90). Therefore, the bargained wage rate, w, increases at new, post-reform steady-state
(i.e. from 0.982 to 1.081). The net return to labour increases as well (i.e. from 0.717
to 0.720), since the increase in the wage rate outweighs the increase in the labour tax.

































w 0.982 1.081ew 0.717 0.720







The increase in the wage rate leads to an increase in unemployment benets. This
is because unemployment benets are proportional to the wage rate, i.e. G
u
= rw.
One one hand, the number of workers looking for jobs at the steady-state, s, increases
(i.e. from 0.044 to 0.047). On the other hand, the increase in the wage rate reduces
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rmsexpected prots from a successful match, despite the higher labour productivity
due to higher capital accumulation. Thus, the rms reduce the number of vacancies
open for unemployed workers (i.e. from 0.306 to 0.283). These changes, in turn, imply
a tighter labour market which can be seen that z falls from 0.9 to 0.782. A tighter
labour market implies a lower probability for an unemployed worker to match with a
job vacancy (i.e. from 2.657 to 2.475), and a higher probability at which a job vacancy
can be matched with an unemployed worker (i.e. from 2.951 to 3.168). According
to the employment evolution equation (112), steady-state employment falls (i.e. from
0.587 to 0.583). The income, consumption and welfare of workers rise resulting from
two positive e¤ects. On one hand, unemployment benets are higher resulting from
the increasing wage rate so that income from search is higher. On the other hand, the
increased net wage rate raises the income from working. The tax reform can also benet
the capitalists since the elimination of capital tax boosts investment and capital. The
pre- and post- reform investment-to- and capital-to-output ratios are (0.225, 2.252)
and (0.267, 2.673), respectively. As a result, the income, consumption and welfare of
capitalists increase. Thus, all agents benet from the reform that implements a zero
capital tax in the long run. Capitalists directly benet from the zero capital tax and
also the increased capital. The capital income e¤ect is bigger than the labour income
e¤ect. Hence, capitalists benet more from this tax reform and inequality increases
despite the Pareto superiority of the reform.
3.4.2 The transitional e¤ects
In contrast to the above steady-state analysis, we now investigate the welfare e¤ects
of the tax reform in the transition period. The literature suggests that during the
transition period, capital tax cuts met by labour tax increases will hurt the agents
whose income rely on labour income, even if there are benets to them in the long
run (see e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) and Angelopoulos et al. (2011b)). To assess
the implications of the transition period in our model, in Table 3.3 as follows, we
present the post-reform lifetime welfare, U ilt, for each type of agent, which measures
the lifetime welfare of agent along the transition period. We assume that the tax reform
is implemented at period 0. The post-reform lifetime welfare is then computed by using
the discounted lifetime utility expression in (104) and (106) from period 1 until period
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where i = k; w; j denotes the number of years after the tax reform; uij is the jth
period welfare for agent i in the post-reform economy. The aggregate post-reform




We also report the relevant welfare gains/costs measured by the compensating con-
sumption supplement,  i. 77 The measures of U ilt and 
i
lt can therefore capture the
importance of the timing of the benets and costs of eliminating the capital tax.
In contrast to our ndings in Table 3.2, the results in Table 3.3 suggest that there
are welfare losses for the workers (i.e. from -63.029 to -64.231) and at the aggregate
level (i.e. from -61.598 to -61.765) over the lifetime, although this tax reform is Pareto
improving in the long run. It predicts that the elimination of capital tax will hurt the
workers and also worsen social welfare during the transition.















 lt n.a. -0.003
77In particular, it is the additional level of consumption to give to the agent so that he is equally
well o¤ before and after the tax reform (see e.g. Baier and Glomm (2001) and Ardagna (2007)). For
more detail, see Section 1.7 in Chapter 1.
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To understand the underlying transmission mechanism driving these results, we
rst plot the transitional paths of variables to the new steady state. We assume that,
at initial period, the capital tax unexpectedly and permanently shifts from 0.442 to 0.
In response to the permanent policy change, the responses of variables are illustrated
in Figure 3.1 as follows. In other words, Figure 3.1 shows how the economy gradually
coverages to the new steady-state. These paths are generated by simulating the model
as it converges to the new, post-reform steady-state, starting from the pre-reform
steady-state (see e.g. Giannitsarou (2006)).
[Figure 3.1 about here]
Table 3.4 further presents the e¤ects of the zero capital tax on the key variables
in the short-run, i.e. one, two and three years after the zero capital tax has been
implemented, as well as the long-run, i.e. fty years after the reform and also at the
new steady-state.




Steady-state Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 50 Steady-state
Ck 0.659 0.715 0.722 0.728 0.806 0.808
Cw 0.606 0.556 0.564 0.566 0.608 0.609
Kk 15.746 16.032 16.335 16.605 20.278 20.383
w 0.270 0.367 0.361 0.360 0.334 0.334
w 0.982 0.991 1.001 1.005 1.079 1.081ew 0.717 0.629 0.641 0.644 0.718 0.720
e 0.587 0.583 0.585 0.584 0.584 0.583
s 0.044 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.047 0.047
v 0.306 0.249 0.251 0.254 0.283 0.283
z 0.900 0.588 0.620 0.622 0.777 0.782
p 2.657 2.147 2.205 2.209 2.468 2.475
q 2.951 3.652 3.555 3.549 3.177 3.168
We note that the labour tax initially goes above its new, post-reform steady-state
(i.e. 0.367 versus 0.334). This intends to increase the bargained wage rate via its
positive e¤ect on the reservation wage as discussed above. However, the labour pro-
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ductivity does not increase much initially, as the higher capital accumulation due to
elimination of capital tax is not yet realized at rst which weakens the increase in
wage rate. These two e¤ects, on the whole, result in slightly rising wage rate for the
rst period (i.e. from 0.982 to 0.991). This, in turn, leads to higher unemployment
benets. The net wage rate falls short of its old, pre-reform steady-state (i.e. from
0.717 to 0.629), as the initial increase in labour tax exceeds the increase in wage rate.
The search-unemployment overshoots its post-reform steady-state (i.e. 0.055 versus
0.047). This result is driven by the higher unemployment benets and lower net wage
rate in the post-shock economy. The rms cut job vacancies in the short-run, since
prior to the new steady-state, the positive higher capital accumulation e¤ect on labour
productivity is not strong enough to outweigh the negative prots e¤ect induced by
rising wage rate. As capital accumulates and this is transformed into higher labour
productivity, the rms begin to open more job vacancies over time, although the num-
ber is less than the old, pre-reform steady-state. Labour market tightness is increasing
as search-unemployment falls and the number of vacancies increases over time. As
can be seen in Figure 3.1a, employment at the rst period falls, but remains almost
unchanged over time. This is because the increase in p and decrease in s e¤ectively
net out over time, which leaves no e¤ect on employment. The combination of lower
net wage rates and higher search-unemployment creates short-run losses for the work-
ers and also aggregate welfare worsens, which are reversed in the long run, similar to
Domeij and Heathcote (2004).78
3.4.3 Changes in bargaining power of workers
As have discussed earlier, the choice of workers bargaining power, , is crucial in the
models with search frictions due to the existence of externalities. We now illustrate
the degree to which our results are robust to variations in this parameter and examine
the importance of workers bargaining power on the welfare e¤ects of elimination of
capital income tax. Our calibration above is based on the Hosios condition,  = . In
what follows, we examine changes in  that encompass the entire range used in the
literature, see e.g. Domeij (2005). In Table 3.5, for each value of , we report the
di¤erences in the long run between the pre- and post-reform steady-state for the key
78They nd that in the heterogeneous agent economy capital tax cuts are supported only by a
minority of households during the transition.
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economic variables.79 We also report the compensating consumption supplement for
each agent and the aggregate economy at the steady-state.80
Table 3.5: Changes in workersbargaining power for tax reforms
(di¤erence from pre-reform policy)
0.250 0.375 0.500 0.625 0.750
%Ck 0.2364 0.2297 0.2260 0.2237 0.2220


















0.2683 02675 0.2669 0.2665 0.2662
%Kk 0.2937 0.2942 0.2945 0.2946 0.2947
w 0.0683 0.0651 0.0635 0.0626 0.0619
w 0.1098 0.1038 0.1009 0.0992 0.0981
 ew 0.0060 0.0053 0.0051 0.0050 0.0049
kss 0.1912 0.1868 0.1843 0.1828 0.1817
wss 0.0061 0.0056 0.0055 0.0054 0.0053
ss 0.0227 0.0225 0.0224 0.0223 0.0222
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the welfare gains for all agents from elimination of
the capital tax are decreasing in . In other words, for xed , increasing the workers
bargaining power makes the tax reform less e¢ cient in terms of welfare improvement.
As discussed above, the wage rate is rising after the tax reform via the higher labour
productivity and concurrent increase in labour tax channel. The results in Table 3.5
show that, as  increases, the tax reform has a smaller e¤ect on labour tax but bigger
e¤ect on labour productivity due to higher capital accumulation. As the relative bar-
gaining power of worker increases, the importance of the increase in labour tax has been
improved relative to the labour productivity. Hence, the tax reform exerts a smaller
e¤ect on wage rate and in turn on unemployment benets. The e¤ect on net wage
rate has also been reduced for a combination of smaller e¤ects on labour tax and wage
rate. Therefore, given that the e¤ects on net wage rate and unemployment benets
79Note that for all cases considered, the parameters,  and G
t
are re-calibrated so that the base in
all cases is an economy with 7% unemployment and 27% labour tax rate. The remaining parameters
used are as in Table 3.1.
80Note that the results in Table 3.5 are in percent di¤erences, except that the values starting from
w until q are in percentage point di¤erences.
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have been reduced, the income, consumption and welfare for the workers increase by
less as  goes up.
As  increases, the job posting cost needs to fall in the pre-reform economy such that
the new calibration can yield the same unemployment rate as in the base case. This
implies that the costs of posting vacancies have been reduced. As a result, the expected
prots of rms are getting bigger and the rms increase production. It implies that
the tax reform has a bigger e¤ect on boosting investment of capitalists and therefore
a smaller e¤ect on consumption increase. The welfare gains for the capitalists become
smaller as  goes up. Finally, it is worth noting that inequality improves as can be
seen from decreasing relative income of capitalists and workers, Y
k
Y w
. It indicates that
increasing the workersbargaining power can help to reduce the income gap between
capitalists and workers.
3.5 Alternative specication of unemployment benets
3.5.1 The new specication
In this section, we employ an alternative specication of unemployment benets. Pis-
sarides (1998) and Koskela and von Thadden (2008) have discussed the importance of
the specication of unemployment benets in the wage bargaining. We now assume
that unemployment benets depend on past wages due to some institutional features
in the labour market, see e.g. Blanchard and Katz (1999) and Chéron and Langot
(2010). Thus, unemployment benet, G
u








where w is the steady-state wage rate. As can be seen, unemployment benets are
proportional to past wages by the constant z
w
> 0 in the transition period. However, in
the steady-state, they are constant and equal to z > 0. When the wage rate rises after
the tax reform, unemployment benets remain the same. Hence, this new specication
of unemployment benets is important in determining both the long- and short-run
results of the tax reforms.
The parameter, z, is re-calibrated to obtain the steady-state w of 0.27. All the
other parameters are used as in Table 3.1.
141
3.5.2 The long-run e¤ects of tax reforms
We rst examine the importance of this new specication of unemployment benets
in determining the long-run e¤ects of the tax reforms. Column (1) and Column (2) of
Table 3.6 present the pre- and post-reform steady-states, respectively. We report the
steady-state allocations and welfare of agents.
The results in Table 3.6 show that there are welfare gains for all agents in the long
run if the government chooses a zero capital tax and increases labour tax to make
up for the tax revenue losses although this tax reform increases inequity. It implies
that the tax reform is still Pareto improving despite increasing income di¤erence (see
Y k
Y w
). In the new unemployment benets setup, the tax reform has di¤erent e¤ects on
labour market which can be seen from the changes in labour market variables. The
unemployment benets remain the same in the post-reform economy. In this case, the
search-unemployment only depends on net wage rate.
As discussed before, the net wage increases after the tax reform and therefore search-
unemployment falls (i.e. from 0.044 to 0.041). The rms create more vacancies at the
post-reform steady-state (i.e. from 0.306 to 0.328). This is because, on one hand, the
increase in wage rate is relatively smaller (i.e. from 0.982 to 1.081 versus from 0.982 to
1.077), which implies smaller negative revenue e¤ect. On the other hand, the higher in
labour productivity due to higher capital accumulation increases the rmsexpected
prots from a successful match. The production is more protable at the post-reform
steady-state which can be seen in equation (118) since the discounted expected value of
prots at t+1 are higher. The labour market tightness is rising (i.e. from 0.9 to 1.029)
when v increases and s decreases. Therefore, the probability at which unemployed
workers can be matched with job vacancies increases (i.e. from 2.657 to 2.841), and
the probability at which job vacancies can be matched with job seekers decreases (i.e.
from 2.951 to 2.760). In turn, employment goes up at the post-reform steady-state
(i.e. from 0.587 to 0.589). This creates one additional channel for the increases in
income, consumption, and welfare of workers as working can generate higher income
relative to searching. The steady-state welfare gains for workers are therefore when
unemployment benets are assumed to depend on past wages.
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As explained before, a zero capital tax boosts investment and capital. The income,
consumption and welfare of capitalists increase at the post-reform steady-state. Fur-
thermore, the capitalists can gain more from the tax reform due to the increase in
rmsprots in the production. To summarise, if unemployment benets depend on
past wages, the tax cuts met by the labour tax increases can result in higher welfare
gains for all agents and the tax reform is still Pareto improving in the long run. Hence,
the formation of unemployment benets only inuences the magnitude of steady-state
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welfare e¤ects of tax reforms. But as discussed above, the tax reforms have di¤erent
e¤ects on labour market variables so that the mechanism driving the results is di¤erent.
3.5.3 The transitional e¤ects of tax reforms
We then analyse how the results will change during the transition period. We report
the same variables in Table 3.7 in order to compare with those in Table 3.3.
As can be seen, our main result that the capital tax cuts will hurt the agents whose
income rely on labour income during the transition period stands in the model with
new specication of unemployment benets. As in the long run, the tax reform has
higher welfare e¤ects for all agents in transition period. It is worth noting that the
aggregate welfare losses turn into the welfare gains over the lifetime. Our results show
that the tax reforms imply short-run welfare losses only for the workers, similar to
Ardagna (2007).81



















 lt n.a. 0.009
To understand what drives these results, we evaluate the transitional dynamics
between steady-states. Table 3.8 reports the e¤ects of tax reform in the short-run and
81She employs a model with unionised labour market to examine exogenous changes in scal instru-
ments accomodated by changes in government debt and nds that workerswelfare goes down after
the increase in labour tax.
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Figure 3.2 plots the transitional paths of variables.
[Figure 3.2 about here]









Steady-state Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 50 Steady-state
Ck 0.659 0.740 0.745 0.750 0.814 0.816
Cw 0.606 0.571 0.576 0.578 0.612 0.613
Kk 15.746 16.951 17.207 17.440 20.483 20.564
w 0.270 0.347 0.344 0.343 0.324 0.324
w 0.982 1.005 1.012 1.016 1.076 1.077ew 0.717 0.657 0.664 0.668 0.727 0.729
e 0.587 0.590 0.590 0.590 0.589 0.589
s 0.044 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.042 0.042
v 0.306 0.299 0.301 0.303 0.328 0.328
z 0.900 0.844 0.868 0.873 1.025 1.029
p 2.657 2.573 2.609 2.617 2.835 2.841
q 2.951 3.047 3.005 2.996 2.765 2.760
In contrast to Table 3.4, the wage rate increases by more (i.e. from 0.982 to 1.005
versus from 0.982 to 0.991) for the rst period although at the new, post-reform steady-
state, it is smaller (i.e. 1.077 versus 1.081). This is because the capital tax cuts have
larger initial e¤ect on boosting capital accumulation in this model (i.e. 16.951 versus
16.032). This is transformed into higher labour productivity and thus higher wage rate
as can be seen in the wage condition (90). The wage rate is rising over time since
capital accumulation is increasing which results in increasing labour productivity. The
net wage, ew, initially falls short of the old, pre-reform steady-state, due to the large
increase in labour tax as discussed before. Thus, the search-unemployment at the rst
period overshoots its old steady-state (i.e. 0.046 versus 0.044). The net wage is rising
over time which causes the decrease in search-unemployment. Besides, unemployment
benets depend on past wages and their path follows the path of wage rate which
causes the inertia in the increases in unemployment benets in the transition. This
tends to weaken the increase in search-unemployment. As a result, the increase in
net wage dominates and search-unemployment falls during the transition. The rms
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cut job vacancies at the rst period (i.e. from 0.044 to 0.046) as the positive prots
e¤ect due to the higher capital accumulation is not yet realized and the increase in
wage rate makes the production less protable. As more capital is built up, the rms
open more job vacancies in the labour market. The labour market tightness is reduced
for the rst period (i.e. from 0.9 to 0.844) due to less available vacancies and more
search-unemployment. In turn, employment increases for the rst period (i.e. from
0.587 to 0.590), but there are small uctuations of employment over time, which can
be seen in Figure 3.2a.
We see in Figure 3.2, that the tax cuts have larger e¤ects on increasing capital
accumulation and raising the net wage rate during the transition. As a result, the
income, consumption and welfare of capitalists increase by more over time, and the
income, consumption, and welfare of workers is raised more quickly relative to the
model with old specication of unemployment benets. Thus, the lifetime welfare
gains for capitalists are higher and the lifetime welfare losses for workers are lower.
The lifetime social welfare improves in the aggregate economy.
3.6 Optimal tax policy under commitment
In this section, the optimal design of steady-state factor taxes is studied. We intend
to investigate the relevance of search frictions in determining the optimal taxation of
government. Domeij (2005) shows that when the Hosios parameter restriction holds,
the optimal capital tax in the long run is always zero. In our case, we still assume
that the Hosios parameter restriction is satised, i.e.  = , but our optimal policy
set-up is is di¤erent from Domeijs in several ways.82 As a result, we will show later,
this model implies di¤erent optimal steady-state factor taxes.
In the optimal policy set-up, the tax rates are no longer xed to their data averages,
but optimally chosen by the government with the aim of maximising the aggregate
welfare subject to the DE conditions given in sub-section 3.2.10.83 We assume that
the government is Benthamite in the sense that the weight attached to the welfare
of agent in its objective function corresponds to its population share. Furthermore,
82Our model di¤ers from his model in that: (i) household heterogeneity is introduced; (ii) gov-
ernment debt is not present; (iii) government optimally chooses all the tax rates; (iv) prots are
taxed.
83We have also checked the optimal tax policy in the model with unemployment benets depending
on past wages, and nd that the steady-state results are qualitatively the same as those in the baseline
model. This implies that di¤erent unemployment benets assumption can inuence the e¤ects of tax
reforms, but not the optimal choice of policy.
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following for example, Guo and Lansing (1999) and Domeij (2005), the government
is assumed to have a commitment technology to avoid any issue of time-inconsistency
problem. It assumes that the government commits to a set of scal policies announced
at initial period and never reoptimizes. This is referred to as the governments Ramsey
problem. We apply the dual approach to solve the Ramsey problem. In this sense, the
government optimally chooses both tax rates and allocation of resources.84
Column (1) and Column (2) in Table 3.9, respectively, give the steady-state of de-
centralised equilibrium with given policies and the steady-state of Ramsey equilibrium
when all the tax rates,  kt , 
w
t and rt are optimally chosen by the government.
First, the long-run optimal capital tax is negative, i.e. -0.108. This result is di¤erent
from that in Domeij (2005). He shows that the optimal capital tax is zero in the
long run as in Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). However, this nding is consistent
with Judd (2002), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), and Chugh (2006), who suggest
that negative optimal capital tax rates should be used to indirectly a¤ect some types
of market frictions.85 In our case, the market frictions arise as the forward-looking
behavior of rms results in a higher marginal product of labour than the marginal
cost of labour. Therefore, the investment subsidy helps to correct the search frictions.
Due to the investment subsidy, the investment is boosted and this is transformed into
higher capital accumulation (i.e. from 15.746 to 21.907). The income, consumption
and welfare of capitalists increase as the negative capital boosts capital accumulation
and therefore brings them more capital income.
Second, the government increases the labour tax to make up for the tax revenue
losses from reducing capital tax (i.e. from 0.27 to 0.3). The steady-state wage rate as
the outcome of bargaining goes up due to higher labour productivity resulting from
higher capital accumulation and increase in labour tax (i.e. from 0.982 to 1.071). The
net wage rate is increased in Ramsey (i.e. from 0.717 to 0.750). This is because the in-
crease in gross wage outweighs the labour tax increase. The optimal replacement rate,
r, falls substantially in the long-run of Ramsey (i.e. from 0.500 to 0.009). Thus, unem-
ployment benets are much lower in Ramsey. The steady-state search-unemployment
is less than it would be in the model with exogenous tax rates (i.e. 0.024 versus 0.044)
as the net wage rate increases and unemployment benets decrease. The rms create
more job vacancies (i.e. from 0.306 to 0.595) since the positive e¤ect of higher labour
84The governments optimization in Ramsey problem is described in the Appendix 8.7.
85In these papers, a capital subsidy boosts output via encouraging capital accumulation, which is
ine¢ ciently low due to the presence of a monopolistic distortion.
147
productivity on prots outweighs the negative e¤ect of increased wage rate and there-
fore expected prots from a successful match are higher. The steady-state employment
increases since the probability at which unemployed workers can be matched with job
vacancies increases (i.e. from 2.657 to 5.006). This is benecial to the workers as
working can generate higher labour income and therefore the consumption and welfare
of workers increase.






 k 0.442 -0.108
w 0.270 0.300
 p 0.500 -0.108
r 0.500 0.009










3.7 Summary and concluding remarks
This chapter investigated the e¤ects of tax policy on unemployment, distribution of
income and the welfare of agents assuming household heterogeneity. The households
were divided into capitalists and workers. Only workers worked and only capitalists
had access to the asset market. The analysis was conducted in a search and match-
148
ing model. Unemployed workers sought potential job opportunities and rms opened
new job vacancies to employ the desired number of workers in the following period.
The wage rate was determined in a Nash bargaining between a pair of worker and
rm once they were matched through a Cobb-Douglas matching function. If the bar-
gaining was successful, the worker was employed by the rm in the following period
and the rm produced employing capital and labour. In this sense, employment was
pre-determined at any given period of time. The government taxed interest income
from physical capital, prots and labour income to nance its spending. The model
was calibrated to match the main characteristics of the UK economy, with particular
focuses on its labour market. In the tax reform experiments, we analysed the e¤ects
of capital tax cuts associated with concurrent labour tax increases. This allowed us to
examine the productivity-tax burden trade-o¤ and di¤erent impacts on heterogeneous
households. Finally, optimal tax policy of the government was examined. In this case,
the government chose all the tax rates in order to maximise the lifetime social wel-
fare and it had access to the commitment technology in the policy making. Our main
ndings are summarized as follows.
First, in a model with search and matching frictions, the tax reform considered is
Pareto improving in the long run although it increases inequality between agents. In
other words, all the agents are better o¤, despite higher welfare gains for the capitalists
compared to the workers. However, the capital tax cut met with the labour tax increase
hurts the workers and also worsens the aggregate welfare in the transition period. This
is because the positive e¤ects resulting from higher capital accumulation take time
to be realized. As a result, the combination of an initially lower net wage rate and
higher search-unemployment creates short-run losses for the workers and aggregate
economy, which are reversed in the long run. We also show that our results are robust
to variations in the relative bargaining power of workers in the Nash bargain. Increasing
the workersbargaining power makes the tax reform less e¢ cient in terms of welfare
improving.
Second, when we assume that unemployment benets depend on past wages, the
model can generate similar welfare results in both the long- and short-run although
the mechanism driving results is di¤erent. The tax reform is still Pareto improving in
the long run but generates higher welfare gains for all agents. Similar to the long run
results, the tax reform has higher welfare e¤ects for all agents in the transition period.
In other words, the lifetime welfare gains for capitalists are higher and welfare losses for
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workers are lower. As a result, the lifetime aggregate welfare improves. The wage rate
increases by more in the short run since the capital tax cuts have larger initial e¤ects
on boosting capital accumulation. In turn, the net wage increases in the transition
period. The unemployment benets depend on past wages and their path follows the
path of wage rate which causes the inertia in the increase in unemployment benets
over the transition. The welfare of workers is raised more quickly in the new, post-
reform economy. To summarise, the long- and short-run welfare gains of tax reforms
are higher for all agents by assuming unemployment benets depending on past wages.
Finally, we nd that the optimal tax policy under commitment implies a negative
optimal capital income tax in the long run which is accomplished by the labour tax
increase and unemployment benets reduction. The negative capital income tax helps
to correct the market frictions caused by the forward-looking behavior of rms. As
a result, the investment is boosted and this is transformed into higher capital accu-
mulation. The income, consumption and welfare of capitalists increase. The labour
income tax is increased and the unemployment benets are reduced to make up for the
tax revenue losses from capital income. The lower unemployment benets reduce the
search-unemployment of workers. The rms open more job vacancies resulting from
higher labour productivity. As a result, the probability at which job seekers can be
matched with job vacancies is increased. In turn, employment increases which is ben-
ecial to the workers. There are welfare gains for the workers and aggregate welfare
improves in the long run.
Our analysis makes clear that the tax reform of reducing capital tax and a concur-
rent labour tax increase can increase the welfare of all agents but with the sacrice
of inequality under di¤erent specications of unemployment benets. We further see
that, in the short run, the tax reform will hurt the agents who rely on labour income.
Thus, our analysis adds to the tax policy studies in the search-and-matching literature








3.A.1 Optimization of capitalists
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where 1t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the capitalists budget constraint.
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The FOC for Kkt+1 is:





3.A.2 Optimization of workers
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where 2t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the evolution equation of employment and 
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t
is the Lagrangian multiplier on the workers budget constraint.
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3.A.3 Optimization of rms
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where 4t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the evaluation of rms labour input.
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3.A.4 Derivation of rms expected prots
We rst rewrite the present value of the stream of rms prots in (116) starting from
time 1 by making use of two rst-order conditions of rms set out above, the prots
equation (88), the law of motion for the rms employment (114), and the properties

















































































































































































by making use of the condition
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Making use of the evolution equation of employment, Lf1 = q0v0 + (1  )Lf0 , we
can rewrite the nal expression above as follows:




























It states that, in equilibrium, the costs of posting a vacancy today should equalize
the discounted value of stream of prots brought about by each lled vacancy tomorrow.
This implies that the marginal cost of a vacancy is equal to the marginal benet of
lling it in the next period.
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3.A.5 Solution to Nash bargain
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where 1t refers to the Lagrangian multiplier from the capitalists problem; 
2
t and
3t refer to the Lagrangian multipliers from the workers problem; 
4
t refers to the















3.A.7 Ramsey approach to optimal taxation

















, and initial conditions for Kk0 , e0
and Lf0 as given.
86 We substitute out multipliers, 1t  4t , by making use of some DE
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Note that we consider the Ramsey problem starting from time 1 and assume that time
0 optimality conditions do not alter the results in equilibrium. This is because some
FOCs of the government at time 0 are di¤erent from the same rules governing behav-
86G
t
t is xed at 0.164 as in the case with policy given.
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ior from time 1 on. Specically, these include the FOCs of values appearing in the
forward-looking intertemporal constraints. The FOCs of the government should also
include the eight constraints to the Ramsey problem.87




The thesis is composed of three inter-related chapters studying the e¤ects of both
exogenous and optimal scal policy in heterogeneous agent models incorporating un-
employment. These include models of equilibrium unemployment, right-to-manage
union bargaining, and search and matching in three chapters, respectively. Households
in the thesis are distinguished by their di¤erent economic roles, namely capitalists and
workers. Specically, capitalists are assumed not to work and workers by assumption
cannot save in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. In Chapter 2 both capitalists and workers can
work and save, but they di¤er in their capital holdings. The heterogeneous agent setup
allows us to investigate the distributional e¤ects of policy, and to study inequality issue
which arises from the conict of interests between agents. In addition, the models in
three chapters incorporate di¤erent labour and product market failures. The analysis
undertaken informs us of the importance of market failures in scal policy studies.
Chapter 1 studied optimal taxation under commitment and its e¤ects on unem-
ployment, the distribution of income and the welfare of agents. Unemployment was
generated in perfectly competitive labour markets as the outcome of optimal choices
made by the workers. The workers did not save and the capitalists did not work in the
economy. Competitive rms produced by using a constant-returns-to-scale technology
by employing capital and labour. The equilibrium prots were zero. The government
taxed labour income and interest income from capital and prots. The government ex-
penditures included utility-enhancing public consumption and unemployment benets.
As a model extension, productive public investment was introduced in the modied
model. In this case, equilibrium prots were strictly positive. The relevance of model
prots in determining the optimal burden of taxes was also examined.
First, it is found that, in the model with zero prots, it is optimal for the government
to implement a zero tax rate on capital income in the long-run. The long-run optimal
replacement rate becomes negative. It is equivalent to a subsidy to labour supply of
workers, while the explicit tax rate on labour income increases. The optimal taxation
eliminates the labour wedge and labour supply increases in the long run. There are
welfare gains for all agents. It implies that the optimal taxation is Pareto-improving.
All these results hold when the government attaches di¤erent weights to welfare of
agents, so that there is no conict of interests between agents. Second, in the model
with prots as a result of the presence of productive public investment, it is optimal for
the government to subsidize capital income of capitalists and tax the leisure of workers
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in the long run. The long-run labour wedge cannot be eliminated. As a result, the
welfare of workers worsens despite welfare gains for the capitalists. Finally, the optimal
taxation has the redistributional e¤ects when the weight attached to the welfare of
capitalists in governments objective function exceeds a critical value, so that there is
a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity for the government.
Chapter 2 examined the relevance of distortions in labour and product markets in
determining the welfare e¤ects of capital tax cut associated with labour tax increase.
The households were distinguished by di¤erences in their capital holdings. The labour
market distortion appeared in a right-to-manage bargaining setup in which unions and
rms bargained over the wage rate with the aim of maximising a weighted average of
labour income and prots. In the monopolistically competitive product market, inter-
mediate goods producers earned non-zero economic prots due to their market power.
The nal goods producers, in contrast, were perfectly competitive. The government
taxed capital income, including interest on savings and prots, and labour income by
using two di¤erent tax rates to nance unemployment benets and non-employment
related public transfers.
We rst nd, in the model with labour market distortion only, a tax reform that
implements a zero capital tax results in welfare losses for the workers despite welfare
gains for the capitalists and the aggregate economy as well. The unemployment channel
is found to be the critical link that modies the results from the model without market
distortions. In particular, although the labour productivity and after-tax wage increase,
the workers cannot capture the full benet of this as unemployment also increases.
Second, in the model with product market distortion only, the tax reform leads to
welfare gains for the capitalists but welfare losses for the workers and the aggregate
economy. This happens because the government has to forego revenue from a non-
distortionary tax base comprised of prots. Hence, the required increase in labour tax
is larger and thus the net wage falls. However, when these two distortions are combined
in a realistic calibration to the current UK economy, employment increases and there
are welfare gains for all agents. These results imply that the tax reform becomes
Pareto improving. Consistent with the theory of second-best, the two distortions work
to correct the negative distributional e¤ects of a capital tax cut that each other, on its
own, creates.
Chapter 3 augmented a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model with a
Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching technology. The wage paid in any given
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job was determined via a Nash bargaining between a pairing of matched worker and
rm. The matching was of Cobb-Douglas form. The bargain was over the wage rate
to maximise a weighted average of workers and rms surpluses. If the bargaining was
successful, the worker was employed in the following period. Thus, employment, at
any given period of time, was predetermined. The capitalists did not work and the
workers did not save. The time endowment of workers was split into working, seeking
working opportunities and leisure. The rms, in each period, opened new job vacancies
and employed capital and labour to produce goods using a constant-returns-to-scale
technology. Finally, the government taxed capitalists and workers to nance the pub-
lic spending. Using this framework, the importance of search frictions in determining
the welfare and distributional e¤ects of tax reforms which re-allocated the tax burden
from capital to labour income was examined. In addition, the optimal policy under
commitment by assuming that the government optimally chose all the tax rates in the
economy was studied.
Using a realistic calibration to the UK economy, we nd that the tax reform is
Pareto improving but increases inequality in the long run, despite welfare losses for at
least one segment of the population over the transition. These results also hold when
the relative bargaining power of workers and the unemployment benet structure are
varied, respectively. However, the welfare gains will be higher for all agents as workers
bargaining power falls or when unemployment benets positively depend on past wages.
It is nally demonstrated that optimal policy under commitment implies a negative
capital tax in the long run which can help to correct the market frictions caused by
the forward-looking behavior of rms. Meanwhile, the government increases the labour
tax and reduces the unemployment benets in order to generate enough revenues to
nance public spending. As a result, the rms open more job vacancies and employment
increases as well. In this case, there are welfare gains for all agents in the long run.
This thesis contributes to the growing literature on the general equilibrium analysis
of scal policy. It makes clear that the structure of the economy, especially the distor-
tions in the markets, are important in determining not only the e¤ects of tax reforms
but also the choice of optimal policy. Therefore, the relevant market failures should
be taken into account in policy decision making. Each of the three chapters explains
a di¤erent channel through which the scal policy can impact on the allocation of
resources and therefore welfare of agents in the economy. The analysis is constructed
by assuming di¤erent labour and product failures. This thesis further analyses the
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distributional e¤ects of scal policy by assuming the household heterogeneity. House-
hold are grouped with regards to their working and saving propensities. We intend to
explore the redistributive potential of scal policy in the economy. The results show
that the tax reform considered is Pareto improving in the long run although it has
redistributional e¤ects in the transition period. Our studies suggest that all the agents
will benet from the capital tax cut which is accomplished by the labour tax increase
despite welfare losses for the agents relying on labour income in the transition period.
This result stands even if we assume di¤erent market distortions in the economy.
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Closing remarks
This thesis employed several models with di¤erent unemployment setups to study the
e¤ects of tax reforms and the determination of optimal taxation. Although the analysis
undertaken contributed to overcoming some of the theoretical gaps existing in the
literature, there are further areas where more research could be conducted. These are
summarised point by point as follows.
Chapters 2 and 3 investigated the welfare and distributional e¤ects of cutting capital
income tax. In the absence of public debt, the government needs to increase labour
income tax concurrently in order to retain a balanced budget in each period. This tax
reform assumption makes our analysis comparable with the optimal taxation literature
by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). In their studies, the government optimally chooses
the capital and labour income tax rates. However, given that the government has
two other balancing instruments in its budget constraint, i.e. government transfer
and unemployment benet, one interesting exercise in the future research could be
to reduce the unemployment benet to full the capital tax cut. Since the change
in unemployment benet would have a big e¤ect on the employment. In Chapter 2,
it represents the outside option for the union in the bargaining. If unemployment
benet is reduced by the government, the outside option for the union becomes less
attractive and therefore the relative bargaining power of the union is reduced. This
in turn generates a positive e¤ect on the employment. In Chapter 3, the reduction in
unemployment benet has a direct e¤ect on the search-unemployment of workers which
can be seen in the optimization problem of workers. Specically, search-unemployment
falls as unemployment benet is reduced.
In the future research, the expenditure tax can be introduced as the model exten-
sion. Instead of applying a tax based on the income earned, the expenditure tax is
levied based on the amount of spending of households. Its advantage is that the tax can
eliminate the adverse e¤ects of the income tax on the investment and saving incentives
of households. This new tax form is expected to bring many interesting ndings to
the models in terms of studies on the e¤ects of tax reforms and the determination of
optimal scal policy.
The agent heterogeneity setup in this thesis was only restricted to the di¤erent
working and saving abilities of agents. The heterogeneity in the labour markets was
ignored. In practice, many other types of agent heterogeneity can be considered in the
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future research. For example, the workers are assumed to have heterogeneous prefer-
ences towards working and leisure. This is reected by the di¤erent elasticity of labour
force participation rate in the utility function. This new assumption is particularly
useful for the analysis of welfare distribution within the working population. Another
extension is to introduce the skill heterogeneity of the working population. In partic-
ular, the workers are assumed to be able to provide either skilled labour or unskilled
labour to the rms. These two di¤erent labours can contribute to the production of
rms. But they are paid di¤erent wages. Therefore, the issue of wage premium can be
analysed in the research.
In Chapter 1, the government consumption acted as a perfect substitute for the
private consumption and it provided direct utility for the households. One alternative
specication of the utility function of households could be the imperfect substitutability
between private and government consumption. In other words, these two components
no longer have a linear relationship in the utility function. This in e¤ect could generate
some interesting results regarding the impacts of TFP and scal policy shocks, as the
government consumption is assumed to be the residual variable for the government to
ensure that the government budget constraint is balanced at any given period of time.
The change in any other exogenous variable will be fullled by the change in government
consumption. Di¤erent substitutabilities with private consumption create di¤erent
channels via which private consumption is crowed out in the post-shock economy. This
is crucial for the analysis of welfare of agents.
When the optimal policy was analysed in the thesis, the government was assumed
to only choose the tax rates. Another experiment would be to allow the government
to optimise the public expenditure alongside the tax instruments in its Ramsey setup.
We should expect the government to pick a di¤erent best policy which can yield the
highest aggregate welfare in the economy when more policy variables are allowed to
be optimally chosen. In turn, the new optimal policy implies a di¤erent equilibrium
allocation in the private sectors. One interesting thing to be looked at would be the
changes in the welfare of di¤erent agents compared to the previous Ramsey setup.
In Chapter 3, we studied both the long-run and transitional e¤ects of eliminating
capital income tax accompanied by a concurrent labour tax increase. We found that
the tax reform considered was Pareto-improving in the long-run but it hurt the agents
whose income reply on labour income in the short-run. However, the focus of Chapter
2 in this thesis was the study of welfare and distributional e¤ects of the tax reform
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in the long-run. We aimed to analyse the relevance and importance of labour and
product market distortions in the tax reform across four di¤erent models. It would be
interesting to investigate the transitional e¤ects on the welfare of agents as an extension
to Chapter 2. It is expected that the tax reform will hurt the workers in the short-run
as in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 1, the utility function of households exhibited constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) between capital and labour. The constant elasticity of substitution
was set to be 2 in the calibration. But we can consider other values for this parameter.
For example, if it approaches 1 in the case of unit elasticity of substitution, in the limit
we get the Cobb-Douglas utility function which is the special case of the CES utility
function. This in e¤ect will a¤ect the transitional path of labour supply in response to
the exogenous shocks. In this case, the substitution e¤ect resulting from a wage rate
change should get closer to the income e¤ect as the elasticity of substitution approaches
1. In turn, the dynamics of wage income and welfare of workers are a¤ected.
In this thesis, we assumed that the government could not distinguish between return
to capital stock and prots of rms so that both types of income were taxed at the same
rate. One interesting exercise to be tried is to release this assumption. In other words,
the government is assumed to be able to tax the return to capital stock separately
from the prots of rms. In this case, a new tax instrument of prot tax will be
introduced in the model. This new assumption is expected to deliver some new results
in terms of optimal policy study. Specically, the government would have the incentive
to conscate all the prots of rms, as the prot tax is non-distortionary. As a result,
the optimal tax rate on capital stock could become even smaller compared to the
previous ndings. It is because the government gains a great amount of tax revenue
from a non-distortionary tax base comprised of rm prots.
A nal possible extension could be to broaden the model to an open economy model.
A recent paper by Correia (2010) shows that the assumption of the open economy
is crucial for the analysis of distributional consequences of abolishing capital income
taxation. Thus, we can assume that the capitalists can invest in both domestic and
foreign assets markets when assessing the e¤ects of cutting capital income tax. This
would create another income resource for the capitalists and also more tax revenue for
the government. In this case, when the government reduces the capital income tax,
there could be higher addition to the labour income tax. Therefore, the tax reform
considered implies a larger e¤ect on the unemployment.
171
References
[1] Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (2009). The Economics of Growth, The MIT Press.
[2] Ahmed, S. (1986). Temporary and permanent government spending in an open
economy: some evidence for the UK, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 17,
pp. 197-224.
[3] Ai, C. and Cassou, S. (1995). A normative analysis of public capital, Applied
Economics, vol. 27, pp. 1201-1209.
[4] Ambler, S. and Paquet, A. (1996). Fiscal spending shocks, endogenous govern-
ment spending, and real business cycles, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, vol. 20, pp. 237-256.
[5] Andolfatto, D. (1996). Business cycles and labor-market search, American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 86, pp. 112-132.
[6] Angelopoulos, K., Malley, J. and Philippopoulos, A. (2011a). Time-consistent s-
cal policy under heterogeneity: Conicting or common interests?, CESifo Work-
ing Paper Series: 3444.
[7] Angelopoulos, K., Fernandez, B. and Malley, J. (2011b). The distributional con-
sequences of supply-side reforms in general equilibrium, CESifo Working Paper
Series: 3504.
[8] Ardagna, S. (2001). Fiscal policy composition, public debt, and economic activ-
ity, Public Choice, vol. 109, pp. 301-325.
[9] Ardagna, S. (2007). Fiscal policy in unionized labor markets, Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control, vol. 31, pp. 1498-1534.
[10] Arseneau, D. and Chugh, S. (2008). Optimal scal and monetary policy with
costly wage bargaining, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 55, pp. 1401-1414.
[11] Arseneau, D. and Chugh, S. (2009). Tax smoothing in frictional labor markets,
International Finance Discussion Papers: 2009-965.
172
[12] Aschauer, A. (1985). Fiscal policy and aggregate demand, American Economic
Review, vol. 75, pp. 117-127.
[13] Aschauer, A. (1989). Is public expenditure productive?, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 23, pp. 177-200.
[14] Aschauer, A. and Greenwood, J. (1985). Macroeconomic e¤ects of scal policy,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 23, pp. 91-138.
[15] Atkinson, A. and Stiglitz, J. (1980). Lectures on Public Economics, Mc-Graw
Hill, London.
[16] Baier, S. and Glomm, G. (2001). Long-run growth and welfare e¤ects of public
policies with distortionary taxation, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
vol. 25, pp. 2007-2042.
[17] Barro, J. (1981). Output e¤ects of government purchases, Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 89, pp. 1086-1121.
[18] Barro, J. (1989). The neoclassical approach to scal policy, Modern Business
Cycle Theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 178-235.
[19] Benabou, R. (1996). Heterogeneity, stratication, and growth: macroeconomic
implications of community structure and school nance, American Economic
Review, vol. 86, pp. 584-609.
[20] Benhabib, J. and Farmer, R. (1994). Indeterminacy and increasing returns,
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 63, pp. 19-41.
[21] Blanchard, O. and Diamond, P. (1989). The beveridge curve, Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, vol. 1, pp. 1-60.
[22] Blanchard, O. and Katz, L. (1999). Wage dynamics: reconciling theory and
evidence, American Economic Review, vol. 89, pp. 69-74.
[23] Blanchard, O. and Giavazzi, F. (2003). Macroeconomic e¤ects of regulation and
deregulation in goods and labor markets, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 118, pp. 879-907.
[24] Boone, J. and Bovenberg, L. (2002). Optimal labour taxation and search, Jour-
nal of Public Economics, vol. 85, pp. 53-97.
173
[25] Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M., and Fisher, J. (2003). Fiscal shocks and their
consequences, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 115, pp. 89-117.
[26] Chamley, C. (1986). Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium
with innite lives, Econometrica, vol. 54, pp. 607-622.
[27] Chari, V., Lawrence, C and Kehoe, P. (1994). Optimal scal policy in a business
cycle model, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, pp. 617-652.
[28] Chari, V. and Kehoe, P. (1999). Optimal scal and monetary policy, in J.B.
Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics. Elsevier 1(26), 1671-
1745.
[29] Chari, V., Kehoe, P. and McGrattan, E. (2002). Accounting for the great de-
pression, American Economic Review, vol. 92, pp. 22-27.
[30] Chari, V., Kehoe, P. and McGrattan, E. (2007a). Business cycle accounting,
Econometrica, vol. 75, pp. 781 836.
[31] Chari, V., Kehoe, P. and McGrattan, E. (2007b). Comparing alternative repre-
sentations and alternative methodologies in business cycle accounting, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Sta¤ Report 3
[32] Chéron, A. and Langot, F. (2010). On-the-job search equilibrium with endoge-
nous unemployment benets, Labour Economics, vol. 17, pp. 383-391.84.
[33] Chugh, S. (2006). Optimal scal and monetary policy with sticky wages and
sticky prices, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 9, pp. 683-714.
[34] Conesa, J., Kehoe, T. and Ruhl, K. (2007). Modeling great depressions: the
depression in Finland in the 1990s, Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Nov., pp. 16-44.
[35] Conesa, J., Kitao, S. and Krueger, D. (2009). Taxing capital? not a bad idea
after all!, American Economic Review, vol. 99, pp. 25-48.
[36] Correia, I. (2010). Taxation and globalization?, Bank of Portugal Working Paper
Series: 201020.
[37] Cooley, T. and Hansen, G. (1992). Tax distortions in a neoclassical monetary
economy, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 58, pp. 290-316.
174
[38] Daveri, F. and Ma¤ezzoli, M. (2001). A numerical approach to scal policy,
unemployment, and growth in Europe, Econometrics and Applied Economics
Working Paper, Istituto di Economia Politica, Bocconi University, No. 4.
[39] Dixit, A. and Stiglitz, J. (1977). Monopolistic competition and optimum product
diversity, American Economic Review, vol. 67, pp. 297-308.
[40] Domeij, D. and Heathcote, J. (2004). On the distributional e¤ects of reducing
capital taxes, International Economic Review, vol. 45, pp. 523-554.
[41] Domeij, D. (2005). Optimal capital taxation and labour market search, Review
of Economic Dynamics, vol. 8, pp. 623-650.
[42] Farber, H. (1986). The analysis of union behavior, NBER Working Papers Se-
ries: 1502.
[43] Finn, M. (1998). Cyclical e¤ects of governments employment and goods pur-
chases, International Economic Review, vol. 39, pp. 635-657.
[44] Gali, J., López-Salido, J. and Vallés, J. (2007). Understanding the e¤ects of
government spending on consumption, Journal of the European Economic As-
sociation, vol. 5, pp. 227-270.
[45] Galor, O. and Zeira, J. (1993). Income distribution and macroeconomics, Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 60, pp. 35-52.
[46] Garcia-Milà, T., Marcet, A. and Ventura, E. (2010). Supply side interventions
and redistribution, Economic Journal, vol. 120, pp. 105-130.
[47] Giannitsarou, C. (2006). Supply-side reforms and learning dynamics, Journal
of Monetary Economics, vol. 53, pp. 291-309.
[48] Guo, J. and Lansing, K (1999). Optimal taxation of capital income with Impe-
fectly competitive product markets, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
vol. 23, pp. 967-995.
[49] Hagedorn, M (2010). Ramsey tax cycles, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77,
pp. 1042-1077.
[50] Hall, R. and Milgrom, P. (2008). The limited inuence of unemployment on the
wage bargain, American Economic Review, vol. 98, pp. 16531674.
175
[51] Hansen, G. (1985). Indivisible labor and business cycles, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 16, pp. 309-327.
[52] Hosios, A. (1990). On the e¢ ciency of matching and related models of search
and unemployment, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 57, 279-298.
[53] Judd, K. (1985). Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model,
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 28, pp. 59-83.
[54] Judd, K. (1989). Optimal taxation in dynamic stochastic economies: theory and
evidence, manuscript, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
[55] Judd, K. (1997). The optimal tax on capital income is negative, NBERWorking
Paper, No. 6004.
[56] Judd, K. (1999). Optimal taxation and spending in general competitive growth
models, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 71, pp. 1-26.
[57] Judd, K. (2002). Capital income taxation with imperfect competition, American
Economic Review, vol. 92, pp. 417-421.
[58] Kass, L. and von Thadden, L. (2004). Budgetary policy and unemployment
dynamics in an OLG model with collective bargaining, Economic Journal, vol.
114, pp. 867-889.
[59] Klein, P. (2000). Using the generalized schur form to solve a multivariate linear
rational expectations model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol.
24, pp. 1405-1423.
[60] Klein, P. and Rios-Rull, J.-V. (2003). Time-consistent optimal scal policy,
International Economic Review, vol. 44, pp. 1217-1245.
[61] Klein, P., Krusell, P. and Ríos-Rull, J. (2008). Time-consistent public policy,
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 75, pp. 789-808.
[62] Kormendi, R. (1983). Government debt, government spending, and private sector
behavior, American Economics Review, vol. 73, pp. 994-1010.
[63] Koskela, E. and von Thadden, L. (2008). Optimal factor taxation under wage
bargaining: a dynamic perspective, German Economic Review, vol. 9, pp. 135-
159.
176
[64] Krusell, P. (2002). Time-consistent redistribution, European Economic Review,
vol. 46, pp. 755-769.
[65] Krusell, P., Mukoyama, T. and Sahin, A. (2010). Labour-market matching with
precautionary savings and aggregate uctuations, Review of Economic Studies,
vol. 77, pp. 1477-1507.
[66] Lansing, K. (1998). Optimal scal policy in a business cycle model with public
capital, Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 31, pp. 337-364.
[67] Lansing, K. (1999). Optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical
growth model, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 73, pp. 423-453.
[68] Leith, C. and Malley, J. (2005). Estimated general equilibrium models for the
evaluation of monetary policy in the US and Europe, European Economic Re-
view, vol. 49, pp. 21372159.
[69] Ljungqvist, L. and Sargent, T. (2006). Do taxes explain European employment?
Indivisible labor, human capital, lotteries, and savings, NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, vol. 21, pp. 181-246.
[70] Lucas, R. (1990). Supply-side economics: an analytical review, Oxford Economic
Papers, vol. 42, pp. 293-316.
[71] Ma¤ezzoli, M. (2001). Non-walrasian labor markets and real business cycles,
Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 4, pp. 860-892.
[72] Malley, J., Philippopoulos, A. and Woitek, U. (2009) To react or not? Technol-
ogy shocks, scal policy and welfare in the EU-3. European Economic Review,
vol. 53, pp. 689-714.
[73] Martinez-Mongay, C. (2000). ECFINs e¤ective tax rates, properties and com-
parisons with other tax indicators, European Economy - Economic Papers Series:
146.
[74] McGrattan, E. (1994). The macroeconomic e¤ects of distortionary taxation,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 33, pp. 573-601.
[75] Mirrlees, J., Adam, S. , Besley, T., Blundell, R., Bond, S., Chote, R., Gammie,
M., Johnson, P., Myles, G. and Poterba, J. (eds) (2010). Dimensions of Tax
Design: the Mirrlees Review, Oxford University Press.
177
[76] Mirrlees, J., Adam, S. , Besley, T., Blundell, R., Bond, S., Chote, R., Gammie,
M., Johnson, P., Myles, G. and Poterba, J. (2011). Tax by Design: the Mirrlees
Review, Oxford University Press.
[77] Merz, M. (1995). Search in the labor market and the real business cycle, Journal
of Monetary Economics, vol. 36, pp. 269-300.
[78] Mortensen, D. (1982). Property rights and e¢ ciency in matching, racing, and
related games, American Economic Review, vol. 72, pp. 968-979.
[79] Mortensen, D. and Pissarides, C. (1994). Job creation and job destruction in the
theory of unemployment, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 61, pp. 397-415.
[80] Mortensen, D. andWright, R. (2002) Competitive pricing and e¢ ciency in search
equilibrium, International Economics Review, vol. 43, pp. 1-20.
[81] Munnell, A. (1990). Why has productivity growth declined? productivity and
public investment, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, New England Economic
Review, January/February, 3-22.
[82] Nickell, S. and Andrews, D. (1983). Unions, real wages, and employment in
Britain 1951-79, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 35, pp. 183-206.
[83] Nickell, S. and Nunziata, L. (2001). Labour Market Institutions Database.
[84] OECD (2004). Wage-setting institutions and outcomes, Employment Outlook,
Chapter 3, pp. 127-181.
[85] Ohanian, L. (1997). The macroeconomic e¤ects of war nance in the United
States: World War II and the Korean War, American Economic Review, vol.
871, pp. 23-40.
[86] Pissarides, C. (1986). Vacancies and unemployment in Britain, Economic Policy,
vol. 3, pp. 499-559.
[87] Pissarides, C. (1998). The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and
wages; the role of unemployment benets and tax structure, European Economic
Review, vol. 42, pp. 155-183.
[88] Pissarides, C. (2001). Equilibrium unemployment theory, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
178
[89] Pissarides, C. (2006). Unemployment in Britain: a European success story, in:
Werding, Martin, (ed.) Structural unemployment in Western Europe: reasons
and remedies, CESifo seminar series, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 209-236.
[90] Pissarides, C. (2009). The unemployment volatility puzzle: is wage stickiness
the answer?, Econometrica, vol. 77, pp. 1339-1369.
[91] Prescott, E. (2002). Prosperity and depression, American Economic Review,
vol. 92, pp. 1-15.
[92] Prescott, E. (2004). Why do Americans work so much more than Europeans?,
Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue July, pp. 2-13.
[93] Rogerson, R. (1988). Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium, Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 21, pp. 3-16.
[94] Rogerson, R., Shimer, R. and Wright, R. (2005). Search-theoretic models of the
labor market: a survey, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 43, pp. 959-988.
[95] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (2006). Optimal scal and monetary policy
in a medium-scale macroeconomic model, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005,
vol. 20, MIT Press.
[96] Schweitzer, M. and Tinsley, D. (2004), The UK labour force participation rate:
business cycle and trend inuences, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 44,
pp. 329.
[97] Shi, S. and Wen, Q. (1997). Labour market search and capital accumulation:
some analytical results, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 21,
pp. 1747-1776.
[98] Shi, S. and Wen, Q. (1999). Labour market search and dynamic e¤ects of taxes
and subsidies, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 43, pp. 457-495.
[99] Shimer, R. (2005). The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and va-
cancies, American Economic Review, vol. 95, pp. 2549.
[100] Shimer, R. (2009). Convergence in Macroeconomics: the labor wedge, American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 1, pp. 280-297.
[101] Yashiv, E. (2007). Labor search and matching in macroeconomics, European
Economic Review, vol. 51, pp. 1859-1895.
179
